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Abstract
The key research questions of this dissertation are: ‘How do domestic actors 
construct Europe?’ and ‘How do they utilise it in seeking to empower themselves 
against other actors?’ The questions of construction and utilisation of Europe are 
some of the most topical questions in Europeanization. The first question addresses 
constructivist/sociological concerns. The second addresses the issue of winners and 
losers (differential empowerment). Both are key issues in the literature of 
Europeanization and yet have been little addressed in the context of post-communist 
EU accession countries. This dissertation aims to bridge this gap by focusing on the 
post-communist country of Romania, a soon to be EU member-State. The actors 
under investigation are civil society, which emerged in Romania for the first time 
ever after 1989 and the central government Executive. The study covers the period 
during which the EU acquis negotiations were negotiated under the Social 
Democratic government led by Prime Minister Adrian Nastase (2000-2004). The 
data was gathered through in-depth case study and process-tracing, the methods 
found best able to disentangle a complex causal nexus.
The Europeanization literature is contradictory with regard to which domestic actors 
are constrained and which empowered: some scholars theorise that it empowers civil 
society (Diffusion); others that it empowers the Executive (Executive 
Empowerment); still others that it promotes co-operation between them (Network 
Governance). The empirical evidence so far has been inconclusive. This dissertation 
shows that only a small elite made of civil society entrepreneurs and government 
Executives constructed and utilised Europe in the pre-membership phase, to 
empower themselves relative to other actors, particularly opponents. The empirical 
data support two of the classical Europeanization theses in the literature: the 
Diffusion and the Executive Empowerment Theses. The Diffusion Thesis better 
explains civil society empowerment near the beginning and at the peak of acquis 
negotiations, although some evidence also favours Executive Empowerment. This 
latter thesis better explains the powerlessness of civil society at the close of 
negotiations, although some evidence for Diffusion was also found. No evidence was 
found supporting Network Governance. Instead evidence was found in favour of its 
critics, namely support for the claim that the EU (or Europe) empowers an elite in 
both civil society and the State.
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2
Chapter 1: The Europeanization of domestic politics: bottom-up and
actor-centred
This dissertation endeavours to understand how Europe has affected the domestic 
politics of the accession country of Romania. The research questions are, ‘How do 
domestic actors construct Europe?’ and ‘How do they utilise it in seeking to 
empower themselves over other actors, particularly opponents?’ These questions will 
be explored through in-depth case studies drawn from the accession country of 
Romania, and by way of process-tracing, the method found best able to disentangle a 
complex nexus of causes and effects interacting over time.
Addressing these questions will make an original contribution to the field of 
Europeanization, which is concerned with studying the impact of European 
integration on domestic governance processes and structures.1 Despite an explosion 
of research into this field in recent years, the outcomes of Europeanization and the 
processes that constitute it remain empirically underexplored. This is true all the 
more of the Europeanization of domestic politics in the accession countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) , henceforward referred to as East 
Europeanization.
Several themes drawn from the Europeanization literature for their relevance to these 
questions are reviewed below, in particular: the top-down vs. the bottom-up 
approach; the ‘differential empowerment’ of domestic actors through Europe; and 
the Europeanization of State-civil society relations. The last section details the design 
of this dissertation, and outlines the contents of the thesis.
1 Simon, Hix and Klaus H. Goetz, ‘Introduction: European Integration and National Political Systems’ in Klaus 
H. Goetz and Simon Hix (eds.), Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems 
(London: Frank Cass, 2001).
2 See for example Kenneth Dyson and Klaus H. Goetz, ‘Europeanization Compared: The Shrinking Core and the 
Decline o f  “Soft’ Power’” in Kenneth Dyson and Klaus H. Goetz (ed.) Germany, Europe and the Politics o f  
Constraint, Proceedings o f The British Academy, 199 (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 373.
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1.1 The top-down approach
This section provides an overview of the ‘top-down’ Europeanization paradigm, the 
dominant approach to date. Its limitations will be highlighted, especially: the 
difficulty of establishing causality as opposed to mere correlation; the excessive 
focus on ‘the EU’ at the expense of the domestic arena; and the fogginess of a 
theorisation that overemphasises institutions and marginalises actors and agency, as 
opposed to making both part of the explanation.
The ‘top-down’ approach purports to explain the impact of the EU on the domestic 
arena as being the causal effect of EU ‘mechanisms’. This approach commits the 
researcher to a view of the EU as key or intervening ‘independent variable’; as an 
external ‘agent’ or ‘force’ which causes determinate effects in member-States, the 
‘dependent variable’; as a ‘superior legislator’ pressurising ‘inferiors’ to adapt; or 
even as a ‘menu’ of institutional and policy templates to be ‘downloaded’. For 
Europeanization to occur in the way assumed in this paradigm, two ‘necessary’ 
conditions must be in place first: ‘misfit’ and ‘adaptational pressure’.4 ‘Misfit’ 
denotes some incompatibility between EU and domestic policy or institutions, which 
is supposed to create a pressure to adapt from the top down, to which ‘the domestic 
level’ responds, thus becoming Europeanized.5 From ‘measuring’ the ‘value’ of the 
misfit and/or the adaptational pressure (high, medium, low), one is supposed to 
predict the ‘degree’ to which a policy area or a country will be Europeanized.6
3 E.g., Kenneth Dyson and Klaus H. Goetz, ‘Living with Europe: Power, Constraint, and Contestation’ in Dyson 
and Goetz, Germany, Europe.
4 Tanja A. Borzel and Thomas Risse, ‘Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact o f Europe4 in Kevin Featherstone 
and Claudio M. Radaelli (ed.) The Politics o f  Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) pp. 60- 
61.
5 BOrzel and Risse, Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact; Claudio M. Radaelli, ‘The Europeanization o f Public 
Policy’ in Featherstone and Radaelli, The Politics.
6 Radaelli, The Europeanization o f  Public Policy.
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Europeanization mechanisms have been classified as ‘hard’ (‘vertical’), operating 
through pressure or coercion, or ‘soft’ (‘horizontal’), operating through 
‘socialisation’ and ‘social learning’.7 This typology reflects rational-choice 
institutionalism, informed by the ‘logic of consequentialism’, and sociological
o
institutionalism, informed by the ‘logic of appropriatedness’. These purport to 
predict Europeanization effects and the conditions under which they occur with the 
certainty of a logic similar to natural science models.9 The consequentialist logic 
predicts changes in the ‘domestic opportunity structure’ that empower or 
disempower domestic actors.10 The logic of appropriatedness predicts changes in 
informal institutions, viz. norms, values, expectations, ‘ways of doing things’, 
‘collective understandings’, and identities at the domestic level.11 These two types of 
mechanisms will be further detailed below, in the third section, where they become 
relevant to the discussion about differential empowerment (the key research question 
addressed by this dissertation).
In recent years, the dominance of the top-down paradigm has been questioned. One 
of the major criticisms has been its heavy reliance on dependent-independent 
variable design. This assumes a linear relationship that neglects the complexity of 
Europeanization phenomena, which entangle the EU with national and sub-national
19actors, structures and processes. This assumption of linearity often fails to isolate 
the EU from other causes which might produce the same effect on their own; e.g.
7 Ibid.
8 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics o f International Political Orders’, 
International Organization (1998), vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 943-69.
9 Borzel and Risse, Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact', Jeffrey Checkel, ‘Constructing European institutions’ 
in Mark Aspinwall and Gerald Schneider The rules o f  integration (Manchester, Manchester University Press,
2001); Jeffrey Checkel, ‘"Going Native" In Europe?: Theorizing Social Interaction in European Institutions’, 
Comparative Political Studies (2003) vol. 36, no. (1/2), pp. 209-231.
10 Borzel and Risse, Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact, p. 58; Kevin Featherstone, “Introduction: In the Name 
o f ‘Europe’” in Featherstone and Radaelli, The Politics, pp. 9, 15; Radaelli, The Europeanization o f  Public P o lic \
11 Borzel and Risse, Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact, pp. 65- 6.
12 Featherstone, Introduction', Johan P. Olsen, The Many Faces o f Europeanization, Journal o f  Common Market 
Studies (2002), vol. 40, no. 5, pp. 921-952(32).
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1globalisation, new public management. ‘Top-down’ scholars sometimes assume 
causality on the basis of temporal consistency between an EU policy and domestic 
effects, when in fact, the ‘causality’ may be mere correlation.14 The habit of 
conceiving Europeanization in terms of causal effects has meant that researchers, 
knowing what they are looking for before going into the field, often only see what 
supports their views.
Key concepts of the top-down model, such as ‘misfit’ and ‘adaptational pressure’, 
have been found to predict poorly how either polities or policies will adapt to the 
EU.15 Europeanization has been detected in the absence of any (discemable) misfit or 
adaptational pressure.16 Notions such as misfit may add value to theory in the study 
of the Europeanization of laws and policies, where ‘hard’ evidence like policy 
documents are available for comparison; but the notion becomes much airier when
1 7one speaks of norms, values, and systems of beliefs. As regards the differential 
empowerment of domestic actors, studies have shown that one cannot assume a 
correlation between an abstraction like ‘misfit’ (even where it can be defined) and
1 fithe response of domestic actors. Misfit might be ‘a good starting point’, but 
Europeanization cannot be fully understood if  ‘the effects on actors [are not] 
considered’.19 In addition, the critics of ‘misfit’ and ‘adaptational pressure’ charge 
that they have no objective existence, but are matters of human interpretation and
13 Featherstone, Introduction, p. 4; Klaus H. Goetz, ‘European integration and national executives: a cause in 
search o f an effect’ in Goetz and Hix, Europeanised Politics?
14 Kevin Featherstone, The Political dynamics o f  external empowerment: the emergence o f  EMU and the 
challenge to the European social model 2001, p. 13. 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/europeanInstitute/articles/featherstonel.pdf
15 Antoaneta Dimitrova and Mark Rhinard, ‘The power o f norms in the transposition o f EU directives’, European 
Integration online Papers (2005), vol. 9, no. 16, p. 7, < http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2005-016a.htm> .
16 Hix and Goetz, Introduction, p. 9; Sophie Jacquot and Cornelia Woll, ‘Utilisation o f European Integration-  
Europeanisation from a Sociological Perspective’, European Integration online Papers (2003), vol. 7 
http://econpapers.repec.org/article/erpeiopxx/p0104.htm: Radaelli, The Europeanization o f  Public Policy
17 Radaelli, The Europeanization o f  Public Policy.
18 Mark Thatcher, ‘Winners and Losers in Europeanisation: Reforming the National Regulation of 
Telecommunications’ West European Politics (2004), vol. 27, no. 2 pp. 284 -  309, (p. 304).
19 Ibid.
construction.20 Thus, they are difficult to ‘operationalise’ for purposes of empirical
•y 1
method. Furthermore, they are not easily applied to the study of domestic 
institutions ‘in crisis’ or institutions that are being built from scratch -  as in often the
99case with institutions in the CEE accession countries) -  where there is nothing on 
the ground that can be compared with an EU institution.
Theoretically, these top-down mechanisms have been couched in the terms of the 
new institutionalist paradigm. They overpredict behaviour based on the alleged 
constraining and constitutive determinism of institutions. Even actors’ most basic 
characteristics {e.g. identity) are subjected to reductionist determinisms to the neglect
9 - 3
of investigating their actual preferences, beliefs and ideas, culture and ideology. 
They neglect the fact that actors do not only follow institutional rules, they also 
create, destroy and modify them. Rational choice institutionalist approaches have so 
far dominated the literature, even though their logic is not incompatible with that of 
constructivism/sociological institutionalism.24 The latter, with its amalgamation of 
approaches and assumptions, and its focus on intangible actor characteristics, has 
been much less theorised or studied empirically, as it presents researchers with
9 Sserious operationalisation problems. In the last few years the two perspectives been 
employed in tandem in the context of European studies with the aim of establishing 
which of the two institutionalisms has more explanatory power. The results have
20 Dyson and Goetz, Europeanization Compared, p. 373.
21 Dimitrova and Rhinard, 2005.
22 Radaelli, The Europeanization o f  Public Policy.
23 For a similar critique see Jacquot and Woll, 2003; Ulrika MOrth, ‘Europeanization as Interpretation,
Translation, and Editing o f Public Policies’ in Featherstone and Radaelli, The Politics.
24 James, G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘Elaborating the “New Institutionalism’” , ARENA Working Paper (March 
2005), no. 11, <http://www.arena.uio.no> (accessed 3 June 2006), p. 3.
25 Dimitrova and Rhinard, 2005; Featherstone, ‘The political dynamics o f  external empowerment: the emergence 
o f EMU and the challenge to the European social model’, in Andrew Martin and George Ross (ed.) Euros and 
Europeans: monetary integration and the European model o f  society (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), p. 228.
remained inconclusive so far.26 This dissertation draws on insights from both
97frameworks, but these are regarded as complementary rather then competitive. 
They are expected to explain different pieces of the puzzles encountered in the case 
studies.
The ‘top-down’ approach, with all its faults, has been exported to the study of 
Eastern Europe. The scope for top-down Europeanization here has been assumed to 
be much larger than in the old EU member-States, because of the highly
7 gasymmetrical power relations between the EU and the candidates. EU accession 
conditionality has been assumed to be the key top-down Europeanization 
mechanism, which, combined with the significant misfit of the Communist legacy, 
would generate strong adaptational pressure that would transform every aspect of
90CEE governance. Accession fever was so strong that Europeanization sometimes
'iA
happened through mere ‘passive leverage’; the EU needed to do little -  its sheer 
attractiveness caused the CEE countries to Europeanize by anticipation.31 Once 
negotiations began, the Commission found itself enabled to influence governance in 
these countries, even where formal EU rules were lacking, with only guidelines,
9^recommendations and ‘informal pressures’ (a.k.a. ‘informal conditionality’). 
Having no room to bargain over either the accession conditions or their evolution,
26 Jeffrey Checkel and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘A constructivist research programme in EU Studies?’ European 
Union Politics (2001), vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 219-248; see also special issue o f Comparative Politics February-March 
2003.
27 For a similar approach see Wade Jacoby, The Enlargement o f  the European Union and NATO: Ordering from  
the Menu in Central Europe. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 196.
28 Featherstone, Introduction, p. 19.
29 Heather Grabbe, ‘How does Europeanization affect CEE governance? Conditionality, diffusion and diversity’, 
Journal o f  European Public Policy (2001), vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 1013-1031; Heather Grabbe, ‘Europeanization Goes 
East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process’ in Featherstone and Radaelli, The Politics, pp. 3 1 4 -5 ;  
Barbara Lippert, Gaby Umbach, Wolfgang Wessels, ‘Europeanization o f CEE executives: EU membership 
negotiations as a shaping power’, Journal o f  European Public Policy (2001), vol. 8, no. 6 pp. 980 -  1012.
30 Anna Milada Vachudova, Europe undivided: democracy, leverage, and integration after communism (Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
31 Grabbe 2001; Lippert, Umbach et al., 2001.
32 Grabbe, Europeanization Goes East, p. 309; James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse, and Claire Gordon 
Europeanization and regionalization in the EU's enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: the myth o f  
conditionality (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
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except for temporality (transition periods), the candidates merely downloaded ready­
made EU models.33 Their transformation was further facilitated by the fact that they
were required to harmonise quickly with an EU much more integrated than it had 
%
ever been before, in any of the previous enlargements;34 and by the fact that their 
political elites, keen to abandon illegitimate Communist-era institutions, emulated 
EU institutions in order to ‘prove themselves ... worthy member states’.35
As more empirical evidence accrued, the dominance of the top-down approach to 
East Europeanization began to be questioned. The net impact of EU conditionality 
appeared limited if one expected to see it everywhere, looking ‘across the board’ -  
over all policy domains in all the countries of CEE. On the contrary, conditionality 
seemed to have rather a ‘differential’ effect, depending on the country and the policy 
area; in some cases the influence was strong, in others it was non-existent.36 Above 
all, conditionality had a short time horizon. The EU’s leverage, whether active or 
passive, formal or informal, seemed to lose traction as soon as the candidate became 
assured of accession. This having happened, domestic preferences were observed to
ip
‘strongly re-assert[ed] themselves’.
By 2003-2004 it had become clear that the widespread expectations of the EU’s 
transforming the CEE countries were not being confirmed by the reality on the 
ground. Research on CEE Executives, for example, revealed some evidence of
33 Grabbe, Europeanization Goes East, pp. 312 - 3.
34 Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova, ‘National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement’, East 
European Politics and Societies (2003), vol. 17, no.l, pp. 42-57.
35 Grabbe, Europeanization Goes East, pp. 312 - 3.
36 Antoaneta L. Dimitrova, ‘Enlargement-driven Change and Post-Communist Transformations: A New  
Perspective’ in Antoaneta L. Dimitrova Driven to Change: The European Union's Enlargement Viewed from the 
East (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004); Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004). 
‘Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries o f Central and Eastern Europe’, 
Journal o f  European Public Policy, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 661-679.
37 Vaduchova, 2005.
38 Klaus H Goetz, ‘The New Member States and the EU: The Challenge o f  Adapting to Europe1 in Simon Bulmer 
and Christian Lequesne Member States o f  the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 494.
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Europeanization effects in the form of the emergence of Core Executives and the
'XQdevelopment of administrative capacity. These effects, however, were found to be 
strictly confined to a few ‘enclaves’ of top-level ministerial bureaucracy.40 Scholars 
found it problematic to attribute to the EU even observed effects which the EU 
specifically aimed for with programmes designed to Europeanize administrative 
capacity in CEE. In the case of the Twinning Programme, for example, any putative 
Europeanization effects were deflected by the large number of domestic variables 
supervening and interacting with them; viz., the public administrative tradition of the 
EU twinning experts; the personalities and professional skills of those involved on 
both sides of the programme; the domestic actors’ perceptions of the aims of 
twinning and of the EU experts; the degree of existing bureaucratisation and 
administrative politicisation; the degree of domestic institutional stability; and 
language and culture 41 Such evidence indicated not only the difficulty of tracing the 
effects of putative EU mechanisms, but also the many domestic factors that lay 
beyond the reach of accession conditionality 42
Conditionality did not produce clearly identifiable effects, and this came to be 
attributed partly to the fact that it left room for re-interpretation by the accession 
countries -  particularly so where the EU acquis was ‘thin’. The Commission’s ‘fuzzy 
commands’ were too often turned against the goals of the EU in favour of domestic 
agendas. EU conditionality proved not a linear cause but a ‘tool bag of differentiated 
and shifting instruments including prescriptive norms, institutional formats and 
preferences’, which domestic actors interpreted and deployed to serve their own
39 Klaus H. Goetz, ‘Making sense o f post-Communist central administration: modernization, Europeanization or 
LatinizationT, Journal o f  European Public Policy (200\) vol. 8, no. 6, 2001, pp. 1032- 1051 (p.1038).
40 Ibid.
41 Dimitris Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, ‘Europeanisation, Conditionality and Domestic Change: the 
Twinning exercise and administrative reform in Romania’, Journal o f  Common Market Studies (2004), vol. 42, 
no. 3. pp. 619-39.
42 Grabbe, Europeanization goes East; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2003.
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purposes.43 This called for research that would treat conditionality as a ‘process’ 
characterised by ‘the interaction between multi-level actors, perceptions, interests 
different rewards and sanctions, temporal factors, [and] institutional and policy 
compliance’.44 More attention needed to be paid to domestic actors and institutions 
and how they made use of conditionality ‘from the bottom up’ 45 It was at this 
juncture in the development of the . East Europeanization literature that the present 
research was taken up.
1.2 The bottom-up approach
Although the term ‘bottom-up’ has been loosely employed for some time,46 only 
recently has it been singled out as a distinct approach to Europeanization research.47 
Bottom-up Europeanization is not a theory but a research design -
that ... start[s] from the analysis of the system of interaction (actors, 
resources, problems, style, and collective problem-solving rules) at the 
domestic level and ... raise[s] the question whether the EU affects this 
system of interaction and if so in what way (as a resource, as a 
reformulation of the problem, as a new set of collective problem-solving 
rules, as a constraint on what is feasible, as an alteration to the
A O
opportunity structure, as a new frame of reference, etc.).
As a research design bottom-up differs from top-down in the way it conceptualises
Europeanization as well as in its research focus. The EU is no longer considered the
independent variable but only as an ‘element in domestic political manoeuvres and in
legitimising domestic reforms’;49 or as an ‘arena’ where complex processes of
‘conflict’, ‘bargaining’ and ‘learning’ between the EU and domestic actors take
43 Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon, p.3.
44 Ibid.
45 Goetz, The New Member States, pp. 480; Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon, p. 174.
46 e.g. Marco Giuliani, ‘Europeanization in Italy: A Bottom-up Process? in Kevin Featherstone and George 
Kazamias (ed.) Europeanization and the Southern Periphery (Routledge, 2001).
47 Dyson and Goetz, Living with Europe, p. 13.
48 Claudio M Radaelli and Fabio Franchino ‘Analysing Political Change in Italy \  Journal o f  European Public 
Policy (2004), vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 941-53 (p. 948).
49 Dyson and Goetz, Living with Europe, p. 13.
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place.50 Europeanization is conceived not as a linear independent-dependent variable 
mechanism, but as ‘an ecology of mutual adaptation’ where institutions, actors and 
processes ‘co-evolve’ and ‘interact’ with each other.51 This ecology takes into 
account feedback and evolution over time. Bottom-up approaches focus more on 
domestic actors and their expectations, values and beliefs; on how they ‘use’ 
Europe; on domestic political conflicts; and on domestic institutions; these have all 
been neglected by the top-down perspective.54
The key question is not whether but how Europeanization happens. The question of 
‘how’ might seem narrow in scope compared to the aspirations of political science 
for natural law-like generalisations.55 However, given the many causality problems 
entailed by the top-down approach, the necessity for case study research to establish 
causation by tracing how domestic actors utilise the EU has been recently 
recognised.56 Empirical evidence so far has been scarce for such propositions as that 
domestic actors deploy a ‘clear strategy to gain empowerment’ from the EU, e.g. by 
using it ‘to provide a justificatory discourse for domestic reform’.57 Without such a 
linkage between the EU and domestic actors’ own ‘interests, strategies and
co #
resources’, correlation is easily mistaken for causation, and theoretical conjectures 
about EU impact risk remaining unsubstantiated.59 But even tracing how actors use 
the EU might not be enough to establish causation; Europeanization is so elusive that
50 Klaus, H. Goetz, Four worlds o f  Europeanisation, Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions o f Workshops. 
Turin, Italy, 22-7 March 2002, p.4
51 Featherstone, Introduction, p. 4.
52 One o f  the few East Europeanization studies that has paid attention to temporality is Hughes, Sasse and 
Gordon, 2004; see also Radaelli, The Europeanization o f  Public Policy, p. 34,
53 What the literature calls ‘usage’ I shall label ‘utilisation’ in this dissertation; ‘usage’ connotes habit or custom, 
whereas the term ought to reflect rational choice theory, which is founded on utility.
54 Dyson and Goetz, p. 13; Jacquot and Woll, 2003; Radaelli and Franchino, 2004.
55 Alan S. Zuckerman, ‘Reformulating Explanatory Standards and Advancing Theory in Comparative Politics’ in 
Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure', 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
56 Featherstone, The political dynamics, 2004, p. 226; Jacquot and Woll, 2003.
57 Featherstone, The political dynamics, 2001, p. 13.
58 Thatcher, p.286.
59 Featherstone, The political dynamics, 2001, p. 13.
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alternative explanations, especially those centred on domestic variables, must always 
be considered.60
The bottom-up approach at least meets these concerns halfway, as being more 
‘empirically grounded’, more open to empirical data springing from unforeseeable 
sources which unexpectedly provide evidence for or against particular explanatory 
variables.61 In this sense the bottom-up approach is capable of combining the 
exploratory with the explanatory. The top-down method, by contrast, searches for 
just that evidence (and no other) which would verify a hypothesis formulated a priori 
with one dependent and one independent variable. By slipping this straightjacket, the 
bottom-up approach increases the likelihood, too, that one will be open to a wider 
range of effects -  whether ‘cognitive’ or ‘material’; ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’; ‘intended’ 
or ‘unintended’.63
Theoretically, bottom-up research has been carried out from both rational choice and 
constructivist perspectives, and sometimes both at once. The rational-choice research 
has focused more on how domestic actors incorporate the EU into their domestic 
strategies; how they utilise the EU as a material or cognitive resource to empower 
themselves; and how these utilisations affect domestic power relations.64 Typologies 
of EU resources and of their utilisation have been identified; resources may be 
‘material’ (e.g. EU organs, directives, funding) and ‘immaterial’ (e.g. ‘discursive 
references’ and ‘ideas’).65 Strategic utilisation is possible because the EU leaves
60 Featherstone, The political dynamics, 2001, p. 13; see also Hughes, Sasse and Gordon, 2004.
61 Klaus H Goetz, Does One Concept Fit All? The Regional Patterning o f  Europeanisation, Paper presented at the 
UCL Europeanization workshop, London, June 2003.
62 Kenneth Dyson, ‘Economic Policies: From pace-Setter to Beleaguered Player’ in Dyson and Goetz, Germany, 
Europe, p. 208.
63 Jenny Fairbrass, The Europeanisation o f  Interest Representation: UK Business and Environmental Interests 
Compared, Paper prepared for the conference, ‘Britain in Europe and Europe in Britain: The Europeanisation o f 
British Politics?’ Sheffield Town Hall, 16 July 2004, p. 5.
64 Featherstone, Introduction, p. 16; Featherstone, The political dynamics, 2001, pp. 12-13; Thatcher, 2004.
65 Jacquot and Woll, 2003.
room for the ‘political discretion of national actors in translating] European 
requirements’.66 From the bottom-up perspective of domestic actors on the ground, a 
top-down ‘pressure’ may constitute an opportunity they can turn to their advantage
fn(utilise). For example, certain domestic actors (typically technocrats) have utilised 
the Economic and Monetary Union as a ‘vincolo esterno’ (external bind): they let 
themselves be ‘bound by EU constraints in order to obtain otherwise elusive reform
/o
at home and gain strategic advantage over their rivals’.
Utilisations of EU resources may thus be ‘strategic’, but they may also be ‘cognitive’ 
and ‘legitimising’ at the same time.69 EU resources are utilised strategically when 
actors import them into the domestic arena to achieve a goal not otherwise possible; 
they are utilised cognitively when actors introduce ideas and discourses not available 
at the domestic level; they are utilised legitimisingly when actors refer to the EU in 
their discourses with the aim of legitimising their acts at the domestic level. 
Legitimising utilisation includes strategic and cognitive utilisations as well, just as 
cognitive utilisation includes strategic motivation; while strategic utilisation is the 
most common of all and can stand alone. Crucial to any of these utilisations is the
70actors’ recognition of the EU as a resource and the will to seize upon it.
The constructivist research, by contrast, assumes strategic behaviour to be important,
71but material interests are socially constructed. Consequently, constructivists have 
focused on how the EU shapes domestic actors’ identity; how EU policies are framed
66 Ibid.
67 Hix and Goetz, Introduction-, Thatcher, 2004.
68 Featherstone, Introduction, p. 9.
69 Jacquot and Woll, 2003.
70 Ibid.
71 John Gerard Ruggie, ‘What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist 
Challenge’, International Organization (1998), vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 855-885; James A Caporaso, Jeffrey T.
Checkel, Joseph Jupille, ‘Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study o f  the European 
Union’ Comparative Political Studies (2003), vol. 36, no. 1-2, p. 14; Kenneth Dyson, ‘Whitehall Culture and the 
Treasury as Institutional Veto Player: A Constructivist Approach to Economic and Monetary Union’ Public 
Administration (2000) vol.78, no. 4, pp. 897-914(18).
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through discourses;72 and how domestic actors ‘translate’, ‘interpret’ and ‘edit’ the 
often ‘ambiguous’ and ‘unclear’ EU rules.
The study of the bottom-up discursive construction of the EU has now become an 
accepted part of the research agenda in Europeanization.74 Discourse is ‘a set of 
ideas’ and ‘a resource used by entrepreneurial actors to produce and legitimate those 
ideas’.75 Discourses featuring the EU are now studied for their content, function and 
actual causal impact, from a variety of institutional perspectives, including rational-
7 ( \choice and sociological. The content of discourses may be about knowledge, 
problems, actors and resources (per rational choice); or they may be more normative, 
richly referring to EU principles and values (per sociological institutionalism).77 The 
function of discourses about the EU may be to mobilise and forge consensus (the 
‘coordinative function’), or else communicate with the wider public for purposes of
7o
‘public deliberation and legitimation’ (the ‘communicative function’).
70Few are those who have tried to combine the two frameworks. Some have focused 
on how the ideas, beliefs and discourses that actors have constructed about the EU
OA
have shaped their strategic utilisations of it. In Cyprus, for example, the 
government constructed the EU as a ‘tool for modernization’ and then used
72 Dyson, Whitehall Culture; p. 647; Donatella della Porta and Manuela Caiani, ‘The Europeanization o f Public 
Discourse in Italy A Top-Down Process?’, European Union Politics (2006), vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 77-112; see Special 
Issue: Policy Change and Discourse in Europe, West European Politics (2004) vol. 27, no. 2.
73 MOrth, 2003.
74 Dyson and Goetz, Living with Europe, p 14.
75 Vivien A Schmidt and Claudio M Radaelli, ‘Policy Change and Discourse in Europe: Conceptual and 
Methodological Issues’, West European Politics (2004) vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 1 8 3 -2 1 0 . (p. 192).
76 Kevin Featherstone, ‘Cyprus and the Onset o f Europeanization: Strategic Usage, Structural Transformation and 
Institutional Adaptation’ in Featherstone and Kazamias, p. 280; West European Politics special issue, March 
2004, vol. 27, no. 2.
77 Claudio M. Radaelli, and Vivien A. Schmidt, ‘Conclusions’, West European Politics (2004), vol.27, no.2, 
pp.364-379, (p. 364).
Ibid.
79 e.g. Dyson, Whitehall Culture, 2000; Featherstone, The political dynamics, 2004;
80 Dyson, Whitehall Culture, 2000; Jacquot and Woll, 2003.
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o 1
strategically to shift onto it the blame for contested and opposed domestic reforms. 
Others have noted that in practice the two dimensions -  strategic and constructivist -  
have proved to be ‘simultaneously at work in ways that are difficult to disentangle
89empirically’. Material changes (integration of financial markets) can lead to 
cognitive changes (new policy paradigms), which in turn affect domestic power 
relations. In Britain, for example, the EMU was constructed only by a ‘small trans­
national policy community’ of finance ministers and central bankers, the same ones
O il
who ended up being empowered by the EMU.
The bottom-up approach, however, has been much less applied to the study of East
oe
Europeanization. A notable exception is Hughes et a l (2004), who by 
conceptualising conditionality as a process, departed from the dominant dependent-
o/r
independent variable approach. The scarcity of bottom-up research is surprising, in 
that domestic actors in CEE with opposite ideological views and policy preferences 
have both been noted to utilise the EU as ‘ammunition’ against each other, to de-
87legitimise the other side of domestic debates about policy or institutions. Elites at
all levels have been noted taking the leverage out of EU conditionality, manipulating,
co-opting and redirecting it, thus gaining unexpected influence over the accession
88process and its consequences. In the teeth of the widespread assumption of a power
asymmetry between Brussels and accession countries, there seems nonetheless to be
80room for bottom-up utilisations of the EU by domestic actors. And yet, except for
81 Featherstone, Cyprus and the Onset o f  Europeanization, p. 142.
82 Dyson, Whitehall Culture, p. 647.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid. p. 645.
85 Goetz, The New Member States, p. 478.
86 Hughes, Sasse and Gordon, p. 2.
87 Grabbe, How does Europeanization affect CEE, p. 1028.
88 Grabbe, How does Europeanization affect CEE, pp. 1013-1031; Hughes, Sasse and Gordon; Cristina E. Parau, 
Europeanisation as Empowerment o f  Civil Society: A ll Smoke And Mirrors?, paper presented at the European 
Consortium for Political Research Conference, Budapest, 8-10 September 2005.
89 Goetz, The New Member States, p. 500.
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occasional references, little research has investigated how domestic actors in CEE 
utilise (let alone construct) the EU, and whether these constructions and utilisations 
affect domestic power relations.
Those few scholars who have focused on domestic politics in CEE and its interaction 
with EU politics90 still conceptualise the EU as an independent variable exercising 
‘passive’ or ‘active’ leverage over domestic actors.91 Even though such studies took 
the domestic level into account, they did not take on the viewpoint of domestic actors 
or the possibility that they might bring about Europeanization at their own initiative 
and in ways not altogether intended by Brussels. I argue that this is an important gap 
in our knowledge, especially about CEE, where actors matter the most, in that formal 
institutions ‘are [still] far from fixed’ and have only limited ‘socialising effects’92 (at 
least by comparison with West European institutions). It is this gap which the present 
study contributes to bridging.
1.3 Europeanization as differential domestic empowerment
This section reviews the literature on one Europeanization theme that will figure 
prominently in the instant dissertation: the differential empowerment of domestic 
actors, its causes and outcomes. Gaps and inconsistencies exist in the theory and 
even more in the body of empirical data. In this first section the theory on how 
differential empowerment is produced by the EU will be reviewed; in the second, the 
theory and empirical evidence about the actual outcome of differential 
empowerment. Where specific theories have been formulated or data found about the 
actor-collectives featured in this dissertation, viz. environmental civil society and the
90 Jacoby, 2004; Vachudova, 2005.
91 Ibid.
92 Goetz, The New Member States, p. 498.
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Executive, these will be reviewed.
The most common domestic-empowerment argument has been made from a rational- 
choice perspective: the EU presents domestic actors a new ‘opportunity structure’, or 
set of political potentials which they may utilise to achieve domestic goals. 
Whether any such utilisations lead to a redistribution of power has been theorised to 
be influenced by two main domestic conditions. One is the number of ‘veto points’ -  
‘individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for the change of the 
status quo’94 -  that withstand Europeanization; the other is the existence of ‘formal 
institutions’ supporting the domestic Europeanizers.95 How far domestic actors are 
able to exploit the new opportunities ‘depends on their previous resources and 
identities shaped by domestic institutions (access to public sphere and decision­
making bodies, financial means, information, legitimacy)’.96 If veto points are few 
and/or formal institutions supportive enough, Europeanization is supposed to 
manifest as an actual redistribution of power among domestic actors. Some win,
07others lose (‘differential empowerment’).
Less widespread has been the argument that differential empowerment might also
QQ
ensue from a ‘trickling down’ of EU (and international) norms and ideas. Norms 
and values might be ‘diffused’ to the domestic level by trans-national advocacy
93 BOrzel and Risse, Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact, p. 57; Featherstone, The political dynamics, 2004, p. 
227; Christoph Knill and Dirk Lehmkuhl, ‘How Europe Matters. Different Mechanisms o f  Europeanization’, 
European Integration online Papers (1999), vol. 3, no. 7, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-007a.htm>: Radaelli, 
The Europeanization o f  Public Policy.
94 George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2002). p. 19.
95 BOrzel and Risse, Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact.
96 Kitschelt, 1986 ‘Political Opportunity Structures and Political protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four 
Democracies, British Journal o f  Political Science 16:57-85; Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James 
Caporaso, ‘Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction’ in Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso and 
Thomas Risse, Transforming Europe. Europeanization and Domestic Change’ (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 2001), pp. 11-12.
97 Tanja A. BOrzel and Thomas Risse, ‘When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change’, 
European Integration online Papers (2000), vol. 4, no. 15, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015a.htm: BPrzel and 
Risse, Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact, p. 64; Featherstone, Introduction, p. 16.
98 Jeffrey Checkel, ‘International norms and domestic politics: bridging the rationalist-constructivist divide’, 
European Journal o f  International Relations (1997), vol. 3, pp. 473-95; Kevin Featherstone, 2004, pp. 228-9.
18
coalitions. These can challenge and even constrain domestic governments whose 
behaviour is not in line with such norms, by alerting the domestic public and parties 
to the international regime to the lack of compliance, and by supporting domestic 
protest groups." Or norms and values might reach the domestic level through the 
‘mechanisms’ o f ‘socialisation’ and ‘social learning’ by the government elite.100
Although such claims would suggest that sociological institutionalism can 
supplement rational choice to help us understand differential empowerment more 
fully, few have recognised its potential to explain puzzling aspects of differential 
empowerment that rational choice does not illuminate. However, a concrete 
phenomenon like differential empowerment may be hard to study from a 
constructivist/sociological perspective, focusing as it does on intangible variables 
like values, norms, and beliefs.101 The difficulty lies first in detecting, then in 
explaining how the actors’ constructions of Europe might alter their orientations and 
thus their behaviour. To overcome these difficulties, the mechanism o f ‘socialisation’ 
or ‘social learning’ has been refined recently by the actor-centred concept of ‘norm 
entrepreneur’, which is easier to operationalise. Norm entrepreneurs (a.k.a. ‘moral 
entrepreneurs’ or ‘change agents’) may be individual actors or actor-collectives (e.g. 
social movements, epistemic communities) whose norms are ‘compatible’ with EU
i mnorms. Through deliberative persuasion they ‘convert’ others, such as policy­
making elites, to internalising these norms.104
99 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The socialization o f international human rights norms intro domestic 
practices: Introduction’ in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, Kathryn Sikkink (ed.), The Power o f  Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p. 5.
100 Checkel, 1997.
101 Dimitrova and Rhinard, 2005; Featherstone, The political dynamics, 2004, p. 227.
102 Featherstone, The political dynamics, 2001, p. 4.
103 Bdrzel and Risse, When Europe Hits Home, p. 5; BOrzel and Risse, Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact', 
Featherstone, The political dynamics, 2004, p. 229.
104 Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘Social construction and Integration’, Journal o f  European Public Policy (1999), vol 6, no. 
4, pp. 545-60 (p. 552).
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Regardless what the exact Europeanization mechanism may be, the Western 
literature contains many competing theses about the identity of those whom the EU is 
alleged to systematically empower over others. At a high enough level of abstraction, 
the empowered are supposed to be the ‘norm entrepreneurs’ who promote EU values. 
They are may be empowered over those promoting contrary values.105 Alternatively, 
the empowered might be domestic actors whose interests are ‘positively affected’ by 
Europeanization.106 More concretely, the following domestic actors have been 
theorised as likely to be empowered by the EU: the executive is theorised to be 
empowered over the legislature; central government over sub-national government; 
the judiciary; ‘economic and monetary authorities’ over ‘ministries and para-state 
organizations dealing with social, cultural and other matters’; interest associations 
over political parties; business and professional associations over trade unions and 
social organizations; ‘specialized “sectoral” forms of associability’ over ‘broader
107“inter-sectoral” or class-based ones’. Other theses include the Executive 
Empowerment thesis; the Diffusion thesis; and the Network Governance thesis.
As this dissertation focuses only on domestic civil society and the Executive, only 
the hypotheses relevant to this focus -  the Executive Empowerment thesis; the 
Diffusion thesis; and the Network Governance thesis -  will be evaluated. As the 
issue of differential empowerment has been poorly theorised and little empirically 
tested in the East Europeanization literature, the theory and evidence in the West 
Europeanization literature, and its adaptability to the Eastern context, will be 
reviewed here.
105 BOrzel and Risse, When Europe Hits Home, p. 5; BOrzel and Risse, Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact', 
Featherstone, 2004, p. 229.
106 Maria Green Cowles and Thomas Risse, Transforming Europe: Conclusions’ in Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 
Transforming Europe, p. 230.
107 Philippe C. Schmitter, The political impact o f  European Monetary Union upon 'domestic' and 'regional' 
democracy (Istituto Universitario Europeo San Domenico di Fiesole, 2002), pp. 19-20; Risse, Cowles and 
Caporaso, ‘Introduction’, p. 11.
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The Central Executive Empowerment thesis was propounded by Moravcsik (1994), 
who claims that the EU augments the political resources domestic central executives 
already have, leading to further centralisation of power at the expense of other 
domestic actors. Participation in international institutions like the EU redistributes 
power at the domestic level in a way that systematically benefits national executives. 
Moravcsik (1994) identifies four causal mechanisms of Executive empowerment: (a) 
‘initiative’: internationalisation of the domestic policy agenda strengthens the 
Executive, as Executives generally control ‘foreign policy’, or international 
negotiations, and can easily exclude domestic alternatives from the beginning; (b) 
‘institutions’: international agreements confront the domestic opposition with a fa it 
accompli that can not be compromised or modified after the fact, and the resulting 
all-or-nothing choice renders opposition so costly that few veto points are left to 
challenge the Executive; (c) ‘information’: participation in an international 
organisation sets up an ‘information asymmetry’ with other domestic actors that they 
find expensive to overcome, allowing the Executive to ‘lengthen the leash’ binding 
them as agents to even their own principal-constituents; (d) ‘ideas’: participation in 
an international organisation furnishes the Executive with potential ideological 
justifications for domestic policies (e.g. the classic ‘the devil made us do it’), giving 
the Executive greater influence over the cost/benefit calculations of other domestic 
actors.108 Of all international regimes, the EU is par excellence a power resource for 
national Executives, as decisions in so many policy domains are now made in 
Brussels, and the decisional process there is too costly for most domestic actors to 
participate in. These factors enhance the Executive’s relative capacity for action by
108 Andrew Moravcsik, Why the European Union Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International 
Cooperation, Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting o f  the 
American Political Science Association, New York, 1-4 September 1994.
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isolating them from the pressures of domestic and trans-national interests.109 Their 
autonomy is thus enhanced.110 The Executive Empowerment thesis -  which 
Moravcsik further refined in 1996 by theorising the origins of government’s 
preferences111 -  has been criticised on several grounds: it unrealistically treats the 
State as a unit; it relies only on foundational decisions, neglecting the cumulative 
influence of the EU routine; its key actors (Executive; societal interests) are
119  1 1 ^unclearly defined; and it is not a theory but a methodological approach.
The main rival of the Central Executive Empowerment thesis is the Diffusion Thesis 
who claims that participation in the EU diffuses power from the central Executive to 
domestic civil society and sub-national governments.114 The EU provides new 
resources and opportunities to these actors, especially recourse to: EU supranational 
organs, empowering them to by-pass domestic constraints;115 pan-European networks 
empowering them to participate indirectly in EU decisional processes and influence 
EU policy independently of the domestic Executive;116 EU funding, enhancing their 
resources and action capacity; and EU legislation (e.g. the El A Directive), enabling 
their direct participation in domestic decisional processes. Such resources are
117particularly important when the State is particularly hostile to civil society actors 
(as one may expect in Romania). Domestic Executives thus find themselves
109 Klaus Dieter Wolf, ‘Defending State Autonomy’ in Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising (Eds) The 
transformation o f  governance in the European Union, (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 234.
110 Kevin Featherstone, Introduction, p. 9.
111 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Reply: The Choice for Europe’, Journal o f  European Public Policy (1999), vol. 6, no.l, 
pp. 168-79.
Daniel Wincott, ‘Institutional interaction and European integration: towards an everyday critique o f liberal 
intergovemmentalism’, Journal o f Common Market Studies (1995), vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 597-609 (p. 598); Jenny 
Fairbrass and Andrew Jordan, ‘Protecting biodiversity in the European Union: national barriers and European 
opportunities?’, Journal o f  European Public Policy (2001), vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 499 — 518.
113 Wincott, p. 598.
114 Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, Introduction, p.l 1.
1,5 Ibid.
116 Tanja A. BOrzel, Environmental leaders and laggards in Europe: why there is (not) a southern problem, 
(Aldershot, Hampshire, England, Burlington: Ashgate, 2003).
117 Maria Green Cowles, ‘The Transatlantic business dialogue and domestic business-govemment relationships’ 
in Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, Transforming Europe, pp. 159-79.
constrained by ‘alliances among sub-national and supranational actors’.118 The 
Diffusion thesis has been criticised for being descriptive, providing no ‘testable 
hypotheses’; for assuming too much sub-national governmental autonomy; for being 
too ‘top-down’; for over-relying on data about sub-national government, leaving 
other sub-national actors out of account; and for not looking beyond mere 
mobilisation to test whether sub-national governments do in fact have power to shape 
policy outcomes.119
The Executive Empowerment and Diffusion theses both assume an adversarial 
relation between State and civil society. By contrast, the Network Governance thesis 
posits that Europeanization does not empower one actor over another but transforms 
domestic governance, leading to co-operative relationships between state and non-
190state actors. Participation in the EU, it is claimed, creates both constraints and 
opportunities for all domestic actors indiscriminately, empowering no set of actors
191over another, but increasing domestic actors’ mutual interdependence. The co­
operative network mode of governance, having emerged and become dominant in 
Brussels, has diffused to EU member-States, where it is replacing other modes of
199governance (e.g. corporatist or statist).
None of these theses has been ‘conclusively proven’ to date;123 all are inadequate to 
explain whatever differential empowerment has been observed at the domestic level 
-  certainly if one looks across all member-States.124 The empirical evidence is highly
118 Moravcsik 1994, p. 3.
119 Fairbrass and Jordan, p. 507; Mark A. Pollack ‘Creeping competence: the expanding agenda o f the European 
Community’, Journal o f  Public Policy (1994), vol 14, no. 2, pp. 95-145.
120 Beate Kohler-Koch, ‘The evolution and transformation o f  European governance’ in Kohler-Koch and Eising, 
The transformation.
121 Ibid.
122 Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising, ‘Introduction. Network Governance in European Union’ in Kohler- 
Koch and Eising, The transformation, p. 7.
123 Schmitter, The political impact, p. 20.
124 BOrzel and Risse, Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact, pp. 54, 64; Schmitter, The political impact, p. 20.
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mixed: no one class of actors or actor-collectives is found to be systematically
empowered over any other. For example, empirical evidence from Britain, France,
Germany and Italy (although in want of further testing) suggests that the EU might
systematically empower certain State and certain societal actors: ‘insofar as EC
integration is controlled by governments and large business interests ...
Europeanisation [might] systematically favour ... those interests’. Others have
claimed that European integration has weakened the State while strengthening civil
1society in the ‘Southern periphery’, although which elements of the State or of 
civil society have been empowered has been left unclear.
Other types of evidence from the environmental field yield a similarly hazy picture. 
Environmental advocacy groups have sought to empower themselves over a 
recalcitrant State by alerting EU organs to their governments’ non-compliance; by 
exploiting the independence of their domestic judiciaries; and by using the
197investigative procedures of their parliaments. A number of studies have looked at 
the empowering effects of specific EU directives expressly designed to encourage 
public participation in the implementation of EU environmental law; for example, by 
allowing advocacy groups to file complaints over non-compliance before both
n o
domestic and EU enforcement bodies. On the other hand, such directives are 
typically ambiguous enough to leave governments ample leeway for interpretation in
190implementation. Governments may implement these provisions tardily and
125 Thatcher, p. 306.
126 P. C. Ioakimidis, ‘The Europeanization o f Greece: An Overall Assessment’, in Kevin Featherstone and 
George Kazamias Europeanization and the Southern Periphery (Chippenham: Antony Rowe, 2001), p. 278.
127 Cliona Kimber, ‘Implementing European environmental policy and the Directive on Access to Environmental 
Information’ in Christoph Knill, Implementing EU Environmental Policy (Manchester, Manchester University 
Press, 2000), p. 174.
128 Tanja A. BOrzel, ‘Improving compliance through domestic mobilisation? New instruments and the 
effectiveness o f  implementation in Spain’ in Knill and Lenschow Implementing EU  policy.
129 Sonja Bugdahn, ‘Of Europeanization and domestication: the implementation o f  the environmental information 
directive in Ireland, Great Britain and Germany’, Journal o f  European Public Policy  (2005), vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 
1 7 7 -  199.
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1 minconsistently, hindering civil society empowerment thereby. The Access to 
Information Directive, for example -  expected to empower civil society and 
constrain the Executive -  has been found, in the case of France, to have had the 
opposite effect of enhancing the State’s legitimacy and authority. In other EU 
member-States, too, civil society groups have been constrained in exploiting EU 
directives. These constraints had been imposed on them by factors specific to the 
domestic society in question: the lack of public interest in environmental issues; the 
degree of civil society mobilisation before the advent of the EU; civil society actors’ 
own de-prioritisation of environmental issues; the characteristics of the domestic 
administrative ‘culture’, and its civic and political context. In poorer member states 
like Spain civil society mobilisation has been found to have been inhibited by a
1 79dearth of human, expert and fiscal resources. The Access to Information Directive 
did little to mobilise civil society in rich member-States such as France and 
Germany, where civil society is much more mature and would have been expected to 
utilise such opportunities.
Still, investigating the environmental policy field, others have concluded in favour of 
the Diffusion thesis.134 Domestic environmental groups, operating within a closed 
domestic opportunity structure, used EU resources and opportunities -  the 
supranational institutions such as the Commission and the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) -  ‘to outflank the government’, bringing about policy outcomes otherwise
130 Christoph Knill and Andrea Lenschow, ‘Do new brooms really sweep cleaner? Implementation o f new 
instruments in EU environmental policy’ in Knill and Lenschow Implementing E U  policy, p. 274.
131 Knill and Lenschow, Do new brooms, pp. 260-1.
132 BOrzel, Improving compliance', BOrzel, Environmental leaders, 2003.
133 Knill and Lenschow, Do new brooms, pp. 260-1.
134 Fairbrass and Jordan, Protecting biodiversity, 2001; Donatella della Porta, ‘The Europeanisation o f Protest:
A Typology and Some Empirical Evidence’, EUI Working Paper SPS No. 2003/18, European University 
Institute, pp. 11-12; Christopher Rootes, ‘The Europeanization o f Environmentalism’, in Richard Balme and 
Didier Chabanet (ed.), L ’action collective en Europe (Paris: Presses de Science Po, 2002), pp. 377-404.
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1-1C
impossible. Interestingly, Fairbrass and Jordan (2001) suggest that the EU might
be used not only by environmental groups but also by the government: ‘the British
authorities did not ... stand idly by, but worked assiduously (e.g. contesting ECJ
court cases and mounting an energetic campaign to dilute the Habitats Directive) to
1nationalize EU biodiversity policy’. Moreover, when the opportunity arose -  with 
the strengthening of one biodiversity directive -  the government used it to ‘claim
117political credit ... when the mood of public opinion became greener’. Such 
findings support the Diffusion as much as the Executive Empowerment theses, as the 
authors seem to suggest, but, this dissertation will show, only if the empirical 
research takes into account the full cycle of events over time.
These are important findings, for this dissertation has empirically recorded evidence
of both Executive and civil society empowerment, albeit in a very different context,
increasing the scope for generalisability. Fairbrass and Jordan’s study (2001) is
limited, as the authors themselves admit, to a case of so-called ‘low politics’ without
evidence about what happens in ‘high politics’.138 This means that the outcome might
be different in ‘high politics’ cases, that is, cases that matter much more to the
Executive. On the assumption that ‘high politics’ is whatever the Executive believes
it is, the third case study herein, tracing differential empowerment in a major public
procurement case, gives evidence of Executive empowerment in a high politics case.
110Research testing the Network Governance thesis has proved equally inconclusive. 
Some have found evidence of network governance in most EU policy areas and of its
135 della Porta, pp. 11-12.
136 Ibid., p. 513.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid., pp 514-515.
139 Featherstone, Introduction, p. 8.
26
‘transformative repercussions’ on member-States.140 Others have concluded that the 
thesis has been falsified: networking in Brussels was not found to have made the 
State more co-operative with other domestic actors, only with other member-States; 
the intergovernmental agreements made actually shut out other domestic and trans­
national actors, just as Moravcsik predicted.141 Critics of the Network Governance 
thesis have even suggested that ‘network governance may only be an euphemism for 
upper class rule’.142 The network governance thesis has also little to say about the 
possibility, evidenced in this dissertation, of rival networks one of which becomes 
more powerful than another.
In Eastern Europe, the issue of differential empowerment has been much less 
explored. Here, the focus of research to date has been primarily on formal 
institutional changes e.g. formal changes of the Executive, reform of the public 
administration.143 Beginning only in 2004, a few authors were asking questions 
pertaining to ‘How EU conditionality changes the domestic opportunity structure?’ 
and ‘How does it change the balance of power at the domestic level, that is, who 
wins and who loses as a result and under what conditions?’144 The discussion here is 
still incipient.
One of the claims made so far is that EU conditionality ‘changes the domestic 
opportunity structure in favour of domestic actors with independent incentives to
140 Rainer Eising and Beate Kohler-Koch ‘Governance in the European Union. A  comparative assessment’ in 
Kohler-Koch and Eising, p. 267; Kohler-Koch and Eising, Introduction, p. 7.
141 Wolf, Defending State, pp. 231 - 2.
142 Kohler-Koch and Eising, Introduction, p. 7.
143 e.g. Dimitrova, 2004; Antoaneta L. Dimitrova, ‘Enlargement, Institution-Building and the EU's Administrative 
Capacity Requirement’, West European Politics, vol.25, no. 4, pp. 171-190; Barbara Nunberg Ready fo r  Europe: 
public administration reform and European accession in Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 2000) World Bank technical paper no. 466; see special issue Journal o f  European Public Policy (2001) 
vol. 8, no. 6.
144 Antoaneta L. Dimitrova and Bernard Steunenberg, ‘Conclusions: the 'end o f  history' o f  enlargement or the 
beginning o f  a new research agenda?’ in Antoaneta L. Dimitrova Driven to Change: The European Union's 
Enlargement Viewed from the East, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 181,189; Hughes,
Sasse and Gordon, 2004; Jacoby, 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, p. 664.
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adopt EU rules’.145 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) created a model that 
purports to predict under what conditions the transfer of EU rules to accession 
countries will be successful. If the empowered are domestic actors with an incentive 
to adopt EU rules, then the Schimmelfennig-Sedelmeier model is relevant to the 
question of domestic differential empowerment. Although framed within the top- 
down dependent-independent variable design, some of the ‘mechanisms’ that go into 
their model are evidenced in the processes traced in this dissertation [see 
Conclusions Chapter]. However, with its more bottom-up, constructivist approach, 
this research goes beyond the top-down limitations of their model.
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier propound three models to explain when an EU rule 
will be complied with or not: the ‘external incentives model’; the ‘social learning 
model’; and the ‘lesson-drawing model’.146 The external incentives model predicts 
that EU conditionality creates incentives for compliance with EU rules. A state will 
adopt the EU rules if the EU rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs.147 The 
social learning model predicts that EU rules will be adopted if domestic actors have 
already internalised EU identities, norms and values. They comply because they 
consider it ‘appropriate behaviour’, rather than out of fear of coercion. The lesson- 
drawing model predicts that policy-makers, out of an ‘internal need’ to improve the 
status quo, will seek to learn from the EU how best to solve domestic policy
14Sproblems. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s model will be revisited in the general 
conclusions, where its applicability will be assessed in light of the empirical data 
revealed herein.
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, p. 664.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid., pp. 664-667
148 Ibid., pp. 667-668
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Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) have also claimed that those empowered by 
EU conditionality are likely to be the domestic governments, as they are the ones that 
have authority over the implementation of EU rules.149 Their claim is not new. Since 
East Europeanization research began, one of its foundational assumptions has been 
that accession negotiations concentrate power and resources in the hands of the 
Executive. The latter is thus empowered at the expense of other branches and levels 
of government, and of civil society.150 Parliament, for example, has been said to be 
weakened by lack of information about accession negotiations, which the Executive 
could withhold from it.151 These claims have been based on the general knowledge 
that the Executive is the domestic actor charged with negotiating with the 
Commission. The argument that this strengthens the Executive, however, is weak. 
The EU acquis, as a substantial body of settled law, is non-negotiable except as to 
the implementation timetable. An accession country Executive, then, has no other 
choice but to agree to transpose it. This could hardly be called ‘empowerment’. The 
Executive may actually be constrained, as they cannot bargain with the EU over the 
content of the acquis. Moreover, the fact that the Executive does most of the work of 
accession does not necessarily empower them, as mostly they merely carry through 
tasks ‘assigned’ by the Commission. Even if other actors were to be involved in the 
negotiations -  for example, even if Parliament had more information about the 
progress of negotiations -  they would still have had no choice but acquiesce as much 
as the Executive, unless they were prepared to challenge accession itself.
The empirical evidence of domestic differential empowerment through accession to 
the EU is patchy, making it difficult to establish any definitive trend. Some scholars
149 Ibid., p. 664.
150 Grabbe, How does Europeanization affect CEE, pp. 1013-1031.
151 Ibid.
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1 ^ 9have claimed that overall, the accession process has marginalised non-State actors.
In Poland, Hungary and Romania, for example, it empowered the Executive relative 
to societal interests, the accession negotiations giving the Executive the excuse of 
‘sheer policy overload’ and ‘time pressure’ to exclude everybody else from decision­
making.153 Such disempowerment of non-State actors has been noted even in policy 
domains where the EU has placed great emphasis on social dialogue (e.g. social 
policy).154 By contrast, others have found that accession has in fact empowered civil 
society. In Slovakia, for example, signals from the EU had the effect of mobilising 
the political opposition, until then fragmented, who rose up to challenge the 
authoritarian government.155
As for the effects of the EU on environmental advocacy groups, the picture is just as 
mixed. Environmental NGOs in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, for 
example, resorted to conditionality to pressurise their governments to keep 
environmental issues on the agendas.156 In other cases conditionality appears to have
1 <7had no such inclusive effects, or has even hindered environmental civil society. 
Others found that environmental groups in the Czech Republic, Poland and Bulgaria 
had made very little use of the EU or its conditionality to promote their interests.
At most, these NGOs had resorted to the Directive on Access to Information out of
152 Grabbe, How does Europeanization affect CEE, pp. 1013-1031; Umut Korkut, ‘The European Union and the 
Accession Process in Hungary, Poland and Romania: Is There a Place for Social Dialogue?’, Perspectives on 
European Politics and Society (2002), vol. 3, no.2, pp. 297-324; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, p. 675; Magda 
Stoczkiewicz, Ivona Malbasic, Stephan von Pohl, Billions fo r  Sustainability? Lessons learned from the use o f  
pre-accessions funds (Prague: CEE Bankwatch Network, 2002).
153 Korkut, p. 297.
154 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, p. 675.
155 Marek Ryb&f and Darina Malovd, ‘Exerting influence on a contentious polity: the European Union’s 
democratic conditionality and political change in Slovakia’ in Antoaneta L. Dimitrova Driven to Change. The 
European Union’s Enlargement Viewed from the E ast’ (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004); 
Vachudova, 2005.
156 Barbara Hicks, ‘Setting Agendas and Shaping Activism: EU Influence on Central and Eastern European 
Environmental Movements’, Environmental Politics (2004), vo l.13, no. 1, pp. 216 -  233, (pp. 221 - 2).
157 Stoczkiewicz et al., 2002.
158 Liliana B Andonova, Transnational politics o f  the environment: the European Union and environmental 
policy in Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), p. 25; also noted by Stoczkiewicz et 
al., p. 26.
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all the provisions of the acquis. Yet even here they referred more to the UN 
Convention on Access to Information.159 They were constrained in utilising 
conditionality by ignorance, and by lack of information and material resources.160
Likewise, the expectation that EU directives such as Environmental Impact 
Assessment and Access to Information would spearhead public participation in 
environmental decisions in CEE has not been corroborated by the available evidence. 
As of 2000 environmental NGOs were disempowered in utilising the acquis by 
manifold domestic constraints: (a) public administrative hostility to power-sharing, 
stultifying NGOs’ input in El A consultations; (b) a paternalistic State tradition, 
inuring the people to subservience before the State; (c) contempt for the rule of law; 
(d) the counter-hostility of NGOs to the public administration; and (e) the jaundiced 
attitude of private investors toward El A procedures.161 As a result, civil society 
groups appeared to have lost trust in the EIA.162 Two years later, EIA consultations 
were still found to have been carried out improperly and untimely and did not seem
1 fkXto have lead to ‘meaningful’ public participation. Funding, another top-down 
mechanisms intended by the EU to empower civil society in the post-communist 
countries, had likewise had little effect.164
In sum, we know too little about the nature of differential empowerment, its causes 
and consequences. No studies of CEE have looked in detail at how accession to the 
EU has affected domestic power relations. Our theories about differential
159 Andonova, p. 25.
160 Andonova, p. 25; Stoczkiewicz et al. p. 26.
161 Joanne Caddy, ‘Implementation o f  EU environmental policy in Central European applicant states: the case o f  
EIA’ in C. Knill Implementing EU Environmental Policy: New Directions and Old Problems (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 2000).
16? Ibid.
163 Stoczkiewicz et al., p. 19.
164 Petr Jehliaka and Andrew Tickle ‘Environmental Implications o f Eastern Enlargement: The End o f 
Progressive EU Environmental Policy?’ Environmental Politics (2004), vol. 13, no. 1 pp. 77 - 95; see also 
Vachudova, p. 216.
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empowerment are in want of empirical testing and refining. We know little about the 
mechanisms (if that is what they are) and the scope conditions leading to it. Few 
have endeavoured to understand differential empowerment from a bottom-up or from 
an actor-centred perspective. Fewer still have combined the rational-choice with the 
sociological perspective. We know little about what exactly it is that empowers 
domestic actors; for example, some authors refer to ‘European integration’, others to 
specific EU policies, still others to ‘Europe’ as a holistic context. We know even less 
about what they do to empower themselves; indeed, the very concept of self­
empowerment is scarcely to be found in the literature. Even a basic concept like 
‘empowerment’ has not been carefully defined. Neither has the identity of those 
empowered or disempowered been carefully noted; for example, ‘civil society’ is 
often used interchangeably with ‘advocacy groups’, ignoring more traditional civil 
society, like trade unions. The exact identity of the State actors being empowered or 
constrained is likewise seldom made clear.
Given this state of the literature, any empirical research that combines rational choice 
with sociological perspectives, and is carried on from the bottom up is on point. This 
dissertation does just this. It also provides much needed empirical evidence against 
which the literature’s three main differential empowerment theses can be matched. 
Thus, the research reported herein tried to escape the box of investigating only issues 
considered ‘doable’ within the methodological framework of dependent-independent 
variable design. The bottom-up design adopted here should complement top-down 
research by revealing much about how domestic politics, as carried-on by domestic 
actors on the ground, interact with top-down opportunities and constraints. The aim 
is to contribute toward the construction of a well-rounded picture of the complex 
interactions between Europe and domestic actors, institutions and politics in
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Romania (and by extension CEE as a whole).
1.4 The approach of this study
The research questions addressed in this dissertation are: ‘How do domestic actors 
construct Europe?’ and ‘How do they utilise it in seeking to empower themselves 
relative to other domestic actors?’ The key actors studied in this dissertation are the 
civil society and the Executive of the accession country of Romania.
Civil society is a ‘multi-faceted’ and ‘contested’ concept with manifold 
definitions.165 The definition adopted here is ‘an arena of uncoerced collective action 
around shared interests, purposes and values’.166 Civil society comprises manifold 
types of organisations: ‘registered charities, development non-governmental 
organisations, community groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations, 
professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, 
business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups’.167 This dissertation will 
ignore trade unions, the form of civil society traditional in Communist Romania, in 
order to focus on those civil society actors and organisations that have emerged in 
Romania for the first time ever after 1989. These organisations, such as 
environmental charitable trusts, promote values and norms that have been alien to 
Romania for most of its history: democracy, the rule of law, accountability, human 
and minority rights, sustainable development, and cultural heritage. References to 
such organisations will be used interchangeably with ‘civil society’ or the ‘new 
social movements’. When other civil society actors than these are referred to, these 
will be clearly identified -  as for example ‘trade unions’.
165 Centre for Civil Society, London School o f Economics, Introduction,
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/coHections/CCS/introduction.htm>. 2006 (accessed January 2006).
The reason for focusing on the new at the expense of traditional civil society is that 
the latter may be presumed on the inside of the Romanian political system already. 
This presumption is particularly safe whenever a government is formed by the Social 
Democratic Party of reformed communists, as was the case during the period studied 
in this dissertation. Trade unions, especially those in the mining and steel industries, 
which formed the core of the Communist economy, have been advantaged since 
1989 compared to the new social movements. The ex-Communists who have ruled 
Romania for most of the transition have privileged the unions, with whom they have 
close connexions, in terms of allowing their participation in policy making. Although 
their influence has likely decreased since 1989 -  a phenomenon observed across the
1 ASCEE -  they are still more ‘on the inside’ of governmental decision-making than 
anybody from the new social movements. The latter, since their emergence in 1989, 
have remained ‘on the outside’ of domestic politics [see Chapter 2]. Will accession 
to the EU, which these more modernist and progressive elements of Romanian civil 
society have done so much to promote and support, empower them to become 
‘insiders’? Will the uncooperative relationship between them and the State be recast?
This research focuses on the central government Executive amongst State actors, 
who during the government of the Social Democrat Party between 2000 and 2004 
was the undisputed centre of policy-making and political decision in all the cases 
studied herein [see Chapter 2].
The questions posed above will be answered within a comparative framework 
comprising three case studies. In two of the cases (Dracula Park and Rosia Montana) 
civil society were empowered quite contrary to all expectation, exerting
168 Laszlo Bruszt and David Stark, ‘Who Counts? Supranational Norms and Societal Needs’ East European 
Politics and Societies (2003) vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 74-82. (p. 78)
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unprecedented influence over the decisions of the Executive. It is a rare phenomenon 
indeed in Romania for the Executive to give up or delay implementing two economic 
development projects at all, let alone to do so for reasons of environmental protection 
and cultural heritage. In fact, these are the first such cases recorded since 1989, when 
the new social movements emerged for the first time. As no new social movements 
existed in Romania before then (or before Communism), the likelihood is that the 
Executive have never been thus constrained in Romania’s recorded history. Prima 
facie Europe appears to have been the source of this empowerment. If this first 
impression holds true, then the question to be researched becomes, How did Europe 
yield this differential empowerment?
In the third case study (the Transylvania Motorway) civil society was not empowered 
at all, even although they constructed and utilised the EU in the same ways as in the 
other cases. The question is ‘Why’? Interestingly, the Executive in this case was also 
observed to have constructed and utilised Europe to empower themselves over their 
rivals before the domestic elections.
This dissertation will endeavour to explain the variation in differential empowerment 
between civil society and the Executive; thus, it goes beyond the exploration of what 
opportunities afforded by Europe domestic actors have resorted to. It will aim to 
establish whether ‘Europe’, or Romania’s accession to the EU, has actually 
empowered any domestic actors over others, and if so, how. As the literature 
suggests, the critical question is whether differential empowerment has actually 
happened, for mere mobilisation or deployment of Europe, or EU opportunities, may 
have little or no effect on domestic power relations. The interesting issue is whether 
Europe affects domestic power relations, not the fate of a single actor; indeed, the
main empowerment theories are differential, as the literature review above has 
shown.
For purposes of this dissertation, differential empowerment shall be defined relative 
to the Executive: -  civil society will have been ‘empowered by Europe’ if without it, 
civil society would not have prevailed upon the Executive to change a given 
decision, and if the latter would not have changed that decision on their own absent 
Europe.169 In other words, if the values and interests of the civil society challenging 
the substance and/or procedure of Executive decisions are reflected in the final 
outcome of the case, and those values and interests are such as the Executive, of 
themselves, would likely have disregarded, then civil society will have been 
‘differentially’ empowered, that is, empowered over the Executive.
The novel proceeding in this dissertation’s method will be to go on from there and 
trace the Executive’s next move, without stopping at evidence of civil society 
empowerment. For, once constrained by this empowerment, the Executive may well 
have taken steps to escape or minimise the consequences, and/or the future 
application of a like constraint. In doing so, the Executive, too, may seek to empower 
itself through Europe. In this case, the ‘net amount’ by which civil society is 
permanently empowered might actually be smaller than would be found if one does 
not look beyond the first instance of differential empowerment.
Once differential empowerment has been established and accounted-for as due to 
Europe, the next step will be to compare the findings to the main Europeanization 
theses in the literature. This the Conclusions will do, by matching the empirical 
findings reported herein against these theses as well as against the Schimmelfennig-
169 Steven Lukes, P ow er: a radical view, (London : Macmillan, 1974)
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Sedelmeier model. As the theses in question are in want of empirical testing, as the 
authors themselves admit, the evidence from the case studies will be evaluated with a 
view to whether or not it supports any of them. As for the Schimmelfennig- 
Sedelmeier model of EU rule transfer, the evidence of the cases will be examined to 
determine whether or not the observed differential empowerment may have 
happened through one or more of the model’s three mechanisms: ‘external 
incentives’, ‘social learning’ and ‘lesson-drawing’. As any abstract model or thesis is 
to some extent a straitjacket, the processes traced herein will be explored for other 
insights as well.
The research design employed herein will be ‘bottom-up’, according to which
1 70Europe is conceptualised as ‘[one] element in domestic political manoeuvres’. 
Thus the research herein begins in the domestic arena. Tsebelis posits the existence 
of ‘nested games’, a concept according to which domestic are involved in making
171rational choices in the domestic arena and beyond simultaneously. This suggests 
that nested games may be expected to be relevant to a bottom-up research design. It 
follows that participation in the EU should mean that domestic actors take part in at 
least two games at the same time, the domestic and the European. Therefore their 
choices might not be explainable without paying attention to their interests and 
motivations on both levels. A sub-optimal outcome at the EU level might bring 
substantial benefits at the domestic level and vice versa; therefore, to fully explain a
1 77domestic outcome, one might have to pay attention to both of these ‘games’. This 
dissertation will take into account the nested-game situation, and show how in all 
cases the outcome was best explained by taking into account domestic actors’
170 Dyson and Goetz, Living -with Europe, p. 13.
171 George Tsebelis, Nested Games Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley, University o f California 
Press, 1991), p. 6.
172 Hix and Goetz, Introduction, p. 12.
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perception of the differential costs-benefits at the domestic versus at the European 
and other levels.
By contrast with most studies, ‘Europe’ shall include not only the centre of EU 
power in Brussels, but also the greater range of ‘peripheral’ phenomena that lie 
beyond the scope of the powers of the supranational institutions. This conception is 
broad enough to take into account the whole spectrum of activities initiated by 
domestic actors. These activities might include the utilisation of ‘material’ top-down 
opportunities provided by accession to the EU (e.g. EU law) as well as the 
construction of Europe through discourses. Bottom-up constructions and utilisations 
may even include instances where domestic actors deploy or attempt to deploy 
Brussels itself in ways not necessarily intended or even foreseen by Brussels in order 
to pressurise the Romanian government. Domestic actors might empower themselves 
by building alliances across EU member-States. Domestic new social movements are 
likely to be empowered by trans-national non-governmental organisations, which can
171provide them with ‘know-how, ties and norms’. Domestic actors may even go 
beyond Europe to empower themselves. An international institution like the UN may 
constitute a further set of opportunities to be exploited. If such phenomena are 
discovered to have a bearing on the cases studied, their interaction with ‘Europe’ and 
with the domestic arena will be traced.174 This broadening of scope to encompass 
non-EU supranational phenomena is aimed to transcend the tunnel vision of the 
empirical research to date.
173 Bruszt and Stark, p. 80.
174 as for example suggested by Jeffrey J. Andreson, ‘Europeanization in Context: Concept and Theory’ in Dyson 
and Goetz, Germany, Europe, p. 39.
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Whether Europeanization ought to include ‘discourses’ has been a contentious issue 
in the literature.175 They shall be treated in this dissertation, inasmuch as the cases 
studies show that processes of social construction embrace discourses featuring 
Europe or the EU. Discourses are an important source of evidence for how domestic 
actors construct, perceive and interpret Europe, and yet they have been a neglected 
dimension in East Europeanization research. At least in Romania, all domestic 
political actors have learnt to deploy discourses featuring the EU; the phenomenon 
became so pervasive during the acquis negotiations that some referred to it as a
17 ft‘psychosis’. Such an empirical observation suggests that discourses may be 
particularly relevant in the context of a post-communist accession country, where all 
actors suffer severe material, cognitive and legitimacy deficits. Discourses may thus 
constitute a weapon much needed by all political actors in the domestic arena. 
Without engaging in the full methodology of discourse analysis, the process tracing 
in the following case studies will remark the content and function of domestic actors’ 
discourses about ‘Europe’. It will also inquire whether systematic differences exist 
between the main actors’ discourses.
By contrast to other studies that have focused on the domestic arena, but at the
1 77macro-level, the focus here shall be on the micro-level of the behaviour of actors. 
The explanation will give priority to actors (collectives and interactions), as opposed 
to systemic institutional or structurally based explanations. Actors will, however, be
178traced within their institutional settings. Actors’ intentions remain subjective, m 
that ‘people act not on the basis of objective reality but on the basis of perceived
175 Dyson and Goetz, Living with Europe, p. 14.
176 Interview by the author with former senior civil servant, Romanian Environment Ministry, 11 November 
2005.
177 E.g. Vachudova, 2005.
178 Fritz Wilhelm Scharpf, Games real actors play: actor-centered institutionalism in policy research (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview Press, 1997), p. 12.
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reality and of assumed cause-and-effect relationships operating in the world they 
perceive’.179 It is for this reason that the key actors in this dissertation are analysed in 
terms of their values, expectations and perceptions, not just their competence and 
power resources. In line with the insights of sociological institutionalism, the 
institutional settings themselves are empirically researched but are not assumed to
1 finexhaustively determine actor behaviour. This is because actors create, destroy and 
modify institutions and rules, as well as conform to them. Formal and informal 
institutions are discussed insofar as process tracing reveals their actual influence on 
actor behaviour. The hope is to illuminate the applicability of the new 
institutionalism to Eastern Europe, as actors in this part of the world have been 
theorised to behave according to different logics to Western actors.181
1 fiOBelieving along with others that the two main strands of new institutionalism are 
necessary compliments of each other, this dissertation intends to make full use of the 
insights of both frameworks. The theme of ‘construction’ draws on insights from 
sociological/constructivist concerns about how domestic actors perceive, interpret 
and construct Europe within their own frames of reference; whilst the theme of 
‘utilisation’ corresponds to rational choice, focusing on how domestic actors use 
Europe, whether constructed (e.g. norms, values, discourses) or objective (e.g. EU 
organs, law), as a power resource and how they incorporate it in their domestic 
strategies and tactics.
The scarcity of empirical evidence indicates a method that will be as inclusive as 
possible, so as to capture whatever bottom-up utilisations of Europe domestic actors
179 Ibid., p. 18.
180 Ibid., p. 12.
181 Thanks to Dr. Vesselin Dimitrov, LSE, for drawing my attention over this issue.
182 Scharpf, 1997.
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may deploy. As one cannot well predict what uses of Europe domestic actors will 
make, a method that follows the empirical evidence wherever it may lead was 
deemed best. The method used herein is therefore process tracing,183 which has been 
little employed in either West or East Europeanization research. Process-tracing is 
the appropriate method for this dissertation which, given the under-specified state of 
the field as a whole and the degree of confusion still persisting, aims to identify
1 fidprocesses of Europeanization rather than prove or predict hypotheses. Although
I Of
entailing disadvantages -  it is time-consuming and laborious, and risks becoming 
tunnel-visioned -  process-tracing nonetheless does bid fair to disentangle Europe
187from the many other causal factors at play. It does so by allowing the careful 
mapping of changes over time as well as of interaction between variables. This is a 
major advantage given that establishing causality rather than mere correlation has 
been a thorny problem in Europeanization research.
1 88Process-tracing may be inductive or deductive. If inductive, it begins with
empirical observation. One begins with what looks like a case of Europeanization
and ‘work[s] back along the temporal causal chain, identifying the facts that have
1 8 0brought about the observed changes’. If deductive, it begins with an a prion 
expectation that ‘[the] domestic configuration of interests, ideas, and/or institutions’ 
will be impacted and a specification of whether this will be due to Europe or to other
183 Alexander George and Timothy J. McKeown, ‘Case Studies and Theories o f  Organizational Decision Making’ 
in Robert F. Coulam and Richard A. Smith (ed.) Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, vol. 2 
(Greenwich, Conn.:JAI Press, 1985).
184 Olsen, The Many Faces o f  Europeanization, p. 925.
185 Anderson, p. 50.
186 Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘It’s the Process Stupid! Process Tracing in the Study o f European and International
Politics’, ARENA, Working Paper no. 26, October 2005, < http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-
papers2005/papers/wp05 26.pdf>. (accessed, June 2006), pp. 3-4.
Anderson, p. 50.
factors.190 As process tracing must be theorised,191 each case study does lay out a 
priori expectations about the key actors’ likely acts, as well as about the expected 
outcome. These expectations are not intended to be predictive, but to establish some 
heuristic relationship between theory and fact.
The cases studied were selected inductively. The research reported herein began as 
an inquiry into the outcome of civil society empowerment immediately observable in 
two controversial affairs, the Dracula Theme Park at Sighisoara and the gold mining 
at Rosia Montana -  an outcome that was unexpected and seemed prima facie to have 
been due to European interventions. As well as environmental organisations, both 
controversies attracted other actors, such as those advocating civic rights, respect for 
the rule of law and governmental accountability. The involvement of these actors has 
been traced too, as they showed up in every case. This alone makes this dissertation a 
valuable contribution to the field of Europeanization. Only 8.3% of the total number 
of Europeanization articles published between 1981 and 2000 focused on NGOs; by 
comparison for example, 33.3% focused on policy-making and 16.7% on foreign 
policy.192
The original design of the research was to trace the fate of civil society alone; 
however, this proved impossible. The centrality of the political branch of the 
Executive in shaping the domestic opportunity structure for all other actors, civil 
society especially, was discovered to be an empirical reality, and the inclusion of the 
Executive in all cases could not be avoided. Indeed, the empirical facts of the third 
case obliged a focus on the Executive and their construction and utilisation of 
Europe, to the relative smaller focus on civil society -  notwithstanding that the case
190 Ibid.
191 Checkel, 2005, p. 5.
192 Featherstone, Introduction, p. 6.
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had originally been selected because domestic civil society had been observed 
attempting to utilise the EU in challenging an expensive motorway. Process-tracing 
then revealed the Executive to have learnt no less than civil society how to construct 
and utilise Europe as a resource. In this case their construction and utilisation of 
Europe was aimed at empowering themselves not against their civil society 
opponents, which mobilised much later in this case, but against their domestic 
political opponents before the elections.
The cases studied were also selected for their controversial nature, in the hope that 
controversy might yield a particularly rich vein of information -  a richness essential 
to any research that aims rather to fully understand Europeanization than to predict it. 
Being controversial, the cases received a lot of attention inside and outside Romania. 
This is a crucial advantage, in that it makes it likelier that the processes to be traced 
will be ‘unbroken’, that is, free of evidentiary gaps. The acts of the interested parties 
will be better documented, so that the real causes of the conjectured Europeanization 
may be discovered. The criterion of controversy, however, entailed a selection bias 
toward atypical cases. This in turn may well bias the empirical results, for example, 
toward ignoring, perhaps, more subtle forms of Europeanization like incremental 
normative drift.193 It was endeavoured to compensate for these possible shortcomings 
by tracing not just one political contest but several of them in order of time. This 
diachronic approach should allow the detection of changes in actors’ resources as 
well as perceptions and learning as the evolution of these might become visible from 
one controversy to another.
The research method is comparative and therefore the cases were selected to be
193 Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel, T h e Impact o f EU Political Conditionality’ in Frank 
Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (ed.), The Europeanization o f  Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 34.
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comparable. They have involved the same actors and actor-collectives, have 
unfolded under the same government, that is, in the period 2001-2004, when 
Romania was ruled by a coalition dominated by the Social Democrat Party under 
Prime Minister Adrian Nastase, and during the period in which Romania negotiated 
the acquis. This homogeneity between cases allows one to carefully trace the 
processes that lead to the differential empowerment outcomes studied herein and thus 
established with greater certainty a cause-effect relation. The third case (the 
Transylvania Motorway) is particularly important not only in that it provides crucial 
insight into the limits of civil society empowerment by the EU but also because it 
captures the Executive skilfully deploying the EU to empower itself.
The research design pays attention not only the interests and utilisations of actors but 
also their constructions, values and norms. Therefore, it has been important to select 
cases from a policy area where norms seem to have mattered, so as to shed light on 
both logics of behaviour. It has been asserted that certain policy areas are inherently 
more normative than others, hence more suitable for the sociological approach; 
whereas, the more technical sides of the acquis, having little ‘normative content’, 
would be unsuitable for a study like this one.194 Norms are central to the 
environmental policy area, thus it has been considered a field of research that could 
shed light on values as well as interests. Accordingly, the three cases were selected 
from the interface of environmental policy and other policy domains; viz. cultural 
policy in the Dracula Park case; industrial policy in the Rosia Montana case; and 
transportation policy in the Transylvanian Motorway case.
194 Dimitrova and Rhinard, 2005.
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Romania is a ‘critical case’ for evaluating the potential of the bottom-up approach for 
furthering our understanding of Europeanization. The Romanian Executive in 
general and the Nastase government in particular was outstandingly hostile to civil 
society influence and participation, except for trade unions and business. Such 
conditions set up model cases of civil society reaction and mobilisation against the 
Executive. Moreover, Romanian civil society is poorly developed, operating under 
severe material and institutional constraints. The expectations as to civil society 
behaviour yield an antinomy that can only be resolved empirically. On the one hand, 
it is reasonable to expect that post-communist path-dependency would be strong 
enough to inhibit Europeanization: Romanian environmental organisations, notorious 
for their low capacity to mobilise, would fail to recognise the new opportunities, 
particularly as utilising them has been theorised to require entrepreneurs who take 
the initiative. On the other hand, like all other Romanians, civil society operates in a 
hostile environment of severe resource scarcity, they may reasonably be expected to 
seize any new opportunities created by Europe to escape these constraints and others 
imposed on them by a deeply hierarchical and centralised State. In addition, 
Romania, being a ‘problem’ candidate, has been a straggler in the accession process. 
Thus, one might expect Brussels’ to take a stronger hand than in other cases, thus 
limiting domestic actors’ room for manoeuvre from the bottom-up. If under such 
unfavourable conditions for bottom-up Europeanization, domestic actors are still 
observed to find ways to empower themselves, then a fortiori one should expect this 
to happen under less constraining conditions.
The evidence yielded is qualitative, and was adduced from a multiplicity of sources: 
more than 60 interviews face-to-face; telephone and email interviews with leaders of 
Romanian civil society organisations, academics, journalists, European Commission
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officials, Members of the Romanian and of the European Parliament, Romanian 
senior civil servants and ministers, and the EU negotiations team; legal and policy 
documents; online discussion forums involving some of the most prominent civil 
society organisations, including the ones featured in this dissertation; news reports; 
and radio archives {viz. BBC Romanian and Radio Free Europe).
The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a background to the case 
studies, and is divided into two parts. The first part gives a broad overview of the 
post-1989 Romanian political system; of the several Communist legacies; of the 
conditions under which the new social movements emerged and their relations with 
the Romanian State; and of the general characteristics of the Romanian Executive. 
Civil society is revealed to operate under a closed domestic opportunity structure that 
affords little or no participation in policy-making processes. The new civil society is 
fragmented, poor in material and human resources, with little capacity to mobilise, 
and lacking in credibility. In stark contrast, the Executive operates under few 
institutional or social constraints. The second part is an ‘up-close’ background of the 
condition of civil society, focusing on the complex genesis of one of the cases -  the 
Rosia Montana gold project. It reveals that neither civil society nor the Executive 
made much of Europe for self-empowerment prior to the commencement of acquis 
negotiations in 2000.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 expound the case studies, presenting them in chronological order: 
Chapter 3 expounds Dracula Park (2000-2001); Chapter 4, the Rosia Montana gold 
mining project (2002 -  2004); and Chapter 5, the Transylvanian Motorway affair 
(2003-2004). In the Dracula Park case, a small group of protestors constructed and 
utilised both Europe and UNESCO in hopes of constraining the Executive to 
abandon a tourism development in close proximity to the medieval Saxon town of
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Sighisoara, in the heart of Transylvania. In the event the Executive chose to constrain 
itself, because it anticipated a loss of international reputation as well as difficulties 
that might have delayed accession to the EU. Although constrained, the Executive 
are observed to utilise Europe, too, in tandem with domestic power resources, in 
order to minimise their consequent liability. The Executive’s self-constraint is best 
explained by a combination of rational-choice and sociological interpretations.
In Chapter 4, a group of farmers managed to controvert a government-favoured gold 
mining project that was likely to have harmed the environmental and cultural 
heritage of the ancient Roman mining town of Albumus Maior, now called Rosia 
Montana. They were empowered by trans-national civil society entrepreneurs, who 
constructed the EU as a community of environmental values, and who lobbied MEPs 
and the Commission. These supranational actors then intervened in ways that obliged 
the Executive again to constrain themselves insofar as not to ‘grandfather-in’ under 
pre-EU rules as planned the permit to mine gold. They changed course because they 
anticipated being sanctioned by the supranationals and also by Hungary (by then a 
member-State), as well as losing reputation and credibility before other member- 
States. Pressurised to abandon the project, they managed to temporise, postponing its 
implementation instead. They constrained themselves (to the extent that they did) 
with less reluctance this time than in the Dracula Park case, because they perceived 
the material and political benefits of the mining project to be relatively minor at that 
time in comparison with the Park. At the same time, the Executive attempted to 
empower themselves by shifting onto the European Commission responsibility for 
taking a decision on the permit, in hopes that this might bolster their credibility and 
burnish their image before the EU.
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Chapter 5 (the Transylvania Motorway) contrasts with the previous two cases. This 
case is one of ‘high politics’: the potential domestic political benefits of building the 
Motorway are much more significant to the political parties in the governing 
coalition, and the stakes in their re-election higher than in the other cases. But in 
order to reap these benefits, they must openly breach the EU law of public 
procurement, despite having just promised the Commission to honour it. The 
Executive eventually escape the full consequences of the ensuing supranational 
sanctions. They succeed because by then they had built trans-national alliances with 
interested Heads of State in the Council as well as with certain supranational 
politicians. One result of these alliances was the timely assurance of Romania’s 
accession to membership of the EU, which shielded the Executive from the 
damaging domestic consequences of the sanctions. This case also contrasts with the 
previous two in that civil society was not empowered. Despite the expectations raised 
by their prior successes, neither environmental nor any other civil society group 
exerted influence over any aspect of the Motorway. They failed to obtain anything 
that they wanted, even though the supranational organs constrained the Executive 
more rigorously than in Dracula Park or Rosia Montana.
Chapter 6 (Conclusions) compares and contrasts the findings of the several case 
studies, drawing the main conclusions of the dissertation. With the help of Europe 
domestic as well as trans-national civil society empowered themselves, and prevailed 
over the Executive. Power thus diffused to them, but only at those points of time in 
the accession process -  the beginning and peak of the acquis negotiations -  when the 
Executive was most sensitive to EU sanctions. Once the Executive became assured 
of membership, they regained their monopoly of policy planning, and proceeded as 
planned in the teeth of supranational opposition. They, too, utilised Europe to escape
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constraints on their discretion imposed by Romania’s accession to the EU, 
implementing a decision they deemed necessary to empower themselves before the 
elections over their opponents.
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Chapter 2: The status quo before the advent of Europe
This chapter gives an insight into the Romanian status quo before domestic actors 
began to construct and utilise Europe to empower themselves domestically. The 
Europeanization processes documented in Chapters 3-5 are better evaluated against 
such a background. The chapter is divided in two parts. Part One (The Context) and 
its three sections provide an overview of the two key actors studied in the cases in 
this dissertation -  the new social movements and the Executive, -  and of their 
relations since 1989. It also sketches-in the main features of the current Romanian 
political system and its Communist legacies. Part Two (Domestic inertia before 
Europe) focuses in on some of the themes introduced in Part One by investigating in 
some depth the history of the Rosia Montana gold mining project before this became 
controversial in 2002.
2.1 The context
2.1.1 The new social movements 
By contrast to other CEE countries, in post-1989 Romania the new social movements 
emerged from scratch. Ceausescu’s ‘totalitarian-sultanistic’ regime was particularly 
harsh never venturing any of the de-Stalinization that everywhere else in CEE 
permitted some reform of the Communist Party and of society.195 Romania 
experienced nothing like Solidarity in Poland; the Party tolerated only civil society 
organisations created from the top-down by the Party itself.196 The Securitate, the
195 Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, ‘The Effects o f Totaliarism-cum-Sultanism on Democratic Transition: 
Romania’ in Linz and Stepan, Problems o f  Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South 
America, and Post-Communist Europe, (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 352.
196 Linz and Stepan, p. 355; Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism fo r All Seasons: A Political History o f  Romanian 
Communism (California: University o f California Press, 2003), p. 4; Laurence Whitehead, ‘East-Central Europe 
in Comparative Perspective’ in Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring and George Sanford, Building Democracy? The 
International Dimension o f  Democratisation in Eastern Europe (London, Leicester University Press, 1994), p.
57.
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largest secret police in Communist Europe, infiltrated all of private life, strangling in 
the cradle anything like a civil society. (It was recently discovered to have recruited
107even children as young as 12). Repression of dissent was stronger than in any of
|  Q O
Romania’s neighbours.
The hope that a vibrant civil society might develop once the Ceausescu clan was 
overthrown in 1989 never materialised. The new social movements that began to 
emerge were stifled by manifold factors. One was the Communist legacy -  a 
preference for informal networks and mistrust of all organisations. The post- 
Communist reality contained others: -  poverty, low public morale, low levels of trust 
in domestic institutions, which in most cases failed to deliver the expected well­
being, and a lack of support by the State.199 As in most CEE countries the emergent 
Romanian civil society was anything but vibrant: private networks continued to 
dominate, often mutually disconnected and hostile to the public sphere.200
By the end of the 1990s, most of the new civil society organisations were small and 
made of volunteers who lacked the time, resources, knowledge, skills and 
commitment to engage in real policy-making. Most volunteers were attracted to the 
sector not for what it stood for but because of what it offered in material terms (e.g. 
access to computers and Internet, opportunities for training and travelling abroad). 
Except for trade unions, mobilisation rates remained low, particularly in rural
197 BBC, 19 July 2006.
198 Linz and Stepan, p. 352.
199 Marc Morje Howard, The Weakness o f  Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); Stephen Welch, ‘Democracy without Civil Society?’, International Studies Review 
(2004), vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 306-308.
200 Howard, p. 17.
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areas,201 notwithstanding that as in other post-Communist countries in the region202, 
the number of civil society organisations increased particularly after mid-1990s.203
Indeed in 2004 Romania was estimated to have no less than 70,000 civil society 
organisations, and this number was growing at the outstandingly high annual rate of 
10%.204 However, as few as 2,000 organisations (at most 4,000) were reported to be
90S‘active’. The rest were typically ‘one-person operations’ trying to eke a living out 
of the external funding opportunities meant to develop civil society in Romania.206 
Moreover, the rapid growth of the sector was being accompanied by a similarly rapid 
‘mortality rate’ due to the dearth of actual funding on one side and of seriousness of 
purpose on the other.
As of the beginning of 2000, Romanian civil society organisations generally lacked 
human and financial resources as well as expertise in most areas, including internal 
organisational management and fundraising.207 Most were active only at the local 
level; only a few were active at the regional, national or international levels. Most 
involved themselves in small-scale projects delivering social services like health care 
or child protection, or raising public awareness of issues little known in Romania 
(e.g. environmental protection, minority and human rights, the rule of law, and
201 Carmen Epure, Oana Tiganescu and Ancuta Vamesu, Romanian Civil Society: An Agenda fo r Progress A 
Preliminary Report On The Civicus Index On Civil Society Project In Romania, Civil Society Development 
Foundation, Bucharest, August 2001, <http://www.fdsc.ro/PDF/Civicus%20index%20- 
Romania%20preliminarv%20report.pdf> (accessed May 2003).
202 Laszlo Bruszt, David Stark, Balazs Vedres, ‘Rooted Transnational Publics: Interfacing Civic Activism and 
Foreign Ties, Theory and Society (forthcoming).
203 Noted across the CEE region from East Germany to Russia -  see Howard, 2003.
204 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2004: Romania, 2004,
<http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/nispacee/unpan016585.pdf> (accessed January 2004); 
Ministry o f  European Integration, Document de Programare Multi-Anuala A Sectorului Societate Civila (2003- 
2007) (draft), Bucharest 2003.
205 Freedom House, Nations.
206 Interview by the author with Oana Penu, Project Coordinator, Regional Environmental Centre for Central and 
Eastern Europe, Bucharest, 3 September 2004
207 Jan Aart Scholte, ‘Globalisation, Governance and Democracy in Post Communist Romania’, Democratisation 
(1998), vol. 5 no. 4, pp. 52-77.
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accountability). Few had any policy expertise or knowledge of Romanian public 
administration, and even fewer were trying to influence public policy.209 Those that 
did tended to be organisations in Transylvania and in Bucharest (where 86% of
910Romania’s civil society organisations are located) who had better material and
911human resources and are well-connected with Western civil society organisations.
Throughout the 1990s, the new social movements rarely engaged in lobbying the
919State. However, as the empirical case studies herein will show, several times 
during the EU acquis negotiations, they succeeded in lobbying the EU organs in 
Brussels as well as international and other European institutions. Protests or any
91 ^
other kind or direct action were rare. So were lawsuits, although some 
intensification of litigation over access to information had been noticeable over the 
last few years.
As of beginning of 2000, the Romanian civil society’s agenda continued to be 
dominated by the more pressing issues of lack of funding and human resources; a 
high degree of conflict between organisations over scarce resources, influence and 
prestige;214 poor coordination, communication and networking; mutual mistrust;215
91 f\State-imposed constraints limiting their autonomy; a closed domestic opportunity 
structure which provided them with few channels to influence or scrutinise policy-
208 Epure, Tiganescu et al. 2001; Freedom House, Nations.
209 Christine Kruger and Alexander Carius, Environmental policy in Romania. Towards EU  accession, (Berlin, 
Ecologic, 2001); Interview by the author with Florin Vasiliu, Legal Expert, Support Centre for Non-Government 
Organisations (CENTRAS), 12 July 2003.
210 Epure, Tiganescu et al., 2001.
211 Dan Manoleli (Ecology Professor, Bucharest University), commentary made during T he Role o f NGOs in 
Romania’s Accession to the EU’ Conference, organised by the Delegation o f the European Commission, 
Bucharest, 10-11 July 2003 (observed by the author).
212 Vasiliu, interview, 2003.
213 Out o f the 113 cases o f environmental prosecution recorded by 2002 none had been initiated by environmental 
organisations (The Environmental Protection Inspectorate DrobetaTumu-Severin web site,, 202, 
<http://www.protectia-mediului.ro/> (accessed January 2003).
214 Manoleli, commentary, 2003 conference.
2,5 Ibid.
216 CENTRAS, Forumul Organizatiilor Neguvernamentale din Romania: 'Dezvoltarea Societatii Civile, the 8th 
edition, January 2002.
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7 1 7making; and public mistrust of civil society. (The latter has been partly blamed on 
instances of corruption involving civil society: at the end of the 1990s, for example, 
the media exposed the misuse of civil society organisations for importing tax-free, 
second-hand cars). Once the process of accession to the EU gained momentum after 
2000, Romanian civil society began to pay more attention to the EU. However, EU 
policy issues remained of marginal interest to most organisations, which became 
mostly concerned about the opportunities that accession has or will create for them
7 1 8such as access to EU funds.
Indeed, starting with 1993, the EU has provided funding to civil society 
organisations in the accession countries. In fact after the withdrawal of most other 
foreign donors in the mid-1990s, the EU became one of the main sources of
7 1 0  7 7 f\funding. Yet, at least before accession, this funding had little impact. Most 
funds were granted for narrowly focused projects such as establishing resource 
centres for civil society groups, citizens’ advice bureaux, and mass-media and
771information campaigns. Few domestic organisations were able to access these 
grants. The difficulty (amongst others) of meeting stringent eligibility criteria 
deterred most organisations from applying. The applicant had to prove that it had 
‘robust and substantial financial and human resources’, and that it could contribute
7 7 710-20% to the cost of its project proposal. At least in the environmental field, few
2,7 Trust for Civil Society in Eastern Europe, 2001 Sustainability Index: Romania,
<http://www.ceetrust.org/romania1 romania.html> (Accessed April 2003).
218 CENTRAS, 2005, http://www.centras.ro/mainro.shtml?cmdf831=i8622956d92d46d40519a38c39cf52bl40. 
(accessed 29 April 2005).
219 Joann Carmin and Stacy D. Vandeveer, ‘Enlarging EU Environments: Central and Eastern Europe from 
Transition to Accession’, Environmental Politics, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 3-24 (p. 11); Petr Jehliaka and Andrew 
Tickle, ‘Environmental Implications o f Eastern Enlargement: The End o f Progressive EU Environmental 
Policy?’, Environmental Politics (2004), vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 77 -  95 (p. 84).
220 Interview by the author with Ioana Derscanu, Task Officer Civil Society, Delegation o f the European 
Commission in Bucharest, 2 September 2004; Interview by the author with Radu Mititean, Executive Director, 
Cyclo-Tourism Club Napoca, 15 September 2004.
221 Mititean, interview, 2004.
222 Ibid.
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if  any Romanian environmental NGOs qualified:
No environmental NGO in Romania meets these conditions, so most of 
them do not even try to apply [for EU funding]. No national 
environmental or even regional NGO is strong enough ... most [NGOs] are 
small and local. Also, financially, these [NGOs] are not very stable or well 
developed; most of the time they struggle to survive. You have to prove 
that as an NGO you have strong and substantial financial and human 
resources, which very few organisations have.
Although Romanian NGOs were also eligible for funding directly with the European 
Commission in Brussels, as of 2003, only a few were known to have applied (none 
these were environmental NGOs).224
Access to EU funds was obstructed not only by the civil society’s own weakness. 
The fact that some of these EU (and other external) funds were channelled to civil 
society through the State -  being granted for institution building projects that 
included partnerships with civil society organisations -  also contributed. Such 
institutional arrangements reportedly diminished the autonomy of civil society, 
breeding patron-client relationships between the State and certain privileged groups.
This appears to have been the case particularly under the Nastase government (2000- 
2004), which found ways of constraining civil society in accessing EU and other 
external funds which the State was supposed to channel to them. Executive 
Emergency Ordinance 37/2003, for example, prioritised the funding of organisations 
that the State had beforehand classified as ‘public utilities’.225 In theory any 
organisation could have become a public utility;226 in practice the ambiguity and 
vagueness of the decree meant that State bureaucrats wielded ample discretion to
223 Mititean, interview, 2004; Interview by the author with Ionut Sibian, Project Co-ordinator, Civil Society 
Development Foundation, 12 September 2004.
224 Derscanu, interview, 2004.
225 A public utility may, for example, manage a local heating network (Epure, Tiganescu et al., p. 18).
226 Epure, Tiganescu et al., p. 18.
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9 9 7decide who qualified. By the end of 2003, Freedom House reported that the 14 
‘public utilities’ that received funding from the State and three of these were
99Qconnected to the Prime Minister.
This dependency on State approval encouraged opportunistic behaviour, both by the 
State and by civil society.229 Many civil society organisations were drawn into 
supporting the status quo in exchange for funding.230 Often these organisations were 
poorly skilled, ‘shell’ NGOs, set up by entrepreneurs to eke out a living. Business 
entrepreneurs set up dummy NGOs for tax sheltering purposes as the NGOs were 
exempted from tax.
‘Shell’ NGOs were also set up by political entrepreneurs scrambling for funds which
9^ 9they would not otherwise have been eligible for. Political parties, Members of 
Parliament, even central and local administrations were reported to have set up their 
own NGO partners to grab EU funds. This phenomenon was apparently amplified 
in 2003 when the Nastase government introduced the Act on Funding of Political 
Parties and Electoral Campaigns, (No. 43/2003). The Act dismantled all limits on the 
funding of political parties and electoral campaigns by civil society organisations.234 
This raised the concern -  expressed in 2003 by the Romanian Ministry of European 
Integration -  that it might be used by political parties for partisan purposes and even
227 Ion Olteanu, Ex-Government Counsellor, Office for Govemment-NGO Relations paraphrased in Epure, 
Tiganescu et al., p. 18.
228 Freedom House, Nations, p. 7.
229 Dan Manoleli, Central Administration and Accession to the European Union. The Map o f  Players and Issues 
o f  the Accession to the European Union (Bucharest: Open Society Foundation, 2003), pp. 9-21.
230 Interview by the author with Dumitru Mihu, former civil servant, Romanian Environment Ministry, 14 July 
2003.
231 Penu, interview, 2004.
232 Ion Olteanu, Ioana Avadani, Mihai Lisetchi, Letter o f  response to the Strategy fo r  the Development o f  the Civil 
Society in Romania, presented at The Role o f  NGOs in Romania’s Accession to the EU  Conference, held in 
Bucharest, July 2003, posted on <Mediu@ngo.ro>. 20 August 2003.
233 Mititean, interview, 2004; Penu, interview, 2004.
234 Vasiliu, interview, 2003.
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be abused to facilitate money laundering. The pursuit of basic material wants 
contributed to an explosion of non-governmental organisations and of ‘partnerships’ 
after 2000-2001. The phenomenon became so widespread by 2004 that some 
referred to the phenomenon as ‘the alternative civil society’.237
It was to be such weaknesses intrinsic to civil society and the constraints imposed on 
it by other domestic actors that will soon drive a few civil society entrepreneurs to 
deploy Europe and the EU strategically so as to empower themselves not only with 
basic action capacity but also relative to the State (see the empirical case studies in 
this dissertation).
2.1.2 State-civil society relations 
Post-1989 relations between Romanian civil society and the State developed along 
Statist/corporatist lines. The State’s ‘social partners’ were trade unions and business;
‘7‘IQ
it excluded most other civil society actors. ‘Civil society entrepreneurs’ tried to 
establish formal relations with the central and local government Executives shortly 
after the toppling of Ceausescu. Their attempts met with little success. Both central 
and local State authorities were highly reluctant to communicate with civil society 
organisations or include them in policy decisions. Sometimes they were rejected 
openly and blatantly with comments like: ‘Why should we consult with you? Such 
things are confidential’; or ‘We disapprove the participation of NGOs [non­
governmental organisations], as we have functionaries who are responsible for these 
things; we will not tolerate all kinds of anti- and non-governmental organisations
235 Ministry o f  European Integration, 2003
236 Sibian, interview, 2004.
237 Mititean, interview, 2004.
238 Olteanu, Avadani and Lisetchi, Letter. Interview by the author with Doina Constantinescu, senior civil servant, 
Environmental Department, Industry Ministry, 12 July 2003.
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interloping in State affairs’.239 Reactions like these were the norm in the early 1990s, 
and they were sometimes even signed or stamped by the local Prefect, the central 
government representative.240
Throughout the 1990s the relations between the State and the new social movements 
were characterised by lack of communication, mutual suspicion, and hostility, even 
though the State, under pressure from the general process of accession to the EU, 
began in the mid-1990s to adopt various top-down initiatives intended to formalise 
relations with the new social movements. These initiatives included legal procedures 
mandating State consultation of civil society, and the instituting of formal 
organisational structures of consultation. These top-down initiatives became more 
frequent once the process of accession to the EU took off after the entering into force 
of the Europe Agreement in 1995, and even more once acquis negotiations were 
opened in 2000. However, as with many other institutional reforms in Romania, the 
changes did not go much beyond shallow formalism. Indeed, the weight of the 
empirical evidence suggests that, in fact, the Romanian State at all levels continued 
to be little interested in dialoguing with the new social movements.
Institutionalising relations with civil society was first attempted in 1994 by the Social 
Democrat government, when an Inter-Ministerial Working Group for Supporting 
Civil Society Development was set up.241 This was prompted by the promise of EU 
financial assistance to Romania -  in this case a PHARE-funded project -  for 
reforming the Romanian public administration. The experiment ended as ‘an 
exploratory exercise’, its sole outcome being a (half-finished) report evaluating the
239 Mititean, interview, 2004;
240 Ibid.
241 CENTRAS, 2002:101
state of co-operation between the State and civil society.243
When in 1996 the Social Democrats were succeeded by a centre-right coalition, their 
programme featured a whole section dedicated to collaboration with civil society.244 
In 1998 Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea set up an Office for State-Civil Society 
Relations within his Cabinet and instructed all local governing bodies to charge a 
member of staff with responsibility for civil society relations.245 The result was an 
‘informal network’ of departments for civil society relations across the country; few 
meetings with civil society actually took place.246 A year later, in February 1999, the 
Office was reshuffled and its staff folded Russian doll-like, into another office- 
within-an-office: the Unit for NGO Relations within the Department for Social 
Dialogue, arranged under the Council for Economic and Financial Co-ordination. 
Nonetheless, by the end of 1999 only a small number of consultations with a handful 
of ‘carefully selected’ organisations had actually taken place.247
In yet another government reshuffle, in 2000, under the new PM Mugur Isarescu, 
many more offices and departments were set up by Executive Ordinance to formalise 
relations with civil society at all levels: ‘Within Parliamentary chambers, within the 
Romanian Presidency, within the General Secretariat of the Government, within the 
Office of the Ombudsman, and within autonomous government agencies, ministries 
and other specialised organs of the central public administration and of the local 
public administration, there shall operate organisational structures for the relations 
with [private] associations and foundations’. Most State organisations ignored the
243 ibid.
244 Ibid.
245 Ibid., p. 102.
246 Ibid.
247 Mititean, interview, 2004;
248 Romanian Government, ‘Ordinance no. 26 from 30 January 2000 regarding associations and foundations’, 
Official Journal, no. 39, 31 January 2000.
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Ordinance.249 The structures that were set-up were poorly staffed, short-lived 
‘political footballs’ that ‘had great difficulty co-operating with civil society 
organisations’.250
The domestic opportunity structure became particularly closed for the new social 
movements under the rule of the neo-Communist Social Democrats (PSD) (who were 
in power for most of Romania’s first 15 years of transition). When the PSD returned 
to power at the end of 2000, the new PM, Adrian Nastase, created in January 2001 
another department under his own direction to replace the former bureau in charge of 
civil society relations. This was necessary, Nastase claimed, because ‘partnership 
with civil society is a necessary condition for improving governmental policies’. 
However, except for an intensification of rhetoric, little actually happened until July 
2003, when another government reshuffle saw the re-organisation of all ministerial 
Departments for Relations with Non-governmental Organisations, making them 
essentially inoperative.
All this evidence suggests that the State was not in fact earnest about dialoguing with 
the new social movements, in spite of the structures that were continually being 
recycled to formalise relations with them. The fact that all these ‘reforms’ coincided 
with the period in which the process of Romania’s accession to the EU was gaining 
momentum suggests they may have been undertaken in response to the government’s 
perception of how they ought to behave or appear to behave within the new context.
249 CENTRAS, 2002, pp. 103, 105.
250 Ex-counsellor to the Office for Govemment-NGOs Relations paraphrased in CENTRAS, 2002, p. 105.
251 CENTRAS, 2002, pp. 20-1.
252 Romanian Government, Department for Institutional and Social Analysis web site (link no longer valid) 
(accessed August 2004).
253 Personal communication with Elena Stefanescu, civil servant, Ministry of European Integration, Department 
for the Relation with the Public and NGOs, 12 July 2003.
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That only shallow formalism is likely to have been at work in the arena of State-civil 
society relations is corroborated by the generality of this phenomenon. Throughout 
the 1990s, Romanians put little stock in formal institutions, which, despite existing 
on paper, were widely ignored or abused in reality. Distrust in formal structures and 
the dominance of informal norms of behaviour was still a powerful Communist 
legacy for most of the 1990s even in the teeth of external pressures, such as the EU’s 
insistence on administrative reform. Indeed, these very pressures were often co-opted 
by the partisan elite in power and utilised publicly to justify ministerial or 
administrative changes that were in fact motivated by domestic power games. It has 
become a commonplace amongst Romanians that these frequent and very opaque 
reshufflings and restructurings are typically motivated by personal interests and ties 
between power-brokers, notwithstanding their justification by reference to accession 
conditionality.254
Often the fate of government structures pivoted on private interests entirely, such as 
which cronies the current Cabinet wanted to employ; having determined this, 
ministerial portfolios were then cooked up to accommodate them. The ‘churning 
out’ of formal structures at the highest (Cabinet or Prime Ministerial) level is likely 
to have been motivated by very similar considerations as well as by the government’s 
perception that this would look good before the EU.
The accession process did obligate Romania to transpose a flurry of legislation 
mandating that the authorities consult civil society. In theory this created new 
opportunities for civil society to influence government decisional processes, as many 
domestic laws now provided for public and stakeholder consultations. The accession
254 Interview by the author with Task Officer, European Commission Delegation in Bucharest, 13 July 2003.
255 Ibid.
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process also obligated the Romanian government to ratify all the international 
conventions it had signed. These too created a new opportunity for domestic civil 
society -  in particular the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information and Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and the Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo)256 [see Chapter Four].
Some of these laws were introduced in the absence of any EU Directives (e.g. public 
administration reform laws like the Act on Decisional Transparency of the Public 
Administration, No. 52/2003). They were driven from the top-down by the European 
Commission and its Delegations who relied mainly on informal conditionality to 
influence the quality of the domestic State-civil society relations.
Indeed, European Commission officials had constantly ‘encouraged’ the Romanian 
government to respect EU principles of good governance like accountability and 
transparency, public- and stakeholder consultation, and social dialogue.257 
Occasionally, EU organs publicly backed up civil society demands, lending moral 
support by publishing statements in favour of their campaigns (e.g. for the Campaign
• 'I C QAgainst Corruption at the Local Level in Romania). The Commission also took 
steps to establish relations of its own with civil society in accession countries. One 
example has been the regular meetings under the ‘EU Dialogue’, in which the 
Commission familiarised NGOs with EU institutions and policies, encouraging their 
participation to policy consultations in Brussels, and, above all, urging them to 
watchdog the candidate government’s compliance with EU conditionality.
256 Mititean, interview, 2004.
257 European Commission, Strengthening social dialogue in Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, Istanbul, le 19 
novembre 2004 Discours d'ouverture de Madame Odile Quintin, Directeur g6n6ral de l'Emploi et des Affaires 
sociales, Commission europdenne.
258 Interview by the author with Dolores Neagoe, Task Officer Civil Society, Delegation o f the European 
Commission, Bucharest, 2 September 2004.
259 Carmin and Vandeveer, p. 18.
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However, most of the new laws were poorly implemented as late as 2004,
961suggesting that, just as in some EU member-States, opportunities decreed from the 
top down are in themselves insufficient to empower domestic civil society per se. 
Domestic laws mandating public access to information, for example, contain 
manifold exemptions which the authorities exploited to restrict public access 
anyway.262 Furthermore, regardless who was in power, civil society actors commonly 
reported being denied or ignored in their requests for public information. In some 
cases, the government circumvented accountability by classifying public contracts
96^‘secret’ and thus forbidding access to information. In other cases, individual 
Ministers issued Ministerial Orders (secondary legislation) charging fees for 
releasing information in the Ministry’s possession. Such Orders in fact amended the 
provisions of the Free Access to Information Act that the State shall make public 
information available free of charge 264 By charging for searching and photocopying 
of information prices higher than the market price, Ministries such as the
•  • 965Environment Ministry prohibited the NGOs’ access to State information. Such 
amendments were deemed unconstitutional as a Ministerial Order cannot modify an 
Act of Parliament. (The Environment Ministry allegedly admitted, in the wake of a 
media expose, that the fees they had introduced were a ‘mistake’ and promised to
9 6 6rectify the matter, but two years on, the fees were still standing).
Under such constraining circumstances, civil society have had to rely on ‘informal 
channels’ of information -  i.e. civil servants with whom certain NGOs have personal
260 Interview by the author with DG Environment, European Commission, 6 July 2005.
261 Kimber, p. 174.
262 Email communication with Sorin Ionita (Research Director), Romanian Academic Society, Bucharest, 18 
March 2006.
263 Mititean, interview, 2004.
264 Bugdahn, p. 190.
265 Mititean, email posted on Discussion List on Environment, Mediu@ngo.ro, 4 June 2003.
266 Mititean, interview, 2004.
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contacts. But these friendly civil servants must be highly discreet about passing on to 
third parties even information that was not confidential, resorting to spy-novel ruses 
like anonymous emails or meetings in a public park, because ‘the boss had better not
*)fnsee me’. In a few instances, activists have even resorted to the lawcourts to wrest 
information from the State. In spite of the new laws, then, opportunities to access 
information held by the State have remained scarce for the new social movements.
As for consultations, the process of acquis negotiations has been responsible for the 
first-ever consultation of Romanian environmental civil society. This happened in 
October 2001, and was driven by the government’s submission of its Position Paper 
on Environment to the European Commission, the first stage in the negotiations 
process. The consultation was organised by the Environment Ministry on advice 
from Commission negotiators.268 Although civil society were given too little time (1- 
2 days) for anyone to make any sensible comments,269 this first consultation was
970perceived at the time as a milestone in Romanian State-civil society relations. It 
proved a one-off event, however, as witness, a year later, the scores of organisations 
complaining to Environment Minister Lificiu that they had been ‘cut o ff from 
contact with the Ministry.271 (Lificiu promised to meet with them, but when they
979arrived in Bucharest, ‘nobody in the ministry remembered anything about it’. ) An 
NGO delegation did later meet with Lificiu and with Chief Accession Negotiator
97^
Vasile Puscas -  they reported that the officials’ tone was ‘threatening’. Lificiu told
267 Ibid.
268 Mititean, interview, 2004.
269 Personal Communication with research officer, Regional Environmental Centre for Central and Eastern 
Europe, Bucharest, 14 July 2003.
270 Mititean, interview, 2004.
271 Ibid.
272 Ibid.
273 Interview by the author with Lavinia Andrei, Director, Terra Mileniul III, 11 July 2003; Manoleli, conference 
commentary.
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them that the Environment Ministry ‘has no obligation to consult NGOs’.274
Nonetheless, meetings between the Environment Ministry and environmental groups 
did take place thereafter, two to four times a year, which, compared to the status quo 
ante, amounted to some ‘contact’, at least, between these groups and Ministry civil 
servants. Most of these meetings, however, were mere updates on the Ministry’s 
activities, not proper consultations.275 Furthermore, civil society veterans complained 
that the government too often consulted organisations ‘nobody ever heard o f  276 
(The earnestly active environmental organisations in Romania are so few, and they 
know each other so well, that dummy ones like these are spotted instantly.277) When 
anything like consultation did take place, it was ‘unpredictable’, ‘irregular’ and ‘at 
short notice’; i.e. only a few days before the event.278 Thus, as late as 2004, the 
relations between the State and the new social movements was still informal.279 Civil 
society elites claimed that they were ‘deliberately excluded from the institutionalised
<^O A
system’ , notwithstanding that the State had toned up its rhetoric about the
AO 1
importance of consultation and partnership.
At the European Commission Delegation’s behest (in response to complaints from 
civil society that they have been excluded from the acquis negotiations),282 in 2004 
the Nastase government instituted within the Ministry of European Integration a new 
formality of State-civil society collaboration, with the goal of assisting the
274 Mititean, interview, 2004.
275 Andrei, interview, 2003; Interview by the author Anca Tofan, Director, Regional Environmental Centre for 
Central and Eastern Europe in Bucharest, 14 July 2003.
276 Mititean, interview, 2004; Manoleli, conference commentary.
277 Andrei, interview, 2004; personal communication with Viorel Lascu, Director European Integration, Oradea 
County Council, 14 July 2003.
278 Derscanu, interview, 2004; Mititean, interview, 2004.
279 Personal communication with Adrian Popescu, Romanian journalist, Sibiu, 15 July 2003.
280 Maria Kaldor, President Foundation for the Development o f the Civil Society, commentary made during July 
2003 conference.
281 Comments made by civil society representatives at the July 2003 conference.
282 Sibian, interview, 2003.
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Negotiations Team. Included was one environmental organisation, Terra Mileniul 
III. The bulk of the ‘partners’, however, remained trade unions and industry 
groups, the same non-State actors that had always been consulted by the Negotiations 
Team.284
The above evidence suggests that the process of accession to the EU had some effect 
on the Romanian State’s relations with the new social movements. These evolved 
from almost total neglect in the early 1990s to some communication by the end of the 
1990s, and especially after acquis negotiations began in 2000. Romanian civil 
society entrepreneurs themselves were convinced that, without the accession process, 
neither the law nor the practice of consultation, as little and as faulty as they were, 
would have evolved at all in Romania. (Indeed, State authorities have allegedly 
said ‘to NGOs’ faces’, and ‘non-chalantly’ too, that ‘we consult because the EU 
demands it’. ) State actors were observed to have learnt how to mimic consultation, 
as by cherry-picking NGOs they foresaw would approve their decisions or 
consulting dummy NGOs, and to have tempered their rhetoric. The political elites’ 
underlying values had not changed; but, having grasped that mistreating civil society 
in public was no longer ‘politically correct’, they no longer felt free to reject public
788 •consultation openly. Thus, accession did do a little to constrain the Romanian 
State; nevertheless, this constraining effect has generally been weak, as witness the 
closed domestic opportunity structure under which Romanian civil society still 
operated at the beginning of 2000.
283 Mititean, interview, 2004.
284 Vasile Puscas, Romania’s Chief Negotiator, speech given the the July 2003 conference.
285 Mititean, interview, 2004.
286 Sorin Ionita, Executive Director, Romanian Academic Society quoted in ‘Guvemul a bifat doar un sfert din 
angajamentele catre U E Evenimentul Zilei, 29 April 2004; Mititean, interview, 2004.
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Under pressures brought to bear by EU accession conditionality, a kind of twilight 
relationship had thus evolved between the State and the new social movements. For 
this reason, Romanian civil society may be expected to take the initiative to construct 
and utilise Europe and the EU on their own; supply the defects of accession 
conditionality and its insufficient top-down opportunities; and empower themselves 
with the action capacity to move the Romanian State off dead centre.
As the empirical case studies will show, they will indeed use Europe and the EU to 
empower themselves domestically. However, it will take domestic civil society some 
time to learn how to do this. As the history of the Rosia Montana case shows [see 
Section 2.2 below], civil society only woke up to the possibilities of Europe halfway 
through Romania’s acquis negotiations, that is, around 2002. Before then, the 
domestic status quo was largely characterised by a state of inertia with regard to 
domestic actors’ constructing and utilising Europe to empower themselves.
2.1.3 The Executive
Because the controversies studied herein emerged during the tenure of the Nastase 
government between 2000 and 2004, it is necessary to overview the characteristics of 
the Social Democrat Party (henceforward the PSD), and of the Executive institutions 
they staffed during that time.
The PSD was the successor party of the National Salvation Front, the ‘popular front’ 
organisation which metamorphosed out of the Communist Party in 1989, and which, 
under different names, ruled Romania until 1996. As the PSD they were re-elected in 
November 2000, when they won 37% of the popular vote, most of which were 
protest votes intended to punish the ‘ineffectiveness, gridlock and corruption
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scandals’ of the centre-right Romanian Democratic Convention.289 This latter had 
been a ‘coalition of coalitions’ made up of pre-1945 centre-right political parties, 
civic leaders, and the Democratic Union of the Magyars in Romania (hence UDMR), 
and which had governed Romania between 1996 and 2000.290
Although PSD won only a plurality of the popular vote, they nonetheless managed to 
form a majority in Parliament by signing a post-electoral protocol of co-operation 
with the UDMR. This plus a fragmented opposition gave the PSD a comfortable 
margin of control in Parliament, shored by the fact that the Greater Romania Party, 
the party of ‘extremist’ nationalism, though ostracised from this and all governing 
coalitions, almost invariably votes with the PSD 291 The PSD’s position was further 
strengthened by the fact that, traditionally, many Parliamentarians from opposition 
parties defect to the winning coalition (although the most massive wave of defections 
to the PSD took place at the local and county levels).292 Parliamentary rule in 
Romania was already weakened by the Constitutional loophole permitting the 
Executive to legislate by Emergency Ordinance -  a powerful prerogative, and 
particularly so when the same party controls both Executive and Parliament, for the 
consequent Ordinances are unlikely to be amended. This was the case under Nastase, 
and he and his Cabinet fully exploited this constitutional right. Under all 
governments Emergency Ordinances have become notorious for their ‘partisan and 
arbitrary character’.293 Under the PSD they were often denounced for serving the 
interests of only a few power brokers and their clientele.294 All of these factors
289 Monica Ciobanu and Michael Shafir, ‘The 2004 Romanian elections: A test for democratic consolidation?, 
Radio Free Europe Reports (7 april 2005), vol. 7, no. 3.
290 Ibid.
291 Ibid.
292 Vladimir Tismaneanu and Mircea Mihaies, Schelete in dulap (Bucharest: Polirom, 2004), p. 296.
293 Horia R. Patapievici, Commentary, Radio Free Europe, 30 November 2004 (audio).
294 Mona Musca, National Liberal Party MP, commentary made at the July 2003 conference.
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combined to neuter Parliament under the Nastase government.295 Indeed, so plenary 
was the PSD’s control that Nastase became notorious for his contempt of it: 
reportedly he ‘turned his back’ on Members of Parliament when they demanded that 
he gives an annual report on his government’s activities.296
The only potentially significant constraint the PSD elite had to beware throughout 
their tenure was their coalition partner, the UDMR.297 The post-electoral pact 
between PSD and UDMR was subject to annual review, renewal depending on the 
success of the bargains struck between them.298 The bargaining was not always 
smooth. Tensions showed up over some of the UDMR’s most controversial demands, 
such as elaborated constitutional rights for Hungarians and the creation of 
Hungarian-language faculties within Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj, Transylvania. 
Moreover, by 2002-2003 UDMR appeared to be crumpling under the threat of 
defection by radical elements within the party.299 The bargaining was to become 
more intense the closer the elections loomed, as the PSD became obliged to heed not 
only the UDMR’s but also the electorate’s preferences.
Other constitutional constraints were also neutralised. Within the PSD itself, no 
alternative elite existed that could check and balance the one in office, so that a 
significant intra-party veto-point was missing.300 To top it all, the PSD controlled the 
Constitutional Court -  and still did in 2005, after losing the 2004 elections301 -  a
295 Interview by the author with senior official, European Commission Delegation in Bucharest, 10 May 2006.
296 Tismaneanu and Mihaies, p. 270.
297 Alina Mungiu-Pipidi, ‘Constitutional Watch A country-by-country update on constitutional politics in Eastern 
Europe and the ex-USSR 2003’, East European Constitutional Review, winter 2002/spring 2003, 
<http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/voll l_12num4_l/constitutionwatch/romania.html>.
298 Ciobanu and Shafir, The 2004 Romanian elections.
299 Mungiu-Pipidi, 2003.
300 Jean Blondel and Maurizio Cotta, ‘Conclusion’ in Jean Blondel and Maurizio Cotta Party and Government: 
an inquiry into the relationship between governments and supporting parties in liberal democracies (Basingstoke 
: Macmillan, 1996).
301 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Transformation Reloaded?’, SAR Policy Brief, August 2005, p. 2, 
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circumstance that effectively removed constitutional constraints from Nastase and his 
Cabinet.
Few also were the extra-constitutional constraints. Domestic civil society was too
•JAO
weak to pose significant challenges. However they did succeed in constraining the 
Executive on several occasions, as evidenced in the cases studied herein. Even the 
media had been enfeebled by the PSD’s implicit control over a considerable segment 
of it, either through ownership or through indebtedness to banks controlled within the 
Party’s inner circle. The near-vacuum of checks and balances gave pretty much 
plenary discretion to PSD power-brokers. This led to a pullulation of corruption. 
Indeed, under the PSD the institutions of the State reportedly became ‘subordinated 
to the momentary self-interests of the government’; the ruling circle deployed public 
assets as if ‘a personal account available to its clients’, and ‘ran [the State treasury] 
gangster-style for the benefit of the political clientele’.304 Absent any significant 
domestic checks and balances, the EU and its accession conditionality was left the 
only significant constraint on the Executive (but this too would lose its power once 
EU membership became certain).
During his Premiership Adrian Nastase, also President of the PSD, gained a 
reputation for being a strong and even ‘autocratic’ leader. He was said to suffer 
from a ‘cult of the personality’, and was widely perceived as pompous, arrogant and 
‘self-important’.306 For such reasons, and by contrast with the former PSD leader, 
now President Ion Iliescu, Nastase was not very popular with the public, and the two 
leaders would compete throughout their tenure for influence over the PSD and
302 Vachodova, p. 214.
303 Mungiu-Pippidi, Transformation, pp. 4; Interview by the author with Gelu Trandafir, BBC Romanian 
journalist, 24 February 2006; Vachodova, p. 214.
304 Patapievici, Radio Free Europe, RFE (audio).
305 Tismaneanu and Mihaies, p. 225.
306 Ibid. pp. 164, 165, 166, 193.
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beyond.307 Nastase led a Cabinet made up mostly of former apparatchiks (himself 
being one) who were loyal both to him and to Iliescu. The Cabinet’s loyalty and 
Nastase’s autocratic style meant a highly ‘disciplined’ Cabinet. It was apparently so 
disciplined that no minister dared to speak publicly on any issue without Nastase’s 
prior approval.309 Indeed, the Nastase Cabinet proved perhaps the more stable after 
1989. For comparison, the PM was reshuffled three times under the previous centre-
-JIA
right coalition. It also proved a more efficient Cabinet, as witness the fact that it 
was under PSD that most of the acquis was transposed.
•711
Nastase was ambitious and had an ‘appetite for global visibility’. After taking the 
Party Presidency away from Iliescu in 2000, he was determined to transform the
^1 A
PSD’s image from one of ‘unreconstructed’ communists ‘with authoritarian and 
populist tendencies into a European-style social-democratic party’.313 The Party’s 
poor image had been acquired during its previous tenure (1990-1996), during which 
its leaders, among whom were Iliescu and Nastase, had proved reluctant to take 
radical reform measures or push too strongly for Romania’s integration into Euro- 
Atlantic structures. The government then apparently feared that accession to the EU 
might undermine their domestic power base by ‘strengthening opposition forces, 
limiting rent-seeking opportunities for economic cronies, and precluding ethnic 
scapegoating as an easy ploy for rallying support’.314 On the other hand, it was under 
their rule that the Europe Agreement was signed (1993) and the application for EU 
membership was made (1995). Their attitude toward integration was ‘strategic’, in
307 Task Officer, 13 July 2003.
308 Tismaneanu and Mihaies, p. 225.
309 Ibid., p. 162.
310 Ibid., p. 163.
311 Ibid., p. 163.
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313 Ciobanu and Shafir, The 2004 Romanian elections.
314 Vachudova, p. 73.
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that they put on display just enough commitment to the EU to gamer its assistance
o i f
and to avoid alienating the pro-EU Romanian public against themselves.
This time around the PSD and its leaders were determined to make the Romanian 
government ‘a more serious partner for discussion with the European Union and 
international organizations’, and to integrate her into both the EU and NATO.316 This 
became Nastase’s number one priority; he was prepared to do whatever it took to 
shield these goals. It has transpired this was what had motivated him to joifi the
11 Q
PSD in the first place. Romanian political analysts opine that the PSD appealed to 
Nastase not so much because he identified with its ideology, as because he somehow 
foresaw that ‘in the epoch of the Europeanization process one of the most 
fundamental blocs of enlargement was the Socialist bloc ... [Nastase] understood 
that the most efficient way of entering the European structures is through the
1 o
Socialist International’. Indeed, the PSD became a member of the Socialist 
International in 2004, and Nastase its Eastern European President between 2004 and 
2006.320 By way of the Socialist International fomm he and the PSD were able to 
build important strategic alliances with Social Democrats all over Europe, alliances 
that were to contribute much to the Nastase government’s progress toward EU 
membership [for an illustration of this, see Chapter 5]. Indeed it was under the PSD 
government that Romania was admitted to NATO in March 2004, and that acquis 
negotiations were closed in November 2004 -  although, as Chapter 5 will show, the 
credit for these accomplishments cannot be given to the Nastase government alone.
3,5 Ibid.
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2.1.4 Communist legacies and the post-1989 political system 
Before discussing the status quo in more detail, it will be useful to sketch-in the 
salient general features of Romanian political system as it stood after 1989. The key 
feature is the sundry Socialist legacies, which continued to influence events in 
Romania. These legacies cannot well be ignored by any study of contemporary 
Romanian politics, and have been well-documented by Vladimir Tismaneanu, the 
Romanian historian of Communism. Only a memorandum is needed here: ‘the 
resurrection of the secret police’; ‘the lack of transparency in public life’; ‘the 
climate of rampant suspiciousness and corruption’; ‘the emergence of “red-brown” 
Stalinist-fascist ultranationalist coalitions’; ‘the paternalistic style characteristic of 
both government and opposition’; ‘the absence of reform-oriented groups in the 
ruling bureaucracy’; ‘the weakness of liberal pluralistic efforts to strengthen civil 
society’; ‘a political culture based on fear’; ‘problematic legitimacy’; ‘spurious 
internationalism’; ‘populist manipulation of symbols’; ‘unabashed personalization of 
power’; ‘persecution mania’; ‘a deep inferiority complex’; ‘a sense of illegitimacy’; 
‘political narcissism, sectarianism, anti-intellectualism’; and ‘the obsession with
"XO 1political and social “transformism”’.
These legacies have pervasively influenced the kind of political system and 
institutions that have developed in Romania since 1989. These have often been 
characterised in the academic literature as ‘pathologies’ that Romania shares with 
other CEE countries, including: a high degree of fragmentation of institutions and of 
the political party system; lack of trust in and legitimacy of State institutions in
321 Tismaneanu, pp. 4, 5, 9, 13.
322 Klaus, H. Goetz and Helen Z. Margetts, ‘The Solitary Centre: The Core Executive in Central and Eastern 
Europe’, Governance (1999), vol. 12, no. 4. pp. 425-453 (p. 428).
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general, and post-Communist elites in particular;323 shallow and malfunctioning 
formal institutions, particularly those mediating accountability;324 opportunistic 
rather than principles-driven politicians and parties;325 the dominance of 
personalisation in politics and procedures; the dominance of ‘networks of influence’, 
for which Romania has been recently characterised as a ‘phenomenon of 
mafiotization’ with a ‘quasi-mafia’ political leadership;326 the prevalence of private 
and partisan interests over the public interest; a poorly performing, heavily 
politicised and corrupt public administration;328 the predominance of informal rather 
than formal norms of behaviour;329 the wide latitude of discretion -  few checks and 
balances, constitutional or extra-constitutional -  afforded public office holders by the 
Romanian polity; a wide-spread disregard for democratic norms and values, such as 
the rule of law, and human and civil rights; the ascendancy of material ‘proletarian’ 
values at the expense of everything else (e.g. a concern for the environment or 
cultural heritage); and the lack of a political culture of consensus and power-sharing, 
or the prevalence of zero-sum adversarialism (the Leninist tit-for-tat).330 The latter 
especially has led to frequent, acute conflicts between governing coalition partners 
and to discontinuity between the reforms and programmes of one government and 
another (according to the Romanian proverb, ‘I didn’t bake the cake lest others eat 
it’) 331 The case studies herein will illustrate many of these features, showing the
323 Tismaneanu and Mihaies, p. 174.
324 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Culture o f Corruption or Accountability Deficit?’ Special Report, East European 
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remarkable resilience of the Socialist legacy,332 to overcome which Romanian norm 
entrepreneurs were driven to turn to Europe.
2.2 Domestic inertia before Europe: the Rosia Montana gold mining project 
(1995-2002)
Before tracing how and when domestic civil society ‘woke up’ to the new 
opportunities created by Europe and by Romania’s accession to the EU, it is 
necessary to give some insight into the Romanian status quo that preceded Europe’s 
advent. Of the cases studied herein, Rosia Montana is by far the best window into 
such an insight, for the case began before domestic actors started to deploy Europe 
strategically to empower themselves relative to each other.
Insight into the state and behaviour of Romanian civil society is complemented in 
this chapter by insight into the behaviour of the Romanian Executive regarding such 
issues as the rule of law, public accountability, and the handling of civil society 
opposition. These insights are arrived at by tracing the history of the Rosia Montana 
project from inception in 1995 until the juncture of 2002. At that point the evolution 
of the project takes an unexpected turn, marked by an unprecedented construction 
and utilisation of Europe by domestic civil society and the Executive for purposes of 
self- and differential empowerment [see Chapter 4]. Such insights into the status quo 
will be valuable as providing a benchmark against which Europeanization effects 
documented in the subsequent chapters may be evaluated; therefore, this section 
should be read as background not only to the Rosia Montana controversy in Chapter 
4, but to the whole thesis.
332 Goetz, Making sense, p. 1033.
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The first part of this section introduces the political, economic and social matrix in 
which the controversy over the Rosia Montana gold mining project arose in 2001. It 
is against this hostile background that domestic civil society will be empowered. Part 
two will document how the Rosia Montana gold mining project came into being. Part 
three will examine how a local opposition sprang up; their treatment at the hands of 
the Romanian government, which were interlocked with the managers of State- 
owned companies; and their near-failure in the absence of any domestic or external 
support.
2.2.1 The Communist industrial legacy 
The Rosia Montana project fell out of the necessity the Romanian government was 
under to re-construct the failed economy inherited from Ceausescu. Of the many 
misfits between Western and Eastern institutions exposed by the collapse of the 
Communist regime, the inadequacy of the command economy paradigm for a market 
economy may have been the worst; if not the obsession with industrialisation at all 
costs, with no thought for sustainability. This legacy was a labyrinth of enormously
• • • i l llabour-intensive, loss-making industries kept alive by massive State subsidies.
The mining sector posed some of the greatest challenges to the economic reforms. 
Many mines dug under Ceausescu had been unprofitable ab ovo, but this had never 
become an issue under Communism, as the State had been a monopsonist. Even the 
putatively lucrative metals sub-sector (mining gold, silver, copper and uranium) was 
still losing money. Romania emerged from Communism producing gold at a cost of 
US$800-1,000 per ounce while the world market price was US$300 per ounce; the
333 Tom Gallagher, The Theft o f  a Nation. Romania since Communism. (London: Hurst and Company, 2005), p. 
80; Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministiy Romania, interview, 11 November 2005.
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State was thus losing US$500-700 for every ounce of gold mined.334
For most of the 1990s few effective pressures impinged on the Romanian 
government to induce them to reform the mining sector. As most mining districts in 
Romania are mono-industrial and economically isolated, sudden closures without 
alternatives for the local populace heavily dependent on mining would have 
worsened poverty and unemployment, an outcome that all Romanian governments 
were keen to avoid. But there were other reasons to avoid reform. Between 1989 
and 1996, during which Romania was ruled by ‘reformed Communists’, President 
Ion Iliescu and the ruling National Salvation Front called upon miners to assault their 
newly emerged political opponents. Being one of the best organised groups of all 
Romanian civil society, the miners could mobilise quickly, helping Iliescu and the 
Front hold onto power in the uncertain days after December 1989.336 Even when, a 
few years later in the mid-1990s, the economy slumped and the government was 
obliged to privatise or close down the worst revenue-losing enterprises, the miners 
managed either to resist closure of even the most unprofitable operations or to 
negotiate excessive severance pay. They succeeded in this because they were well- 
organised and could bargain collectively, but above all because their leaders had 
close ties with the ex-Communists who ruled Romania until 1996.
Few also were the pressures from abroad for reform. As the EU had no jurisdiction 
before the acquis began to be negotiated in 2000, it played an insignificant role in 
mcentivising the re-construction of the mining sector. What little external
334 Horea Avram, Environmental Officer o f Rosia Montana Gold Corporation, e-mail posted on the Environment 
Discussion List Mediu@ngo.ro. 18 August 2003.
335 Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 11 November 2005.
336 Gallagher, Theft o f  a Nation, p. 80; Tom Gallagher, ‘The Balkans: Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and the Former 
Yugoslavia’ in Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lewis (Eds) Developments in Central and East European 
Politics (2). (Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 48.
337 Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 11 November 2005.
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pressures there were came from international institutions like the IMF and the World 
Bank, who conditioned their support on the adoption of free-market reforms 
including budget deficit cuts and an end of State subsidies to industry.338 They had 
too little leverage to push through reformation of the mining sector, however. The 
lack of sufficient external incentives, plus the vested interests of the ex-Communists 
interlocked with the trade union elites, combined with a severe scarcity of resources 
that made development alternatives impossible, meant that the mining sector 
stagnated throughout the 1990s.
By the mid-1990s the massive subsidies to industry had begun to be an intolerable 
burden on the State, and the Romanian government was weighing up diverse policy 
options for stemming its losses. In theory technological upgrading (‘retooling’) was 
the most promising, as it would have rendered profitable the mining of some of 
Romania’s most valuable metal ores. But in practice, even with the latest 
technology (which Romania would have had to import), a profit could never have 
been squeezed out of most of the 44 State-owned mines at prevailing world market 
prices.340 In the case of metal mining, the ore was usually too poor to be worth the re­
tool;341 hence closure was left the only viable option in most cases. Retooling could 
work for only a few mines (the gold mine at Rosia Montana included), and only if 
external finance could be found.342 The World Bank was only prepared to help 
Romania draft legislation and design mine-closure programmes while financing 
ecological rehabilitation of the mining works and environs.343 They were not
Interview by the author with former senior official, The National Agency for Mineral Resources in Romania. 
22 December 2005.
339 Interview with Nicolae Dicu, former Minister and State Secretary for Mines, Romania by Elena Vijulie, 
‘Colapsul industriei miniere din Maramure§’, BBC Romanian, 22 August 2006.
340 Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 11 November 2005.
341 Former senior official, Mineral Resources Agency, interview, 2005.
342 Ibid.
343 Ibid.
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prepared to finance expensive retooling.344 Privatisation was the only option left 
standing.
The idea of reform through privatisation received a boost in 1998, two years after the 
accession to power of the centre-right Democratic Convention coalition 
government.345 The Mining Act, Romania’s first ‘Western-based’ mining law was 
passed in 1998. Modelled primarily on US and Australian legislation, the law was 
drafted with the assistance of World Bank experts.346 It incorporated some elements 
of Spanish and German law, thus constituting one of the earliest examples of the 
Europeanization of Romanian public policy.
Designed expressly to encourage privatisation and foreign direct investment, the law 
provided that all mining activities, whether exploration or exploitation, should be 
undertaken under licence.347 Licences were to be granted through public tendering 
overseen by the National Agency for Mineral Resources, the public body charged 
with managing Romania’s mineral resources and enforcing her mining-regulatory 
regime. The Act also provided for the transfer of licences from State-owned regies 
to foreign companies, a mode of privatisation formerly forbidden by Communist 
law.349 The hope was that the new Act would encourage private investment in the 
mining sector, and so speed its re-construction.
By 2006 many of the privatisations and investments undertaken during the 1990s had
344 Ibid
345 The coalition was made up o f pre-1945, centre-right political parties; civic leaders; and the party representing 
the Hungarian minority.
346 Former senior official, Mineral Resources Agency, interview, 2005.
347 Gabriel Resources, Romanian Government Reiterates its Support o f  the Mining Industry, 31 March 2000, 
<http://www.gabrielresources.com/home.htm> (accessed January 2003).
348 World Energy Council, Restructuring the Coal Industries. Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS. PART II-  
COUNTRYPROFILES ROMANIA, 2004,
<http://www.worldenergy.org/wecgeis/publications/reports/coal/countrv proflles/romania.asp> (accessed June 
2003).
349 Paul Cristian Radu, Dan Badea et al. ‘Aurul Romaniei, pe mina unui aventurier’ Cotidianul Online, 22 May 
2002, <http://www.crii.org/arhiva/02Q522.htm>.
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been exposed as ill-thought-out and mediated through unprofitable contracts with
foreign investors. Moreover, the liberalisation of trade in concentrated ore after
1998 meant that large quantities of raw metal were exported under massive State 
• •  ^1subsidies, a subvention that the foreign importers in most cases never had to 
refund to the Romanian State, due to the complicity of Romanian regie directors and 
government ministers.352 As with the economic reform in general, so in the mining 
sector too, ‘money poured from the state budget through these enterprises straight 
into the directors’ pockets’.353 By 2006 the rampant corruption had come to be 
blamed for having led to the collapse of important mining centres like that in the 
north of Romania.354
A case in point is the gold mine at Baia Mare in the northwest of Romania. Privatised 
in 1990 through a joint venture between the Romanian regie Remin and the 
Australian company Esmeralda Exploration, the mining works employed cyanide- 
heap leaching to extract gold from the tailings left over from previous mining
• i f f  • •
operations. This proved an ecological as well as an economic disaster. After 
privatisation in 1992, the joint venture’s books were ‘cooked’ to appear as if no 
profits were ever made.356 The Romanian State apparently never saw any of the 
profits that actually were made, even though Remin had a 44% stake in the joint 
venture -  a contribution paid for by State subsidies (by taxpayers’ money, that is). 
This and similar cases allegedly happened with the full knowledge of the highest
350 Dicu, interview with by Vijulie, 2006.
351 Ibid.
352 Ibid.
353 Vachudova, p. 48.
354 Dicu, interview by Vijulie, 2006.
355 Vlad Gabriel Hogea (Greater Romania Party MP), Intervention, Sittings o f the Chamber o f Deputies, 11 
February 2003.
356 Dicu, interview by Vijulie, 2006.
357 Ibid.
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Romanian Executives.358 The joint venture at Baia Mare was also responsible for one 
of the worse industrial accidents and ecological disasters of modem times in Europe, 
when in January 2000 the cyanide retaining dam burst. It is noteworthy that by 
contrast to what was to come at Rosia Montana after 2001, nobody inside or outside 
Romania ever rose to question the gold mining project at Baia Mare, notwithstanding 
that it employed the same cyanide-heap leaching method that was to become so 
controversial in the Rosia Montana case.
2.2.2 The Communist Executive legacy 
Rosia Montana was one of the first metal mines to be privatised under the 1998 
Mining Act. Run by the regie MinVest Deva, the mine is situated in the Rosia 
Montana valley (Western Carpathians) within the so-called ‘Golden Quadrilateral’ -  
considered one of Europe’s richest gold and silver ore-bearing regions. Native gold 
at Rosia had been extensively exploited by MinVest, which the Communists had 
created after the WWII by nationalising private mines.359 Beginning in the 1960s, 
gold was extracted using cyanide solution, although on a smaller scale than with 
heap-leaching.360 Nobody, not even trans-national civil society, has ever challenged 
the regie's use of cyanide during this time.361 This would change, but only after the 
regie had partnered with a private company in 1999, and only after trans-national 
civil society entrepreneurs intervened in 2002.
MinVest continued to exploit open pits after the 1989 revolution, but by 2005 its 
operations had been scaled back and its workforce downsized ten-fold. Even on 
the smaller scale the subsidies did not cover costs: by 2005 MinVest had become one
358 ibid.
359 Interview by the author with Crai Pompiliu, MinVest Director, 26 August 2005.
360 Former senior official, Mineral Resources Agency, interview, 2005.
361 Ibid.
362 Pompiliu, interview, 2005.
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of the State’s biggest debtors in arrears.363 With Rosia Poieni and Baia de Aries (50 
kilometres from Rosia), the largest mines in the area, already closed, and the 
remaining ones threatened, the populace of the Rosia district, mostly miners, became 
impoverished.364 The village of Zlatna suffered 95% unemployment; Rosia Montana 
had 50%, expected to rise to 90% once MinVest was wound up.365 Young people 
were deserting the area in search of employment.366 Only foreign investment could 
rescue the region from industrial implosion.367
Sometime in 1995 MinVest announced that it was seeking a partnership with a 
foreign company ‘to process mining waste containing precious metals from old 
tailings in the area of Rosia Montana’, and that offers should be tendered within the 
next 30 days.368 No investors showed up nor submitted any offers.369 It was therefore 
perceived as a godsend by the local populace and officialdom when one Frank 
Timis, a Romanian national representing the Canadian company Gabriel Resources 
Ltd., arrived in Rosia Montana to prospect investing in its mineral deposits. Gabriel 
Resources, it was later revealed, was a startup penny-stock on the Vancouver 
Exchange, registered in Jersey Island, a ‘tax haven’, and Timis to have been
1 * 7  1
convicted several times in Australia for drug dealing.
Timis propose a partnership to the directors of MinVest to extract gold from tailings, 
promising that Gabriel could provide capital and advanced technology in exchange
363 In June 2004, the Nastase government forgave the tax obligations o f  11 mining companies owing 19 million 
EUROs to the State; MinVest was one o f them (Adevarul, 12 June 2004); Former senior official, Mineral 
Resources Agency, interview, 2005.
364 Interview with Virgil Naritsa, Rosia Montana Mayor by Raluca Damian, Presa Regionala, Cluj, 30 July 2004.
365 Interview by the author with Vice President, RMGC, 20 September 2005.
366 Former Vice President, RMGC, email, 30 September 2005.
367 Former senior official, Mineral Resources Agency, interview, 2005.
368 Radu et al. Aurul Romaniei, 2002.
369 Interview by the author with former Environmental Director, RMGC, 4 July 2005.
370 Alex Dobrota, ‘Canadians go home!’ The Gazette, 29 May 2005, Montreal
<http://www.canada.com/montreal/montrealgazette/news/insieht/storv.html?id=6db6781c-adf2-4e86-b853- 
44c772d0de01> : Interview by the author with Eugen David, President, Albumus Maior, 28 June 2005.
371 No author, ‘Focus: The gusher’, The Sunday Times (Business), 22 May 2005. 
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0..2095-1622093.00.html> (accessed 25 May 2005).
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for a mining concession. The Romanian directors were easily convinced and the 
companies entered into a partnership, the Rosia Montana Gold Mining Company 
(RMGC). RMGC was established in the virtual legal void that existed at that time, 
before the promulgation of the 1998 Mining Act. The legality of this partnership was 
to come under fire from civil society opposition a few years later. The partnership 
proceeded in earnest to explore how best to make a profit, but it soon became clear 
that extracting gold from tailings would not be profitable.373 The partnership decided 
to expand their joint operations to include prospecting uncharted areas, which 
MinVest’s experts had suspected for some time still contained native gold, but had 
lacked the money to explore.
Meanwhile, the Mining Act was introduced in 1998, and MinVest and Gabriel 
Resources could not proceed as they had in 1995. The Act required them to obtain a 
licence from the State by following certain public tender procedures. Embodying 
both European and international norms and values, the Act imposed new constraints 
on the State and its discretion to let public contracts. Yet when RMGC applied for 
the licence, the Industry Minister, Liberal Party member Radu Berceanu, ignored the 
Act. Far from a public tender, negotiations over price and terms were conducted in 
secret between Gabriel Resources and representatives of the Industry Ministry (to 
which MinVest was subordinated). The deal likely involved bribes of senior 
Executives, who in exchange undercharged Gabriel for the licence.374 (Gabriel 
apparently paid only US$3 million to work a deposit later revealed to be worth US$3
372 Cornel Ivanciuc, ‘Frank Timis a inhatat aurul din Apuseni printr-o caruta de falsuri, iar Tariceanu a inchis 
ochii’, Academia Catavencu, 20 April 2005.
373 Former senior official, Mineral Resources Agency, interview, 2005.
374 Ibid.
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billion).375 The Government Decision granting the licence was never published, as 
the Act required.376 The contract itself was then apparently classified a State secret, 
likely so as to prevent the public from accessing the terms of the deal.
At the time, nobody -  neither Parliament, media nor civil society -  challenged how 
the Executive had proceeded. It was only years later that the civil society that had 
arisen in the meantime to oppose the gold mining sued the government over their 
omission to publish the terms of the licence. Surprisingly in a Romanian context, the 
court overruled the Agency for Mineral Resources, ordering it to disclose the terms
^ 77of the licence.
In disregarding public tender, the political Executives overrode the regulatory body, 
the National Agency for Mineral Resources, provided under the Act to oversee the 
licensing proceedings. The Agency was entirely excluded from all proceedings. Its 
Directors were presented by the Industry Ministry with a fa it accompli: ‘This is the 
boy and this is the girl. They arrived at [the Agency] already married’.378 The Act 
failed in practice to constrain Executive discretion. The way MinVest was privatised 
is redolent of Executive behaviour in Communist times, when decision-making was 
characterised by ‘strong hierarchical control’, ‘political control over the 
administration’ and ‘disregard for the rule of law’.379 That the lawful public tender 
requirements, codifying norms typical of a Western liberal democracy, could be so 
easily ignored by the Minister, evidences that, a mere year before the commencement
375 Paul Cristian Radu, Dan Badea, Stefan Candea and Sorin Ozon, ‘Vasile Frank Timis, the Mastermind Behind 
the Rosia Montana Operation, Was Sentenced Twice, Charged with Possession o f Heroin’, Centrul Roman de 
Jumalism pentru Investigate, 22 May 2002. http://www.crii.org/arhiva/e 020522.htm (accessed 3 May 2004).
376 Lucian Augustin Bolca§ (Greater Romania Party MP), Debates o f the simple motion over Rosia Montana. 
Chamber o f Deputies, 10 December 2002.
377 Albumus Maior, Analiza Actualizata a Riscurilor, report, 22 November 2005, 
http://www.cri.ro/files/AnalizaRisc.pdf (accessed 4 Deccember 2005).
378 Former senior official, Mineral Resources Agency, interview, 2005.
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of acquis negotiations, actual behaviour was still lagging far behind legal forms, 
although these were becoming (gradually) Europeanized.
Another important legacy of Communism that likely played a role in the Rosia 
Montana affair was the interlocking of the regies with the political apparatus, which 
throughout the 1990s had mutually benefited the political parties and the regie 
directors. The latter enjoyed broad autonomy, while the State continued to guarantee 
their income. As late as 2000 it transpired that some directors were earning salaries 
as high as US$100,000, when the average monthly wage in Romania was only 
US$100. In exchange, the directors donated 10% of their earnings to the Party.380 
This state of affairs was known to be the norm under the Social Democrat 
government and persisted, no matter which party controlled the government. In 2005 
Tom Gallagher observed the ‘continuing influence [over the political party elites] of 
the directors and managers of ailing state industries, known as “the directocracy” 
(<directoratii). They had been a key pillar of the Iliescu regime [1990-1996 and 2000- 
2004] and were still able to prevent [in 2000] their plants and utilities being placed 
under proper budgetary constraints even in the absence of their patron [Iliescu]’. 
MinVest, one of the biggest regies, the directocracy was likely at work in this case, 
which would explain, together with bribery, why the Industry Minister signed off on 
a partnership of such murky legality.
Once RMGC obtained its licence in 1999, it began exploration in earnest. As 
prospecting advanced, the company made a series of discoveries. These culminated 
in 2000 with the discovery of the largest gold and silver deposit in Europe,
380 Personal communication with Social Democratic Party County Councillor in Sibiu, 20 April 2003.
381 Gallagher, Theft o f  a Nation, pp. 181-2.
382 Stephanie Roth, A Storm in the Making, 5 June 2002.
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containing up to 300 more tonnes of gold and 1,600 tonnes of silver383 and worth 
more than US$3 billion.384 Two deposits in particular, La Cetate and Camic, were 
extensive but, as it later emerged, only of low grade.385
Profitable mining would be impossible without a large-scale open-cast operation -  
four open-pits covering 722 hectares for 15-16 years -  and without increasing 
Romania’s total annual gold production from three to 13-14 tonnes per year. This 
would in turn entail a massive increase of gross extraction from 500,000 to 11-12 
million tonnes per year. The operation would only be profitable if, like Baia Mare, 
cyanide heap-leaching was used. This would entail building a 185-metres high dam 
to contain a tailings-pond covering 300-400 hectares, which would necessitate the 
evacuation of the Coma Valley: 1,000 families and about 2,000 private and public 
estates would have to be removed, including the exhumation and reburial of the dead 
in the cemeteries of several churches.
The company directors were convinced that the project would appeal to
"J QO #
everybody. It would bring to Romania the most foreign direct investment ever; 
convert into a state-of-the-art operation a poorly managed, technically obsolescent 
regie hugely indebted to the State; (allegedly) clean up the district’s legacy pollution; 
create 25,000 jobs in a region afflicted by high unemployment; and develop the local 
infrastructure -  thus contributing much to the regional and something even to the
383 Gabriel Resources, Update On Rosia Montana Development (Press Release), 10 April 2000; Vice President 
RMGC, interview, 20 September 2005; Former senior official, Mineral Resources Agency, interview, 2005.
384 Radu et al., 2002.
385 European Parliament, The Environment Committee Delegation fact-finding visit to Romania on 7-9 December 
2003, p. 3, <http://www.rosiamontana.org/documents/english/EPreport.htm>.
386 Email communication with former RMGC Vice-President, 30 September 2005; European Parliament, p. 38; 
Former senior official, Mineral Resources Agency, interview, 2005.
387 Ibid.
388 Vice President, RMGC, interview, 20 September 2005.
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national economy.389
For such reasons, the project was strongly supported by the local councillors and
mayor so that the permits local authorities had the power to issue were easily
obtained.390 (It later emerged that the many local government officials or their family
members, including the mayor’s brother and sister, had been employed by the
company -  a flagrant conflict of interest, according to Romania’s Local Public
1
Administration Act 215/2001. But such illegalities were only revealed a few years
later by domestic civil society and their Western environmental activist-mentors.) 
The project also had the support of the central government, both the centre-right 
coalition under which the licence had been approved and, after the 2000 elections, 
the Social Democratic Party.392 Nobody, therefore, had any reason to expect that the 
permits necessary for exploitation would be denied or delayed, or that the mining 
would not soon begin in earnest.
2.2.3 The Communist legacy for civil society 
By 2001 the company was already negotiating and buying up local properties,
' I Q ' l
although not all the requisite permits had been obtained. The company called their 
resettlement programme ‘voluntary’, and claimed that locals were glad to sell out and 
leave a moribund locale. Yet reports surfaced that strong-arm tactics were being used 
on recalcitrant villagers. Reflecting the Romanian cultural norm of zero-sum 
adversarialism, local farmers were allegedly being told to sell out ‘or else’ by the
389 Radu et al., 2002.
390 Former Environmental Director RMGC, interview, 2005; Former senior official, Mineral Resources Agency, 
interview, 2005.
391 Centra de Resurse Juridice, Sesizare Consilieri, 12 May 2005, <http://www.cri.ro/reforma.php> (accessed 13 
June 2005).
392 Former senior official, Mineral Resources Agency, interview, 2005.
393 Robin Hickson, Brace Marsh and Lee Doran, Rosia Montana Project, Romania. Environment and Social 
Impact Study and Actions Plans, 11 March 2003,
<http://www.pdac.ca/pdac/publications/papers/2003/Marsh.pdf> (accessed November 2003).
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Romanian directors of MinVest and by miners trade union leaders.394
It was under these circumstances that the first organised opposition emerged in 
February 2000. The founding members of Albumus Maior were goaded into 
mobilising by a local Member of Parliament from the Party for National Unity, one 
of Romania’s nationalist parties. This MP warned them to get organised ‘if they
7Qf
wanted to avoid trouble and face down the company, who are all crooks’. Those 
who organised were a handful of local professionals -  mining engineers and 
surveyors -  and former employees of MinVest. The leaders, Aurel Manta, the local 
historian, and Zeno Cornea, a now-retired chief of MinVest’s geological service, 
recruited a dozen villagers to create the Association of Albumus Maior (the ancient 
Latin name for Rosia Montana). Some were resentful of having been sacked by 
MinVest; Cornea, for example, had been forced into retirement by a trade union 
leader. This is a common story in Romania, where the norm is for trade unions to
•JQ7
defend, not the interests of workers but of the union bosses. Others had had ‘their 
land or family hurt by the mining operation in some way’.398 Still others resented 
how Romanian managers granted new jobs on the basis of personal connections, just 
as in communist times.399 Finding employment through who you are or who you 
know [‘pe pile’] was the norm under Ceausescu, an adaptation Romanians evolved in 
response to an ‘arbitrary and threatening regime’.400 Those who emerged to 
challenge the project were thus ‘privately’ motivated; at this early stage their
394 European Parliament, p. 7; Interview by the author with Codruta Nedelcu, geologist and environmentalist 
ARIN, 10 Februaiy 2006; Interview by the author with Zeno Cornea, Albumus Maior, 4 February 2006.
395 David, interview, 28 June 2005.
396 Ibid.
397 Cornea, interview, 2006.
398 Email communication by the author with former RMGC Vice-President, RMGC, 4 February 2006.
399 Nedelcu, interview, February 2006.
400 Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder. The Leninist Extinction (University o f California Press, 1992), p. 78.
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mobilisation had no connexion with Romania’s accession to the European Union.401 
They stood in the minority, however. A local majority concerned with economic 
survival -  75% of the local inhabitants in 2003 -  favoured the project, without ever 
questioning its impacts on their cultural heritage or the environment.402
Albumus’s official aim was to defeat the company’s resettlement and relocation 
plans: ‘We had in our heads a very important matter: that nobody was going to take 
our properties away’.403 Albumus thus attracted individuals of varying interests. 
Owners of petty concessions for gold exploitation dating from before World War II, 
which the Communists had nationalised, joined Albumus seeking restitution.404 
Others were holding out in hopes of driving a better bargain with the company. Still 
others, particularly those with political aspirations, saw opposition as an opportunity 
to make or burnish their image before their prospective electorate.405 Most if not all 
of them were unconcerned with public-goods values like environment or cultural 
heritage, the issues likeliest to grab the attention of trans-national civil society 
organisations like Greenpeace. Originally, ‘the environment’ featured in Albumus’s 
rhetoric only insofar as it meant their most vital resource -  their farmland.406
Albumus proceeded to utilise whatever domestic opportunities they perceived would 
further their goals. They appealed for help to Members of the Romanian Parliament 
representing nationalist parties, whom they perceived as ‘patriots who cared about
401 David, interview, 28 June 2005.
402 Eddie O’Hara, Rosia Montana Information Report. 21 December 2004, Committee on Culture, Science and 
Education, Council o f  Europe, Doc. 10384.
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the gold deposit’.407 This strategy backfired when RMGC turned the nationalist 
connexion against them, charging the opposition was driven by the xenophobia of the 
local elite.408 This negative spin may have deterred the more progressive and outward 
looking domestic environmental groups from supporting the protest. Indeed, in 2002 
Terra Mileniul III, one of Romania’s major environmental NGOs, sent staff members 
to Rosia to spy out Albumus’s real motives before they were willing to support them. 
Terra were anxious not to join a protest motivated by traditional Romanian 
nationalism (‘we shall not sell out our country’).409 Thus, at its founding, Albumus 
was inward-oriented and unaware of the new opportunities beckoning from abroad.
By the end of 2001, almost two years after its creation, Albumus’s campaign had 
pretty much failed. Its membership lacked the skills, knowledge and resources 
necessary to run an effective protest campaign.410 Apparently, on their own they did 
not know how to convert into a source of power even the vital expertise of their own 
members who, being former miners, understood well some of the implications of 
such a large-scale project.411 Their campaigning consisted of little more than writing 
letters of complaint to sundry authorities, who gave them either no answers at all or 
perfunctory ones.412 They did stage one demonstration, but it attracted hardly any 
media attention outside Rosia.413 Without media savvy, Albumus could not 
effectively publicise their anti-gold mining protest, which remained a ‘monologue’ to 
which few paid attention.414 Albumus was handicapped by their lack of vision in 
framing their campaign to appeal to a wider audience.
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But Albumus was handicapped not by its own weaknesses alone, but also by 
constraints imposed on it, deliberately or inadvertently, by other Romanian actors 
and institutions. The Romanian directors of MinVest tried to strangle Albumus in the 
cradle by threatening to sack miners who had joined if they did not withdraw from 
the Association.415 The company refused any dialogue, treating them to a ‘half- 
neglectful, half-aggressive’ strategy416 and labelling them ‘a bunch of crazy 
people’.417 The authorities ignored their requests for information and marginalised 
them at local public consultations 418 The media did not cover their protests. Most 
Romanian environmental organisations (NGOs) remained passive. Only one NGO 
attempted to mount a campaign; but failed, apparently due to incompetence, or to 
fear of being assaulted by proponents, or of losing influence with the local 
government.419 Potential allies amongst Romanian NGOs were also constrained by 
the cloak of silence enveloping the project. Most heard nothing about the company’s 
plans before 2002. Even those who did were faced with so novel a situation that they 
did not know what to do or where to start 420 Even the best-connected and most 
professional of all Romanian environmental NGOs admitted not understanding the 
consequences of such a project.421 Meanwhile, the company was making swift 
progress, winning permits and buying out properties.
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418 Nedelcu, interview, February 2006; Interview by the author with Mercedes Echerer, Green MEP for Austria, 5 
October 2005.
419 Interview by the author with Laszlo Potozky, Director, Environmental Partnership Foundation, 22 September
Conclusions
This chapter reveals the tenacity of the Communist legacy in Romanian, and its 
impact on both Executive and civil society actors and on institutions. The 
Executive’s behaviour displays many pre-1989 characteristics of Romanian political 
culture, as opposed to what one might expect from an Europeanized or Western 
Executive. They acted unconstrained, enjoying wide discretion over State assets and 
their privatisation. Operating under so few domestic and external constraints during 
this time, the Executive did not bother to seek even formally legal ways of 
circumventing the public-tender requirement of the Western-inspired Mining Act, as 
they would have to do in the Transylvanian Motorway case. They simply ignored it. 
The conduct of State and quasi-State actors like Romanian company directors and 
trade union leaders toward the civil society opposition also reflects one of the classic 
pre-1989 Romanian legacies: opposition is to be ignored at best, or heavy-handedly 
mistreated.
The predominance of pre-1989 norms of behaviour is also noticeable in civil society, 
as evidenced by the tightly shut domestic opportunity structure available to the civil 
society opposition and by the general passivity of environmental organisations. 
Albumus were not only powerless and resource-less; their vision and strategy looked 
inward, revealing a lack of awareness of the possibilities of utilising Europe or 
international resources to achieve their goals. Although some of their weaknesses 
were peculiar to their rural, grassroots origin, Albumus Maior reflect in many ways 
the general state of Romanian environmental civil society at the end of the 1990s. 
The general passivity is particularly surprising given the international uproar over the 
cyanide-spill at nearby Baia Mare in 2000. One would have expected this to have 
made Romanian environmental groups more aware of the impacts of cyanide-based
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mining techniques. Most of them did nothing, even though the local opposition 
furnished a very convenient nucleus for wider mobilisation.
The background of the Rosia Montana affair is one of scant Europeanization of 
domestic actors’ power resources and norms of behaviour. The evidence is rather of 
continuity and tenacity of communist and pre-communist patterns of power relations 
between State and civil society. All actors have yet to become aware of the 
possibilities of constructing and utilising Europe. With Romania’s accession to the 
EU, however, Europe and its benefits for them begin to dawn on all parties 
concerned. How they began to construct and utilise Europe and the EU, and with 
what effects on domestic power relations, are treated in the following chapters.
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Chapter 3: Empowerment of domestic civil society through Executive 
self-constraint in anticipation of EU accession
- The case of the Dracula theme Park -
This chapter traces the evolution of a political contest between, on the one hand, the 
Romanian Executive led by Social Democrat Prime Minister Adrian Nastase, and on 
the other a resourceless and virtually powerless domestic civil society opposition. 
These two actor-collectives clashed over plans laid by the Executive to build a 
Hollywood-style Dracula theme park in the midst of a nature reserve on the outskirts 
of an UNESCO-protected World Heritage Site. Domestic civil society was 
empowered to overcome the Executive contrary to all expectations. It was an 
empowerment that could only have happened because the Executive was constrained 
by a cumulative series of external interventions on the part of UNESCO, the 
European Parliament and Charles, Prince of Wales. How did these external 
interveners move the Executive? And what role did Romania’s accession to the EU 
play, if any?
Section One of this chapter presents the Romanian status quo -  the Executive 
decides unilaterally, and few, if any constraints stand in their way. Section Two 
presents the emergence of a handful of local protestors; the domestic constraints 
under which they laboured; their reaching out to find stronger allies abroad; and their 
treatment at the hands of the State. Section Three shows how powerful external 
mediators and arbiters drawn-in by domestic civil society and their newfound trans­
national allies gradually constrained the Executive so as to tip the balance of power 
in the favour of the protestors. Section Four details how the Executive combined 
Europe with its domestic power resources to minimise the impact on themselves of 
these constraints.
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3.1 The Executive unbound
The broad-brush characteristics of the Romanian Executive have been presented in 
Chapter 2, and are well exemplified in the planning of Dracula Park: closed and 
opaque decision-making; a wide latitude of discretion; and a neglect of consultation 
with anyone outside the Executive circle. Their over-arching values are to gain 
material benefits and to boost theirs and Romania’s reputation abroad.
Dracula Park emerged from the determination of Nastase and his Cabinet, a few 
months after winning the 2000 elections, to develop Romania economically and to 
integrate it into international and European markets and trading regimes. Part of their 
solution for opening up Romania was to revive its moribund tourism industry.422 
This had been in decline as to absolute numbers of tourists and new investment, the 
latter having been frozen at the level of the 1970s.423 The Cabinet hoped to prove that 
they could do better and be more effective than the centre-right government had just 
they replaced.424 The previous government’s plans to modernise Romanian tourism 
had failed, apparently due to a ‘lack of political will, correlated with a defective legal 
framework and outmoded managerial practices’.425 The Nastase government’s 
ambition was to lift Romania up to Western standards in the field of tourism by 
emulating the successes of reputable tourist operators in Europe and beyond.426 This 
was to be done through a package of ‘integrated tourism products’ executed to the 
new public managerial paradigm. Projects would be developed as ‘programmes with 
concrete objectives, deadlines and clearly defined responsibilities’.427 By March
422 Romanian Government, Reasons fo r  Emergency Ordinance 3/2001 approving and implementing the Special 
Tourism Development Program fo r Sighisoara, Bucharest, 2001
<http://www.cdep.ro/proiecte/2001/400/10/l/em411.pdf > (accessed December 2004).
423 Ibid.
424 Interview by the author with Gelu Trandafir, BBC journalist, 24 February 2006.
425 Romanian Government, Reasons fo r  Emergency Ordinance.
426 Ibid.
427 Ibid.
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2001 the Ministry of Tourism, headed by Dan Matei-Agathon, announced a battery 
of ‘golden tourism products’ aimed at ‘rapidly integrating Romania into the 
international tourist flow’.428 One of these was to be ‘Dracula Park’, which the 
Cabinet approved in the spring of 2001.
The Ministry in their planning narrowed the Park’s potential sites to three: Bran in 
the Carpathian Mountains of southern Transylvania; Tihuta-Cobilita in Bistrita in 
northern Transylvania; and Sighisoara in the very heart of Transylvania. To the 
surprise of many, Sighisoara was finally chosen. A small and still intact medieval 
town, Sighisoara is renowned for its well-preserved medieval edifices and Saxon 
traditions dating from the 12th century.429 Because of these riches, its Historic Centre 
had been inscribed in 1999 as a World Heritage Site under the United Nations World 
Heritage Convention.430 Sighisoara is not well known for its associations with the 
Dracula legend that the new Cabinet was so keen to exploit. Some claim it is the 
birthplace of Vlad the Impaler, the 1 S^-century ruler who inspired Bram Stoker’s 
‘Dracula’. The claim, however, has never been substantiated by any credible 
evidence.431 The selection of Sighisoara was formalised by Executive Decree in July 
2001. This was the first that the public had heard about their Dracula Park plans.
Because of the discretionary nature of the Romanian political system, it remains a 
mystery for most people how the Executive came to select Sighisoara. Many 
believed that the man behind the Sighisoara site was Miron Mitrea, the 
Transportation Minister and a major power-broker in the inner circle of the Social
429 CNN, ‘Romania to build Dracula themepark’. 9 July 2001. <www.CNN.com>.
430 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, <www.unesco.org> .
431 Claudia, Constantinescu, ‘Sighisoara, Half Way Between Protection and Valorisation. Interview with Peter 
Derer, Former Minister Secretary o f State on European Institute for Cultural Routes’, 2 April 2001. 
<http://www.culture-routes.lu/php/fo index. php?lng=en&dest=bd ar det&id=00000037> (accessed January
2006).
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Democrat Party (PSD). Originally from Sighisoara, Mitrea apparently championed 
the site because he wanted ‘to do something’ for his home town.432 In the process 
Mitrea and a clique of private interests interlocked with the PSD elite (both centrally 
and locally)433 were to enrich themselves from property speculation. (In fact, local 
housing and land prices boomed as soon as Dracula Park was announced; the average 
house price appreciated overnight from €35,000 to €180,000, while the price of a 
hectare of land increased 100 times.)434 The truth of these allegations has been 
impossible to establish, but, given the nature of the Romanian political system, it 
would come as no surprise if indeed Mitrea did try to divert ‘pork’ to his district. 
Indeed, Executive discretion under Nastase was poorly checked and balanced, 
creating ample opportunities for corruption -  opportunities that were soon taken 
advantage of by the highest Executives, Nastase included (as evidenced by the 2005 
and 2006 investigations into their conduct).
Regardless of who chose Sighisoara, the Cabinet insisted that it was the optimal site 
for Dracula Park. The claim was justified by reference to advice from ‘experts in the 
Tourism Ministry’ 435 It is unknown who these experts were, but the likelihood is that 
they were certain personal friends and advisers to Agathon. At least one of them is 
known to have been a successful tourism operator, and suspected to have vested 
interests in the tourism industry and its development.436 It is the norm in Romanian
432 Interview by the author with Alex Gota Sustainable Sighisoara, 10 November 2006; Interview by the author 
with Popa, National Liberal Party MP, 13 December 2005; Remus Radu, ‘The man who conquered Dracula 
Park’, Evenimentul Zilei, 31 March 2004; Trandafir, interview, 2006.
433 Interview by the author with Hans Bruno Frohlich, Head Priest o f the Evangelical Church in Sighisoara, 14 
December 2005; Interview by the author with Hermann Fabini, architect and former National Liberal Party 
Deputy, 16 December 2005; Popa, interview, 2005; Radu, 2004.
434 Radu, 2004; Popa, interview, 2005.
435 Fabini, interview, 16 December 2005..
436 Romanian Parliament, Tntreb&ri §i interpelSri adresate Guvemului de c&tre senatori’, Nicolae Popa, Sittings o f  
the Senate, 10 February 2003, <http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=5405&idm=13.01&id]=l> 
(accessed 10 March 2003).
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politics, and in fact more generally in CEE,437 for ministers to rely not on advice 
from senior civil servants, but on that of personal friends and counsellors whom they 
bring with them into government from outside.438 The political Executive’s 
discretion to rely on cronies and appoint them to public office greatly amplifies the 
opportunities for corruption.
These experts of the Tourism Ministry had allegedly formulated their advice on the 
basis of a pre-feasibility study carried out by a certain Balzer Continental Inc. of the 
United States.439 The Executive kept silent about this private company, conceding 
only that it was a US company. Sighisoara was recommended because: it stood near 
two domestic airports 50 and 100 kilometres away; it was close to a future pan- 
European motorway, the Budapest-Bucharest-Constanta; and it was rich in natural 
and architectural heritage.440 These factors made Sighisoara an ideal site for Dracula 
Park. In the end the Executive would be forced to re-site the project for the very 
same reasons they had used in justification -  evidencing how worlds-apart the 
Executive’s values were from those of the civil society actors who rose to challenge 
them.
Except for their personal counsellors, the Executive consulted nobody inside 
Romania. Having control of Parliament, they treated it as a rubberstamp. The 
Emergency Ordinance mandating Dracula Park was submitted for ratification in 
August 2001, well after all plans had been finalised.441 Parliament ratified it in 
December 2001 virtually without dissent, although it is also true that the matter was
437 Klaus H Goetz and Hellmut Wollmann, ‘Govemmentalizing central executives in post-communist Europe: a 
four-country comparison’, Journal o f  European Public Policy (2001), vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 864 -  887.
438 Fabini, interview, 16 December 2005.
439 Romanian Government, Reasons fo r  Emergency Ordinance.
440 Ibid.
441 Popa, interview, 2005.
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too small for a fragmented opposition to make an issue out of it.442 The little dissent 
there was came from a marginal ethnic party, the German Democratic Forum, and a 
handful of Liberal Party deputies.443 The latter opposed the Park not out of ethical 
scruples but because they wanted it built in their own district. As for civil society, the 
Emergency Ordinance claimed to commit the authorities to an ‘active partnership’ 
with them as well as with any private companies involved.444 This created the 
impression that the Executive was ready to engage with civil society. In fact, as 
shown by later events, civil society was not even ‘on the radar screen’.
The speed and secrecy with which the Executive acted was likely intended to 
forestall opposition from other politicians and businessmen rather than from civil 
society. Later, Sighisoara’s mayor confessed that other players wanted the Park on 
their own land, and given the opportunity would have stolen the idea.445 This may 
explain why the Executive drafted their plans in the utmost secrecy and implemented 
them by Executive decree -  an instrument designed for swift execution -  even 
though they were operating against few veto points. Indeed, as soon as plans for 
Dracula Park at Sighisoara were revealed in July 2001, a very similar project -  ‘Park 
Dracula’ -  was produced ‘out of the blue’ by a local Liberal Party group in Brasov 
close to Bran Castle, the historical home of Count Dracula.446 The two groups were 
to fight fiercely over the location of Dracula Park in the coming years. The Liberals’ 
vision of Park Dracula contrasted to that of Agathon who, at least to begin with,
442 Popa, interview, 2005.
443 Interview by the author with Wolfgang Wittstock, President o f the German Democratic Forum, 14 December 
2005.
444 Romanian Government, Reasons fo r  Emergency Ordinance.
445 Dan Danesan, Sighisoara’s Mayor paraphrased in Hans Bruno Frdhlich, Only G od Can Stop Us!!! Memoirs o f  
the Protest Against Dracula Park [Numai Dumnezeu de poate opri!!! Amintiri despre protestul impotriva 
proiectului "Dracula-Park" (personal diary), 2003; Fabini, interview, 2005.
446 Cornel Nistorescu, ‘Editorial’, Evenimentul Zilei, 14 November 2001.
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presented it as ‘a 100% Romanian project for Romanians’.447 The Liberals saw it as 
‘a project made with American money for the Americans’.448 They had already 
allocated public land in the Brasov area,449 proceeding with as much speed and as 
little consultation as the PSD Executive. The opposition parties in their own fiefdoms 
exercised equally unlimited discretion.
The Executive rammed-through Dracula Park at Sighisoara without thinking through 
their plans in detail. They were reportedly impressed by 3-D computerised models of 
the Park created by an architect, ‘one of Agathon’s men’, and easily convinced to go 
ahead.450 Their planning consisted of little more than this model, and, as in 
Communist times when ends mattered more than means,451 the project was launched 
at speed with very little businesslike analysis.452
The Executive took little notice of their obligations under the World Heritage 
Convention, which obligated them to inform and consult with the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) about any major 
development projects that might affect the integrity of a World Heritage Site. In 2001 
they had informed UNESCO several times of their intention to build two theme parks 
-  Dracula Park and a ‘Western Land’ park -  and a golf course in the proximity of 
Sighisoara.453 Each time they were advised against it.454 The Executive adjusted 
their plans somewhat in response -  the idea of Western Land was dropped -  but they 
went ahead with the Sighisoara site for Dracula Park in the teeth of UNESCO’s
447 Fabini, interview, 2005.
448 Fabini, interview, 2005.
449 Popa, interview, 2005.
450 Fabini, interview, 2005; Frohlich, interview, 14 December 2005.
451 Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder. The Leninist Extinction, (California: University o f  California Press, 1992). 
p.78.
452 Fabini, interview, 2005.
453 World Heritage Committee. 2002. Report o f  the UNESCO-ICOMOS Joint Mission to Romania, 22-28 March 
2002, WHC-02/CONF.202/INF.11. Paris, p 3.
454 Ibid.
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concerns.
At this early stage, the Romanian Executive was still treating UNESCO 
opportunistically. This seemed to hardly matter to them, as ‘Sighisoara had never 
gotten any money out of it’.455 The Executive nonetheless justified their plans by 
exploiting UNESCO’s warnings and forecasts. The Emergency Ordinance 
implementing the Park referred to the pressing need to rehabilitate and repair the 
mediaeval citadel, which UNESCO had estimated would become totally degraded 
within 50 years.456 Indeed, in 1998 part of the town’s old fortifying wall had 
collapsed, and another part still standing had developed ‘an ominous bulge’ urgently 
calling for repair.457 The Executive argued that Dracula Park would save the citadel 
by bringing in investors and tourists. The number of tourists was estimated to 
increase from 10,000 to 800,000 a year 458 These would bring with them the much 
needed treasure that neither the local nor central government had been able to afford 
since 1989 459 The material facts provided by UNESCO were thus re-interpreted by 
the Romanian Executive in the light of their own values to serve their own interests.
Dracula Park was envisioned to be a ‘mega-park’ modelled on the Hollywood image 
of Dracula and designed for mass tourism.460 As Agathon put it: ‘If Hollywood can 
exploit the Transylvanian legend so profitably, why can’t we package it nicely, wrap 
a ribbon around it, and sell it [ourselves]?’ 461 Based on vampire mythology, the Park 
would feature amusement rides; a castle wired for spooky effects; a maze garden; a 
golf course; themed restaurants (blood); shops and hotels; and a self-styled ‘Dracula
455 Dan Danesan (Mayor o f Sighisoara) paraphrased in D.S. ‘We are not afraid o f historians, ethnographers and 
journalists’, Romania Libera, 6 Nov 2001.
456 Romanian Government, Reasons fo r  Emergency Ordinance.
457 World Heritage Committee, p. 4.
458 Romanian Government, Reasons fo r  Emergency Ordinance.
459 Radu, 2004.
460 FrOhlich, interview, 14 December 2005; Popa, interview, 2005; World Heritage Committee, p. 11.
461 Dan Matei-Agathon, Romania’s Tourism Minister (2001-2003) quoted in Romania Libera, 13 July 2001.
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Institute’462 given out as an ‘international centre for vampirology’.463 Visitors would 
be shuttled by chairlift from the Breite Plateau, where Dracula Park would be 
located, into the citadel 464 The idea prompted some critics to comment later, ‘It is as 
if the Italians had chosen to build a Disneyland in Siena’.465 The Executive, however, 
perceived no incongruity between their plans and the World Heritage Site of 
Sighisoara. At that stage they appeared not to have been aware of, let alone cared 
about, affronting the alternative universe of values embodied in the UN Convention. 
The mass-tourism design of Dracula Park and its siting so close to a UNESCO- 
protected area were to become the centre of the controversy, to be targeted above all 
by the domestic and trans-national civil society opposition.
The Executive appeared ready not only to defy UNESCO and the World Heritage 
Convention, but also to breach domestic law. The 120-hectare Park was to be built 
just outside Sighisoara on the Breite Plateau, which the local government had offered 
to the Tourism Ministry free of charge.466 The Plateau hosted 70 hectares of one of 
Romania’s ecological treasures, an oak forest estimated to be 400 years old.467 For 
this reason it had been declared a nature reserve by the Mures County Council in 
1993 and by the Romanian Parliament in 2000 in Parliamentary Act No. 5 on 
Protected Areas 468 Act 5/2000 forbids any development of a nature-protected site.469 
The reserve, which the authorities should have protected according to the law, had 
been completely neglected until then. A few months later, when the controversy
462 BBC, ‘Coming Soon -  Dracula Land’, BBC News, 9 July 2001.
463 Eugen, Tomiuc, ‘komania: Dracula Park Expected to Pump Fresh Blood Into Ailing Tourism Industry’, Radio 
Free Europe, 8 November 2001.
464 Jessica Douglas-Home, ‘Dracula goes Disney. A Transylvanian theme park with dungeons and blood-festoned 
tunnels could destroy a historic gem’, The Times, 6 November 2001.
465 Ibid.
466 ‘News: Dracula Empire (120 ha) is renamed “Dracula Park”, RoZiare.com, 22 October 2001.
467 Tomiuc, 2001.
468 RoZiare.com, 2001.
469 Alex Gota, Letter Addressed to the Romanian Information Services, 14 November 2001; Gota, interview, 10 
November 2006.
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burst, the local mayor even denied that the Breite Plateau was protected by 
Romanian law470 -  it was nothing but a ‘derelict place’.471 (Apparently the mayor 
had been genuinely ignorant that the Breite Plateau was a nature reserve.)472 
Building a 120-hectare Park would have been entailed bulldozing the land and 
cutting down much of the forest, disfiguring the reserve beyond recovery.473 But 
environmental considerations did not feature in the Executive’s planning. The fact 
that they seemed ready to build a large infrastructure project on a nature reserve 
protected by Romanian law evidences the persistence of Communist and pre- 
Communist norms of behaviour and values.474 It also suggests their indifference to, 
or ignorance of, the subtler tones of the European community that they were hoping 
to join, especially respect for the rule of law. Nevertheless, their behaviour was 
probably more a conditioned response than malice aforethought.
The Executive’s opportunism extended to the EU and its member-States. The plan 
was to attract European tourists and German investment. The choice of the 
Sighisoara site likely was partly aimed at involving the Saxon community, much of 
which had left Sighisoara and now lived in Germany. Their involvement might 
‘politically leverage opportunities for direct and indirect investment by the German 
Federal and Lander governments’.475 The fact that the Executive hoped to attract 
investment from the German government, yet were prepared to disregard the rule of 
law and the Park’s impact on the Saxon heritage suggests that they may indeed have 
been unaware of the incongruity between their domestic behaviour and their
470 Danasan, Dan (Mayor o f Sighisoara) quoted in Corina Ruje and Aura Alexa loan, ‘Hundreds o f  Sighisoarans 
protest against the building o f Dracula Land’, Jurnalul National, 21 October 2001.
471 Ibid.
472 Gota, Letter; Gota, interview, 10 November 2006.
473 Interview by the author with Sherban Cantacuzino, ICOMOS expert to UNESCO, 3 January 2006; Douglas- 
Home, Dracula goes Disney; Fabini, interview, 2005.
474 Goetz, Making sense, p. 1033.
475 Romanian Government, Reasons fo r  Emergency Ordinance.
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Europeanized material goals.
If the Saxon community would be used to attract money from one member-State, the 
norms and values of the EU were taken into account only insofar as necessary to 
avoid their interfering with the Executive’s vision of attracting hard currency. For 
this purpose, the Cabinet drafted into its Ordinance a clause directing the Tourism 
Ministry to draw up a contract that would bind the bond-issuing authority that was to 
finance the park, that is, the local Council, ‘to respect... the technical and ecological 
standards applied in the EU’.476 By referring to EU standards, which Romania would 
someday have to comply with, the Cabinet may have intended to evade subsequent 
challenges for violating them. But this was the extent of their Europeanization at this 
stage: to avoid future difficulties with the EU, whose acquis the Romanian 
government had been planning to begin negotiating.
In planning Dracula Park, the Executive was motivated not solely by material 
incentives, but also by a thirst for higher status and international renown. Tourism 
Minister Agathon, for example, touted that Dracula Park would ‘propel Romania to 
stardom’.477 In pursuing this goal as well, the Executive’s behaviour was ‘rational’ 
within the context. They sought to maximise status and material benefits in a social 
environment not only materially poor, but so steeply hierarchical that the highest 
status is severely scarce and fiercely contested. From a material standpoint, the Park 
would create 3,000 jobs, revitalising the Sighisoara area. This was suffering 17% 
unemployment brought on by the collapse of the regional textile industry, which only 
subsidies had kept alive in Ceausescu’s time.478 As for money, annual revenues of
476 Romanian Government. 2001. Emergency Ordinance No. 3/2001 approving and implementing the Special 
Programme o f  the tourist development o f  the Sighisoara area, 13 July 2001.
477 Dan-Matei Agathon quoted in Rose George. 2002. Dracula Park is supposed to revitalise Romania’s tourist 
industry. But the locals think its sucks’ in The Independent, 26 January 2004.
478 George, Dracula Park is supposed to revitalise.
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US$25 million were projected to accrue, if each of the one million tourists forecast to 
visit the Park spent US$25, as the local Council’s feasibility pilot-study had claimed. 
This would double Romania’s income from tourism, and revitalise the whole 
industry.479 Although the Executive claimed that half of these revenues would be 
used to restore the Citadel,480 no plans were ever drafted to actually spend any 
revenues on restoration. It was this lack that, a few months later, convinced 
UNESCO to suspect the Executive’s real motives.481
The Executive’s style of planning Dracula Park and proceeding with its 
implementation puts on display many norms typical of Communism: cloaking in 
secrecy; total discretion; decisions by a clique formed around the Party’s 
powerbrokers; the motivation of material gains for private persons and interest- 
groups; amateurish planning in disregard of other stakeholders. The Executive also 
appeared unaware of or unwilling to respect the spirit and the letter of international 
and Romanian law. As for the EU and UNESCO, the Executive perceived them 
merely as opportunities to be exploited. Their conformity to EU norms and values 
appears to have been at this stage purely formal and strategic, and driven by material 
gain as the dominant value.
3. 2 The upstarts
In comparison with the untrammelled discretion of the Executive, Romanian civil 
society languished under severe constraints. This situation persisted until 
intervention came from abroad. This section will show how civil society took 
proactive steps to overcome these liabilities and to empower themselves to constrain
479 Nick, Thorpe, ‘Romania scraps Dracula Land’, BBC News, 28 June 2002.
480 Radu, 2004.
481 Cantacuzino, interview, 2006
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an unconstrained Executive.
The Cabinet’s plans had been welcomed with enthusiasm by a majority of the local 
populace, and regarded with sympathy by local government and business. Agathon 
and the Mayor of Sighisoara, Dan Danesan, inaugurated Dracula Park ‘with great 
pomp’ on the 6th November 2001.483 At Agathon’s behest the local Orthodox priest 
led the attendees in prayer. The government had enlisted, the Church -  one of 
Romania’s most influential ‘demagogues’ (as it were) -  to cement local and national 
support for the project.484 Just as in Communist days, some participants Carried 
banners reading ‘Agathon we love you’ and ‘Dracula saves Sighisoara’.485 The 
prospect of better jobs and a higher standard of living appealed to most.486 Indeed, by
A Q H
March 2002 5,000 people had applied to the Mayor's office for employment. Few 
questioned the Executive’s motives for so oddly juxtaposing a Dracula theme park 
next to a mediaeval Saxon citadel unaffiliated with the legend. The fact that the 
Nastase Cabinet’s values and ways of thinking resonated with those of the local 
populace raised an expectation that Dracula Park would be implemented more or less 
as planned.
A small minority of local civil society entrepreneurs nevertheless did rise to 
challenge not just the Executive’s choice of location, but their most basic values and 
ways of thinking and proceeding. This marked the first time Romanian civil society 
had ever challenged a development project sponsored by the government, indicating 
that the classical passivity of Romanian civil society and its acquiescence to the State 
were perhaps beginning to change. The first spark of opposition was lit after the
482 Frohlich, interview, 14 December 2005.
483 FrOhlich, Only God Can Stop', Gota, interview, 10 December 2006.
484 Frohlich, interview, 14 December 2005.
485 Ibid.
486 Fabini, interview, 2005; FrOhlich, interview, 14 December 2005.
487 World Heritage Committee, p. 22.
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Executive published the Emergency Ordinance of July 2001. A local Lutheran 
pastor, the ethnic German Hans Bruno Frohlich, addressed a letter of protest to the 
local authorities. He petitioning them to intervene to keep the town from succumbing 
to an ‘atmosphere beneficial to “evil spirits’” , which Dracula Park threatened to 
promote.488 Frohlich had little rational expectation that the letter, published out of an 
internal need -  (‘I can’t stay on the sidelines; I must do something’), -  would change 
anything, for ‘what could a single man do ... before a government decision?’489 As 
expected, the authorities ignored his letter.490
This first gesture of protest appeared insignificant in the circumstances then 
prevailing. Yet it did not pass wholly unnoticed. Published by the local newspaper, it 
caught the attention of Alexandru Gota, a local freelance journalist and ‘nature 
lover’. His concerns resonated with those of Frohlich. Heartened by his example, 
Gota gave voice to his own concerns, which centred on the Breite Plateau -  already 
under pressure from overgrazing and neglect by the local administration.491 The two 
teamed up to plan a way of stopping Dracula Park.492 They expected no reprisals; 
that the Romanian authorities would respect their freedom to dissent from 
government policy was taken for granted. Had the costs of defying the authorities 
been higher {i.e. imprisonment) they would likely have never mobilised. This change 
in their expectations of how the State would react to protest may have been due to 
Romania’s accession to the EU or simply to the fall of Communism. Their 
mobilisation suggests that the expectations and values of at least a minority had been 
changed by something since the days of Ceausescu. As for values, theirs were the
488 FrOhlich, Only God Can Stop.
489 Frbhlich, Only God Can Stop; Gota, interview, 10 December 2006.
490 FrShlich, interview, 14 December 2005.
491 Frohlich, Only God Can Stop; Gota, interview, 10 November 2006.
492 Frbhlich, interview, 14 December 2005; Gota, interview, 10 November 2006.
107
polar opposites of the local populace’s and the government’s -  values that would 
prove to fit in better with those held by trans-national actors and organisations from 
Europe.
Like most Romanian civil society, neither Frohlich nor Gota had resources or 
experience enough to organise an effective campaign. Locally, only a few friends 
and relatives responded positively to their efforts to gather signatures on a protest 
petition. Gota’s account of the first demonstration in Sighisoara illustrates vividly 
how little support they had in Sighisoara: ‘In October 2001 when I went out with a 
banner in the main square, I was alone’.493 The majority either did not care or, 
anticipating the jobs the authorities had promised, were unsympathetic and even 
hostile. Realising that they stood no chance of success on their own, they proceeded 
to mobilise other Romanian civil society actors.
At the national level, only one Romanian civil society organisation responded 
promptly -  the Pro-Europe League, a civic group campaigning primarily for civil 
rights. The League had been founded in December 1989, directly after the downfall 
of Ceausescu, by a group of intellectuals for the purpose of promoting Romania’s 
integration into the EU.494 It was the threat they perceived in Dracula Park to the 
Romanian and Saxon cultural patrimony, to the environment, and to democracy and 
the rule of law that motivated them to ‘take all necessary action to stop this 
project’.495 Most of Romanian civil society, including even the environmental 
organisations, remained passive, immobilised and unreliable, limiting themselves to 
private letters of support. This disappointed Frohlich and Gota, who had expected
493 Gota, email communication, 5 January 2006.
494 Pro-Europe League, 2004, <http ://www.proeuropa.ro/> (accessed January 2005).
495 Interview by the author with Judit Kacso, Program coordinator, Pro-Europe League, 7 April 2006; Pro- 
Europea League, ‘NO to the transformation o f Sighisoara in Dracula Park’ (Press Conference), TTrgu Mure§, 8 
November 2001, <http://www.proeuropa.ro/document/CP8noi2001 .htm 1> (accessed 1 December 2005).
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more than one organisation to mobilise, particularly given that Romania had many 
environmental organisations, and that many of the significant issues raised by the 
Park were environmental ones.496
J
At length, the local protestors were empowered after all, when they were joined by 
norm entrepreneurs from the West. The first to join were ethnic Germans who had 
emigrated from Sighisoara but had kept in contact with Frohlich. One of them was 
Andreas Mausolf, a German environmental activist specialising in ecological and 
cultural tourism. Mausolf taught the local protestors the concept of sustainability 
[Nachhaltigkeit], and inspired them to found a civic initiative group, which they 
named ‘Sustainable Sighisoara’.497 The group’s stated mission was to enter into 
dialogue with the local and central authorities in order to seek local development 
solutions alternative to Dracula Park.498 They were ignored.
Empowered by the Germans and by the Pro-Europe League, Sustainable Sighisoara 
proceeded to lobby domestic and international organisations to intervene and help 
them to persuade the government to relocate the project. They had observed that the 
Romanian authorities were highly sensitive to international pressures, especially 
those coming from the EU. If they ever modified their behaviour, this tended to 
happen only after ‘receiving messages from abroad’.499 The protestors constructed 
discourses featuring the EU as well as the European identity which the Romanian 
political elites like to claim for themselves: ‘The Government is forever declaring 
that its first priority is integration into Europe; if  so, it should refrain from any act 
that might taint the European cultural heritage. Moreover, the Government should be
496 Gota, interview, 10 November 2005.
497 FrOhlich, interview, 14 December 2005.
498 V. S. Muntean, ‘The Sustainable Sighisoara Association’, Jurnalul de Sighisoara, 2001.
499 Gota interview, 10 November 2005.
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in the vanguard of any campaign aimed at protecting this ... the cultural heritage in 
Transylvania is our evidence that we belong to the European cultural space’.500 
Sustainable Sighisoara had a double aim in invoking the EU thus. On the one hand 
they were trying to alert EU and other international organs to what was happening in 
Sighisoara and to the Romanian government’s two-level game; that is, that their 
internal discourse was a 180 degrees opposite to that ‘for external consumption’.501 
The hope was that these organs ‘would give a signal’, making the Romanian 
authorities fear negative repercussions for their EU accession.502
Besides deploying discourses featuring the EU, the protestors took the initiative to 
lobby Brussels. Believing that the European Commission was ‘professional’ and 
‘interested in the issue of cultural heritage’ (or, that if it was not, they could make it 
feel it ought to be), the Pro-Europe League wrote Enrico Grillo Pasquarelli, 
Commissioner for Enlargement, charging the Romanian authorities with breaching
C A *1
domestic and international law. The protestors perceived the power asymmetry 
between the Commission and the Romanian government as an opportunity to 
empower themselves over the Executive. They believed that the Commission must 
have a ‘weighty say’ in Romania’s accession, and would at least enquire of the 
Romanian government about the project’.504 That the Commission did not intervene 
in the end suggests that civil society might construct opportunities out of the EU 
which nonetheless might not necessarily lead to any empowerment.
The protesters achieved greater visibility with the intervention of the media in the 
affair. In the beginning, the domestic media had paid no attention to them. With the
500 Pro-Europea League, NO to the transformation.
501 Gota, interview, 10 November 2005.
502 Ibid.
503 Kacso, interview, 2006.
exception of Cotidianul and Romania Libera, all newspapers had focused only on the 
benefits of the Park claimed by the government.505 Many suspected that the 
government ‘bought silence’ by buying a lot of adverts in the main newspapers and 
television channels: ‘all media [had] eulogised the government’s grand investment 
and its grand design ... and [had] excluded the voice of those opposing the park’.506 
Foreign mass-media were the first to cover the local protest. Ironically it was the 
inauguration of Dracula Park by Agathon in Sighisoara in November 2001 that had 
brought the protestors to the attention of the foreigners. The Financial Times, 
Business Week, and TV channels like the German ZDF and ARD and the French Arte 
reported not only the Romanian government’s plans but also the local opposition to 
it.507 Later on, aggressive articles authored by the opposition were published by Le
CAO
Monde, The Guardian, The New York Times, and Deutsche Welle. The German 
and the British press were particularly critical of the Park,509 presenting it to their 
respective publics as a non-viable project.510 The intervention of the foreign media 
prodded the domestic Romanian press to give more ‘objective coverage’ to the 
affair.511 Indeed, Evenimentul Zilei, perhaps Romania’s premier broadsheet, became 
one of the most incisive critics, investigating the project’s finances and concluding 
that the sums ‘did not add up ... were completely unrealistic and ... made-up from 
start to finish’. The media was crucial to the empowerment of the civil society
505 FrOhlich, Only God Can Stop; Gota, interview, 10 November 2005.
506 Trandafir, interview, 2006.
507 Ziua de Ardeal, ‘Dracula Park’s enemies searched by the External Information Services’, Ziua de Ardeal, 24 
October 2001.
508 Pro-Europe League, S.O.S. Sighisoara, ‘Gala Premiilor Societatii Civile’, 2002.
<http://www.galapsc.ro/!024 ro/proiects.php?pid=177 > (accessed 1 March 2003).
509 Hermann Armeniu Fabini (National Liberal Party Senator), Sessions o f the Senate o f April 29,2002, 
Romanian Parliament.
5,0 FrOhlich, interview, 13 January 2006.
511 FrOhlich, Only God Can Stop; Gota, interview, 10 November 2005.
5,2 Gota, interview, 10 November 2005.
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opposition.513
The opposition to Dracula Park surprised both the local and central Executives,514 
until then so confident in their unchallenged dominance. The protest risked deterring 
foreign investors, becoming a lightning-rod for bad publicity by ‘media channels of 
great prestige from Western Europe as well as from the East’.515 Worried that the 
negative publicity might deter German involvement, Agathon himself wrote a letter 
to the association representing Sighisoara’s German repatriates, to assure them that 
their Saxon heritage and the environment would be taken special care of. For 
Agathon, the protestors were ‘obscure forces ... who propagate false information ... 
aimed to discredit and undermine [Romania’s] resort to the capital market’.516
In response to the protest, the Executive actors in charge of implementing Dracula 
Park became aggressive and took to personal attacks, thus making recourse to 
‘Communist methods’ of vindicating their exercise of discretion and stifling 
opposition. The leading protestors fell under a torrent of verbal abuse from the 
authorities and many local media. The Mayor summoned Gota and Frohlich to render 
an account, demanding to know ‘Who are you representing?’ and ‘Who pays 
you?’517 He told them bluntly that they were under surveillance by the Romanian 
secret service ‘because they had opposed a governmental project ... thus subverting 
State power’.518 The Park Manager, Marius Stoian, called Frohlich ‘a nutcase’; others 
accused him of being a spy because he was an ethnic German and had regular contact
513 Evenimentul Zilei, 22 July 2002; Gota, interview, 10 November 2005.
514 Frohlich, Only God Can Stop.
515 Dan Matei-Agathon (Tourism Minister o f Romania), The Message o f  Mr. Dan Matei-Agathon, Tourism 
Minister, addressed to the Annual Reunion o f  Ethnic Germans o f  Sighisoara, Letter to the City Hall o f  
Sighisoara, 2001.
516 Ibid.
517 Frbhlich, Only God Can Stop.
518 Frohlich, Only God Can Stop; Trandafir, interview, 2006.
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with Germany.519 The distribution of Romania Libera, the main opposition 
newspaper was, alone of all the national broadsheets, even interdicted in Sighisoara, 
apparently at the behest of the local mayor.520 The Mayor went so far as to slander 
Gota on an issue unrelated to Dracula Park leading to a lawsuit now before the 
European Court of Human Rights.521 For his part, Agathon himself called Gota on 
his mobile and threatened to sue him, and an ‘emissary’, presumably sent by 
Agathon, offered Gota ‘an appreciable sum of money’ to soften his stance.
Contrary to expectations, a civil society minority, whose values differed to those of 
the majority and of the government, was thus prepared to challenge the Executive. 
To do so, they seized every opportunity they could make shift, including discourses 
featuring the EU and lobbying of EU organs. Their lack of expertise and resources, 
the immobile public, the dismissive domestic media, and the Executive’s 
promptitude to use intimidation and corruption were significant obstacles. The local 
protestors overcame some of these on their own -  they involved more experienced 
and resourceful German civil society actors and gained visibility through the media. 
They even garnered some supporters from amongst Romanian civil society, who had 
been so passive to begin with. However, they did not succeed on their own in casting 
off their most burdensome constraint. The Executive, local and central, not only did 
not change its plans, they even moved to shut down the protest, thus threatening that 
critical expectation upon which Sustainable Sighisoara had been founded: the 
freedom to express an opinion and dissent from government policy without fear of 
reprisal. Therefore, to move the Executive off its course, Sustainable Sighisoara and 
its trans-national allies proceeded to involve much more powerful mediators and
519 FrChlich, Only God Can Stop; FrOhlich, interview, 14 December 2005.
520 FrOhlich, interview, 13 January 2006.
521 Gota, email communication, 6 January 2006.
522 Ibid.
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arbiters.
3.3 The posse comitatus
The domestic protest’s bottom-up engagement of Europe was to be complemented by 
the intervention of external actors, acting at their own initiative, more powerful than 
either Sustainable Sighisoara or the Romanian Executive. The serial intervention of 
The Mihai Eminescu Trust, UNESCO, the European Parliament and Prince Charles 
would gradually pressurise the Executive to the point where the external costs of 
pursuing Dracula Park came to be perceived by them as outweighing the domestic 
benefits.
3.3.1 The Mihai Eminescu Trust 
One of the most consequential external interveners constraining the Executive, and 
by default empowering the domestic protest, proved to be The Mihai Eminescu Trust 
(MET). The MET was a London-based organisation under the leadership of Jessica 
Douglas-Home that worked to protect the Romanian cultural heritage. The MET has 
a relatively long history of involvement in Romania. Under Ceausescu Douglas- 
Home had helped Romanian dissidents and got involved in saving Romanian villages 
that Ceausescu had planned to bulldoze.523 Compared to Romanian civil society, the 
MET had access to more power resources. The organisation is under the patronage 
both of Prince Charles and of Prince Sherban Cantacuzino. The latter is an eminent 
Romanian emigre and architect of the Romanian diaspora elite in London and an 
expert of the International Council for Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) and advisor 
to UNESCO. Cantacuzino is also the President of the Pro Patrimonio Trust, which 
together with the MET have been actively involved since 1989 in preserving the
523 Jessica Douglas-Home, Once Upon a Time. Ventures Behind the Iron Curtain, (Michael Russell, 2000); Gota 
interview, 10 November 2005.
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cultural heritage, in particular the Saxon villages of Transylvania. One of their goals 
was to head off what they deemed the ‘wrong sort of development’.524
Both the Pro Patrimonio Trust and the MET, and patrons, shared a vision of 
sustainable development centred on traditional agriculture, crafts and ecological 
tourism. They doubted Dracula Park would bring ‘sustainable prosperity’ to 
Sighisoara. Douglas-Home, for example, believed the Park was ‘tacky’, ‘badly 
made’, and sited ‘in the wrong place’, and was convinced that the government had 
exaggerated the prospects of jobs and tourists.527 If built anywhere, the Park should 
be located on a brownfield site -  of which there are plenty in Romania -  closer to a 
major city like Bucharest. Cantacuzino and Douglas-Home provided the expertise 
and the social leverage that would draw into the affair UNESCO and Prince Charles, 
those whose acts were eventually to constrain the Executive. Their intervention was 
not in any way incentivised by the EU but by their own values alone. Insofar as they 
had an impact on the outcome of Dracula Park, they were bottom-up causes of 
Europeanization by private means and initiative -  ‘norm entrepreneurs’ -  active 
largely in individual EU member-States.
Although Douglas-Home and the MET did not specifically aim to aid the local 
protest,529 in the end this was the effect they had. They empowered Sustainable 
Sighisoara and its domestic allies with ideas, information and strategies. Sustainable 
Sighisoara first met with the MET in December 2001, and agreed informally to 
support each other’s efforts. The agreement produced ‘fruitful collaboration’ on both
524 D.S., We are not afraid o f  historians.
525 The Mihai Eminescu Trust, Letter summarising the outcome o f  the meeting -with Agathon, 26 June 2002.
526 Jessica Douglas-Home, email communication, 2 January 2006.
527 George, Dracula Park is supposed to revitalise', Douglas-Home, Dracula goes Disney.
528 Douglas-Home, Dracula goes Disney.
529 Douglas-Home, email, 2 January 2006.
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sides. Not only did the MET empower Sustainable Sighisoara, but they were in 
turn empowered by them -  first with a constant flow of local information, but later, 
more importantly, with domestic legitimacy, without which the intervention of the 
MET might have backfired for being unilateral and foreign. Prince Charles’s 
subsequent intervention -  arranged by the MET -  might well have been perceived
• C 'J  1
more negatively by Romanians had they not enjoyed local allies.
The MET targeted the Executive for constraint.532 Douglas-Home was particularly 
successful in creating negative publicity about Dracula Park in Britain. In order for 
this to have any effect, she had to rely on the Nastase Cabinet’s keenness to accede to 
the EU. She knew that Romanians gave ‘considerable importance’ to their ‘special 
relation with England’ generally, and even more in the context of accession, so that 
British coverage of Romania was closely monitored by the Romanian embassy. 
The MET calculated that bad publicity in Britain was ‘incredibly important’ for the 
Romanian government at that sensitive time in the accession process.534 Well- 
connected to the British press -  her husband used to be the editor of The Times -  
Douglas-Home’s articles were published by The Guardian, The Times, The 
Spectator ,  and The BBC Wildlife Magazine,535 Most of these were then translated and 
carried by the Romanian press.
The negative publicity in Britain did not escape the Nastase Cabinet’s notice. In 
January 2002, the PM reacted to one of Douglas-Home’s articles in The Spectator 
ridiculing Dracula Park. By juxtaposing the medieval beauty of Sighisoara with 
torture dungeons and restaurants serving brains and blood-coloured cotton candy, the
530 Gota, email, 9 January 2006.
531 FrGhlich, interview, 13 January 2006.
532 Douglas-Home, interview, 12 April 2006.
533 Ibid.
534 Ibid.
535 Douglas-Home, email, 2 Januaiy 2006.
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article implied that the Park was a white elephant that would never attract foreign 
investment.536 Such a portrayal of his project angered Nastase, who counteracted by 
redoubling his Cabinet’s support: ‘We must promote an aggressive tourism ... 
Romania cannot endlessly have a traditional tourism ... This is a governmental 
project; we support it, and this is the sort of thing we want to do, to bring money to 
Romania ... \ 537 Nastase’s anger suggests that the MET’s negative publicity 
campaign had got the Executive worrying about loss of reputation and foreign 
investors, even if the publicity was not still enough at that point to make the 
Executive change course.
3.3.2 The World Heritage Committee and UNESCO 
The MET played a critical role in getting UNESCO and the World Heritage 
Committee (WHC) involved. The WHC superintends the implementation of the 
World Heritage Convention. Alerted by the MET and Sustainable Sighisoara, they 
first intervened in December 2001.538 They succeeded in constraining the Executive 
to some extent by themselves, but lacked the coercive mechanisms to actually keep 
the Park from being built at Sighisoara. They became influential only once the 
Cabinet perceived a connexion between complying with the World Heritage 
Convention and accession to the EU. Thus, even the WHC’s and UNESCO’s 
influence over the Executive ultimately piggybacked on the latter’s keenness to 
accede to the EU and their fear of being sanctioned in this process by the EU.
UNESCO’s first intervention was a letter to the PM expressing concern over the
536 Adevarul, ‘In the prestigious British magazine, The Spectator: Dracula Park covered with blood in’, Adevarul 
16 January 2002
537 Adrian Nastase, PM o f Romania quoted in Corina, Dragotescu, ‘Adrian Nastase says that we cannot have a 
tourism only for the working class tired o f capitalism’, Adevarul, 19 January 2002.
538 Douglas-Home, email, 2 January 2006; Mihai Eminescu Trust web site, 2002.
<http://www.mihaieminescutrust.org.uk/files/newsletter2002.pdf>: Interview by the author with Mechtild 
Rossler, Chief, Europe & North America UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 11 December 2005.
117
impact of mass-tourism on the citadel and the Park’s visual impact on the town
COQ
centre. They advised the Romanian government to carry out an Environmental 
Impact Assessment and explore sites alternative to Sighisoara.540 The Cabinet 
responded by trimming the Park’s design to exclude the chairlift and the golf course. 
This was done informally, without any modification actually being made in the 
implementing Emergency Ordinance.541 They were unwilling to concede more at this 
point; no steps were taken to explore or even to plan to explore alternatives.
The Executive even took steps to hasten the project. Around the same time 
UNESCO’s letter arrived, in December 2001, the Executive floated their bonds, 
authorising the issue of US$5 million worth.542 Hoping to entice emulation, Nastase 
and Agathon publicly bought hundreds of pounds worth.543 There followed other 
politicians and businessmen as well as civil servants.544 Apparently Nastase even 
interrupted a TV channel to announce he was investing in Dracula Park and to urge 
Romanians to get involved -  news which disheartened the opposition.545 UNESCO’s 
letter thus had a minimal effect on Nastase and the Cabinet. Their scant 
accommodation of UNESCO’s recommendations was likely driven by their 
calculation that UNESCO may recommend, but has no coercive power to enforce its 
recommendations. It was only ‘an informal group’, as the Park Manager put it;546 
therefore, in the Cabinet’s view, UNESCO was irrelevant and had no right to call a
539 World Heritage Committee, p. 8.
540 loan F Pascu., ‘UNESCO’s letter to the Romanian government’ Jurnalul Sighisoara Reporter, 23-20 January 
2002.
541 World Heritage Committee, p. 8.
542 ‘Romanian Tourism Minister Launches Public Offering for Shares in Dracula Park’, Radio Free Europe 
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543 Sean Hillen, ‘Prince o f Wales defeats Prince o f Darkness’, Daily Telegraph News.
544 Ion Teleanu and Ovidiu, Zara, ‘Dracula Park investors tremble for their money’ (CD-ROM source, no date 
and publisher recorded).
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halt to a project undertaken by a sovereign government.547
The Executive was nonetheless forced to defend itself when in January 2002 an 
aggressive Romanian press widely publicised UNESCO’s letter (until then 
apparently kept secret).548 The letter had been re-interpreted by the press and civil 
society opposition to mean that UNESCO had in fact demanded, not merely 
recommended that the Park is scrapped. The Executive counterattacked by 
constructing discourses featuring the EU in deploying information about EU 
member-States held by UNESCO. They contextualised UNESCO’s concern over 
Dracula Park, pointing out that there were 82 other cases in Germany, Italy and 
France alone where UNESCO had also signalled concern.549 By this argument the 
Executive was seeking to empower itself by ‘tagging along’ with powerful and 
unquestionably legitimate members of the EU. The Tourism Ministry endeavoured to 
counteract opposition by commissioning a poll into the views about the Park of the 
local populace. The poll showed that the majority supported it.550 The Executive 
deemed this showing of popular support to have legitimised their plans.
Having failed to move the Executive off course, the WHC in March 2002 dispatched 
a joint UNESCO-ICOMOS Mission to investigate matters at Sighisoara. The 
Mission included Sherban Cantacuzino -  patron of the MET and President of Pro 
Patrimonio -  who cherished values that clashed with the Executive’s but resonated 
with those of the civil society opposition. Even before arriving in Romania, the 
Mission conceived that their report could not possibly support Dracula Park, and that 
they ‘would find as many reasons as they possibly could to discourage the Executive’
548 Ovidiu Nahoi, ‘What Minister Agathon forgot to tell us: UNESCO does not want Dracula Park next to 
Sighisoara’, Evenimentul Zilei Online, 16 January 2002.
549 Marius Stoian (Dracula Park Manager) quoted in Adevarul, 17 January 2002.
550 Nicoleta Burtan, ‘With an opinion poll ordered up from an institute founded by a fellow minister, Agathon 
tries to show that Sighisoarans support Dracula Park unanimously’, Evenimentul Zilei Online, 20 December 2001.
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and to make them agree to find another site.551 Because their formal remit was to 
‘evaluate objectively’ the project’s impact on the heritage values of the Site and 
‘make recommendations’ to WHC, the Mission took care to express its opposition 
stealthily. They asked ‘loaded’ and ‘sensitive’ questions of the most vehement 
supporters, viz. Agathon, Danesan the local mayor, and Covali the architect.553 The 
Mission implicitly threatened the Executive by warning them that by going ahead 
with Sighisoara they risked having it removed from the Heritage List onto the 
Danger List.554 That would forfeit Romania’s right to apply to the World Heritage 
Fund or nominate other Sites in future. Such an outcome would be widely perceived 
in the international community to be a ‘pretty disreputable thing to happen to a 
State’.555
The Mission had some effect on the Executive. The provocation of their questions 
triggered angry responses from proponents. Covali, for example, ‘became quite 
heated at one point because he felt that [the Mission] were prejudging their plans’.556 
For his part, Agathon sensed that ‘[Cantacuzino] was very much against Dracula 
Park’, and that ‘the Mission’s report was not going to be favourable’.557 However, 
when it became clear that they had failed to convince the Mission about the merits of 
their project, the Cabinet took several ad hoc decisions that they hoped would 
influence the Mission toward a more positive evaluatiqn. On the Mission’s last day, 
Agathon informed them that the Emergency Ordinance would be formally amended 
to exclude the chairlift and the golf course, and that the ‘Dracula Castle’ towers 
would be lowered below the tree-line to minimise their visual impact. The
551 Cantacuzino, interview, 2006
552 ROssler, interview, 2005.
553 Cantacuzino, interview, 2006.
Environment Minister promised that the 400 year-old oak trees on the Breite Plateau 
would be included in the design and protected inside the development zone; 
moreover, that the Park would feature a natural history museum and a laboratory, and
c c o
offer environmental education and guided tours of the Plateau. For its part, the 
Culture Ministry promised to undertake archaeological diggings in order to 
substantiate claims that a Roman road runs through the site.559 The Mission, then, did 
succeed in constraining the Executive to a certain extent, but not as much as they had 
intended. The Cabinet still did not commit itself to considering alternative sites.
The Executive’s ad hoc efforts to cajole the Mission did not have the intended effect. 
The Mission report was negative, recommending that the WHC ‘requests the 
Romanian government to reconsider the proposed theme park’.560 It also threatened 
the Executive with putting Sighisoara on the List of World Heritage in Danger if no 
immediate steps were taken to rehabilitate the Site with national and international 
funds -  as opposed to waiting for tourism revenues from Dracula Park.561 The 
Mission did succeed in giving the Cabinet the impression that the WHC was 
prepared to criticise the Romanian government severely in Budapest in June 2002. 
This would have sanctioned them for their disrespect for cultural heritage, for the 
international conventions which they had signed but did not enforce, and for the
cfsy
international bodies to which they were endeavouring to accede. Such criticism 
could ‘mark’ the Romanian government,563 provoking a negative reaction from the 
European Commission, which had advised the accession countries that they must
558 World Heritage Committee, p. 9.
559 Ibid.
560 World Heritage Committee, p. 13.
561 World Heritage Committee, p. 12.
562 Interview by the author with Nicolae Ratiu, Pro Patrimonio, 13 June 2006.
563 Ibid.
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comply with all international conventions and treaties to which they were parties.564 
Non-compliance with a UN Convention would signal that Romania was not prepared 
to abide by the rule of law, and thus casting doubt on its accession-worthiness.
The perception that the Commission might sanction a Romanian government that 
flouted its international obligations was played upon and reinforced by Romanian 
civil society, the MET and the press; they all deployed discourses linking UNESCO 
to the EU. One such discourse asserted, ‘Censure from UNESCO will carry no legal 
force. However the stigma it would carry should worry the Romanian government as 
it seeks to enter the EU, which sets much store on environmental issues’.565 The 
European Parliament, intervening a mere three weeks after the Mission, played an 
important role in stressing the connection between UNESCO and the EU. Absent 
such a linkage, many observers agreed that it would have been doubtful that 
UNESCO alone could have significantly influenced the Romanian Executive.566
3.3.3 The European Parliament 
The only EU supranational actor who intervened following appeals by civil society 
was the relatively powerless Culture Committee of the European Parliament (EP). In 
March 2002, the Culture Committee sent one of its members to Sighisoara, Mercedes 
Echerer, a Green Austrian MEP and former Greenpeace leader. Echerer discovered 
to her surprise that Sustainable Sighisoara, the local civil society in opposition, had 
the competence to network trans-nationally and to formulate sound arguments 
against the Park.56,7 Yet she was left with the impression that competence might not, 
on its own, suffice to move the Cabinet. Upon her return to Brussels, Echerer
564 Interview by the author with Henriette Faergemann, Desk Officer for Romania, DG Enlargement, European 
Commission, 6 July 2005.
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prevailed on the Culture Committee to intervene. Her apparent intention was to 
empower domestic civil society by signalling to all parties that the EP sympathised
f/O
with the opposition. The MEPs were well aware of their powerlessness over EU 
member-States, yet they expected the Romanian Executive’s keenness to accede to 
the EU would motivate them to heed even relatively weak external pressures.569 
Romania was already experiencing accession woes, giving the MEPs hope that the 
government would want to avoid worsening things by showing themselves 
insensitive to warnings from the EP.570
Lacking a solid legal basis for intervention, the Committee relied on implicit threats 
like non-accession and damage to reputation, as well as on the promise of rewards. In 
April 2002 the President of the Culture Committee wrote a letter to the Nastase, his 
Culture Minister, his Tourism Minister, as well as to the local authorities in 
Sighisoara, warning them that the World Heritage Convention had been incorporated 
into the EU acquis by an EP Resolution (16/2001).571 He called on the PM ‘to 
suspend all work that already began on the designated site and wait for the decision 
of UNESCO in June 2002’.572 Linking the EU to UNESCO was intended to suggest 
to the Romanians that ‘UNESCO’s ideas and concerns do have an influence on the 
European level’.573 Nastase was admonished that ‘the international community will 
be sensitive’ to his decision on Dracula Park (the threat), and offered the proposal 
that the Committee might ‘examine together [with the Cabinet] all the possibilities of
568 Email communication with Mercedes Echerer, former Green Austrian MEP, 16 June 2006.
569 Echerer, interview, former Green Austrian MEP, 15 December 2005.
570 Ibid.
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supporting the development of Transylvania, the conservation of its patrimony and 
the development of tourism projects’ (the reward).574
The Cabinet was advised to consider matters very carefully before taking a decision 
that might damage the World Heritage Site, and to keep the EP informed.575 The 
Committee tried to influence the Cabinet by making them ‘feel under pressure’, and 
by inducing in them a perception of ‘being watched’ by the EU.576 This perception 
would only have been reinforced by the EP Delegation that visited Romania in 
October 2002 to assess her progress toward living up to the environmental acquis. 
Dracula Park was one of three ‘specific issues’ (along with Rosia Montana and the 
Danube Delta) which the Delegation inquired into.577 Through these interventions, 
the EP constrained the Romanian Executive a step further by making them believe 
that if they built Dracula Park at Sighisoara, it might, at a minimum, ‘disturb’ 
Romania’s accession.578 The Parliament’s intervention reinforced the Cabinet’s 
perception of risk created by all the other external interveners -  WHC-UNESCO’s 
before them and Prince Charles’s after -  but did not decisively move the Cabinet to 
relocate Dracula Park.
3.3.4 Prince Charles’s intervention: the straw that broke the camel’s back 
The last and, according to most actors in the controversy, the decisive influence on 
the Cabinet was Charles, Prince of Wales and heir to the British throne. This final 
external intervener tipped the balance of power against the Park’s proponents. 
Charles intervened during a private visit of his to Transylvania in May 2002, likely at
574 Scrisoarea domnului Michel Rocard.
575 Echerer, interview, 15 December 2005.
576 Ibid.
577 European Parliament. 2002. Summary Note o f  the Environment Committee Delegation to Romania on 28-30 
October 2002, < http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/envi/pdfydeleeations/1999-2004/romania.pdfi>. p. 3.
578 Echerer, interview, 15 December 2005.
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the instance of Jessica Douglas-Home.579 The visit included a stopover in Sighisoara 
immediately he arrived in Romania, a priority seemingly intended to signal his 
concern for the town. Charles telephoned the Romanian President, Ion Iliescu -  
known for his reservations about the Park, and for being ‘more receptive to signals
ron
from abroad’. Charles reportedly urged Iliescu that development through 
ecotourism and traditional farming and crafts would suit Sighisoara better than a 
large-scale development like Dracula Park. The latter ‘would be wholly out of 
sympathy with the area, and will ultimately destroy its character, [leading to] a tragic 
loss for the local inhabitants and for Europe as a whole’.581 Charles’s telephone call 
had an immediate effect on Iliescu. The next day he declared that Romania was 
‘open to all suggestions’, and that the project ‘will not be implemented blindly’.582 
This was the first time an influential member of the government had publicly 
expressed reservations over the project.
The most vehement Cabinet supporters, however, remained defiant. Before 
Parliament Agathon’s Secretary of State downplayed Charles’s opposition as merely 
a ‘personal standpoint’, publicised by people close to Charles but not by Charles
COT
himself. Such declarations aside, Prince Charles’s intervention came to be 
regarded by many as ‘the straw that broke the camel’s back’.584 It was the last in a 
series of interventions that had gradually constrained the Cabinet. Indeed, after 
Charles’s visit, the discourse of the most vehement park proponents budged
579 Cantacuzino, interview, 2006.
580 on Iliescu’s ‘de-radicalization’ see Vladimir Tismaneanu, The Great Shock at the End o f  a Short Century: Ion 
Iliescu in Dialogue with Vladimir Tismaneanu on Communism, Post-Communism and Democracy, East European 
Monographs, (Colorado: Booulder, 2004), p. 13; Wittstock, interview, 2005.
581 Prince Charles quoted in ‘Prince Opposes Dracula Park’, BBC News, 6 May 2002; Fabini, interview, 2005; 
Douglas-Home, email, 2 January 2006.
582 Douglas-Home, interview, 2 January 2005; Fabini, interview, 2005.
583 Alin Burcea (Secretar de Stat, Tourism Ministry), Sittings o f the Senate o f October 14, 2002, Romanian 
Parliament
584 Ratiu, interview, 2006.
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noticeably. A week after the Prince’s visit members of the Cabinet hinted that
coc
Dracula Park might be re-sited. Agathon himself declared that he would resign if 
the park was not built ‘in Romania’ -  as opposed to ‘in Sighisoara’. In all likelihood 
Agathon was dismayed by Charles’s opposition: only a few months before the 
controversy erupted, Agathon had been planning to invite the Prince, along with 
other VIPs, to celebrate the grand opening of the Park at Sighisoara.586 A month after 
Charles’s visit, however, the Cabinet was already looking for alternative sites. They 
officially commissioned Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) of London to conduct a 
feasibility study comparing Sighisoara to other locales.
Charles’s visit not only constrained the Executive, it had the side effect of 
empowering Romanian civil society in opposition, enhancing their legitimacy and 
perhaps prestige, even though Charles had surely not specifically intended this. 
These effects were only by-products of Charles’s intervention, depending in part on 
civil society’s interpretation of the visit. For example, throughout his stay in 
Sighisoara, Prince Charles omitted to meet with the local elite, who supported the 
Park, as protocol would have recommended.587 The opposition trumpeted to the 
world the local elite’s disappointment, interpreting the Prince’s omission as a snub 
that signalled his own opposition.588 Charles’s intervention was similarly interpreted 
and discursively deployed by the Liberal MPs who were trying to move Dracula Park 
to their own patch.
Prince Charles’s influence over the Romanian Executive might at first seem 
unaccountable. It is probably best explained by combining the insights of rational
585 Lucian Purcareanu, Nicoleta Burtan and Lidia Moisei, ‘Agathon withdraws: Dracula no longer haunts 
Sighisoara, Evenmentul Zilei Online, 15 Mai 2002.
586 Jessica Douglas-Home, A new Dracula horror in Romania (CD-ROM source; no date or publisher recorded).
587 Frdhlich, Only God Can Stop.
588 Gota, interview, 10 November 2005.
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choice with constructivist theory. From a rational-choice standpoint, the Executive 
feared that if they disregarded Prince Charles’s concerns over Sighisoara, this might 
trigger a negative reaction from the British government. Prince Charles had been a 
strong supporter of Romania’s interests;589 he had for a long time been seen as 
‘fabulous public relations for Romania’.590 Had the Executive ‘slapped him in the 
face’ by flouting his publicly proffered advice, they might have lost his goodwill, 
from which the Romanian government had been benefiting without actually having 
done anything ‘to deserve or keep it’.591 Some in the Executive even believed that 
Prince Charles might have quit lobbying for or might even have lobbied against 
Romania’s interests, the most important of which for Nastase were accession to the 
EU and to NATO.592 Britain was one of their strongest allies in achieving this, being 
one of the few EU member-States who had given ‘essential and very consistent 
support’ to Romania’s accession, right from the beginning of the negotiations. The 
government were keen to preserve their ‘special relation’ with Britain.594 Even if the 
Cabinet knew that Dracula Park was not important enough for the British 
government to abandon Romania over, they still would have calculated that they 
could not afford the risk of disrespecting the future British monarch.
From a sociological standpoint, Charles wielded influence over the Cabinet because 
they feared losing his friendship for its own sake. Some observers have conjectured 
that this consideration had ‘a big effect’ on the Cabinet.595 Prince Charles is ‘greatly 
appreciated’ by the Romanian government for his ‘Romania-philia’.596 Many times
589 Interview with Robin Barnett (British Ambassador to Romania) by BBC Romania, 16 June 2006.
590 Ratiu, interview, 13 June 2006.
591 Ibid.
592 Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry Romania, interview, 3 June 2006.
593 Interview by the author with senior official, Romania’s negotiations team, 16 June 2006.
594 Douglas-Home, interview, 12 April 2006.
595 Ratiu, interview, 2006.
596 Fabini, interview, 2005; Ratiu, interview, 2006.
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since 1989 Charles had holidayed in Romania, and was known to have a ‘soft spot’
CQ7
for its Saxon villages, monasteries, countryside and history. Directly after a 1997 
visit by the Prince, the MET, in collaboration with Romania’s Culture Ministry, set 
up a large conservation project for Saxon villages, apparently with Charles’s 
financial support.598 The Romanian government ‘feel[s] very flattered’ by Charles’s 
personal involvement in the development of Transylvania, and ’this gives him a 
certain authority over them’.599 All this suggests that the Cabinet had been socialised 
into an international community to which Prince Charles belongs, just as one would 
have predicted from a sociological perspective, and that their identification with this 
community constrained them.
Prince Charles’ visit was the culmination of several external pressures which in 
combination with an intensification of domestic pressures, the Prince had prevailed 
on the Cabinet to constrain themselves. Nastase and his Cabinet began to believe that 
the external costs of pursuing the Park at the Sighisoara site exceeded both the 
domestic and the external benefits they were hoping for. Indeed, ‘a word may have 
been put in [Nastase’s] ear’ (so it is rumoured) that if he persisted with Sighisoara in 
the teeth of so many opponents, it would jeopardise issues of great importance to his 
government, putting Romania in a difficult situation in relation to EU membership 
and even NATO accession.600 Despite the fact that the Cabinet were still enthusiastic 
about the Sighisoara site, they decided they must ‘extricate themselves from it’ at all 
costs.601
597 Ratiu, 2006.
598 Cristina Modreanu ‘The Saxon villages in Transylvania in the attention o f the British Royal House’, 2002 
(CD-ROM source, no date or publisher recorded).
599 Cantacuzino, interview, 2006.
600 Ratiu, interview, 2006; Email communication by the author with Danesan’s office, 6 Feruary 2006.
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3.4 The Executive evades liability
None of these cumulative external interventions may have been ‘quite enough’.602 
The Cabinet had to find a way to pull out with minimal loss and saving face. 
Agathon in particular did not sign a commitment to re-site the Park until after an 
‘exit strategy’ was proposed to him.603
The strategy was to retain Price Waterhouse Coopers to evaluate Dracula Park ‘from 
an international perspective’ and assess the opportunity costs of building it close to a 
UNESCO-protected site.604 In fact, PWC was commissioned with the ‘anticipated 
result’ that Sighisoara would not be found optimal.605 The consultancy firm had been 
chosen carefully. It was not the odd consultancy; it was not even PWC of Bucharest, 
but PWC of London. It was likely reckoned more prestigious and thus for the 
Executive a more potent source of empowerment. PWC were to consider two sites 
alternative to Sighisoara -  the greater Bucharest area and Constanta, and recommend 
the optimal one.606 They were also commissioned to bring-in direct foreign 
investment and/or international investment funds so as to secure the US$30 million 
necessary for building the Park, a sign that the Cabinet had every intention of 
pursuing the project elsewhere.607 By employing PWC, the Cabinet was deploying 
one of its domestic power resources, access to finance. Agathon justified hiring the 
London consultancy on the grounds that ‘Romania has neither the necessary financial
i 'A O
resources nor the necessary specialists’ to evaluate such a project. This 
immediately called into question the validity of the original, Ministry-sponsored
604 Carol Popa, ‘The shareholder have no control over Dracula’, Capital, 11 July 2002.
605 Ratiu, interview, 2006.
606 Dan Matei-Agaton quoted in Liana Subtirelul and Livia Avram, ‘Sighisoara a scapat de Dracula Park’,
Adevarul, 21 January 2003. ‘Vampire Theme Park Seeks Funds’ (World Business Briefing), The New York
Times, 19 June 2002.
feasibility study, on the basis of which tourist flows and revenues had been forecast, 
and bonds sold. The fact that PWC had to delay its evaluation for lack of data on 
Romania’s tourist flows609 strengthens the claim of civil society and the press that the 
Ministry’s forecast of tourists and revenues was hot air.
The idea of using PWC as a pretext for relocating Dracula Park had been suggested 
to Agathon by a London-based Romania expatriate \ and member of the Pro 
Patrimonio Trust. Pro Patrimonio had from the beginning collaborated with the MET 
to stop Dracula Park at Sighisoara. They shared the hope (and the strategy) of 
moving the Executive off its course with as little damage as possible to Romania’s 
interests. The two organisations offered to help the Cabinet find alternative funding 
to rehabilitate Sighisoara. Agathon acceded finally to the plans of the two Trusts to 
develop Sighisoara through sustainable alternatives,610 despite the fact that their 
proposal embodied values and a paradigm of development polarly opposite to that 
which he and the other Executive power brokers of Nastase’s Cabinet cherished. 
Agathon gave in not because the Cabinet were persuaded of the value of cultural 
heritage by these Western ‘norm entrepreneurs’, but because they feared more 
accession woes.611 Once Agathon had agreed, the Trusts were in position to relay to 
WHC-UNESCO the message that the Romanian government was ‘very seriously 
looking for alternative sites’.612 This, it was hoped, would soften the severe criticism 
of Romania planned WHC for the Budapest meeting in June 2002.
The Executive used PWC for two purposes. One was to contain the damage that 
might be inflicted on them by those who had already bought the Dracula Park bonds
609 Sorin Marica (Dracula Park Manager) paraphrased in Nicoleta Burtan and Lidia Moise, ‘Seful Dracula Park, 
Leafa de 20 millioane de lei, Evenimentul Zilei, 22 July 2002.
610 The Mihai Eminescu Trust. 2002. Letter summarising the outcome.
611 Ratiu, interview, 2006.
612 Ibid.
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issued by the local municipal government. They feared being sued and found liable 
to compensate the investors for their losses. Their other purpose was to utilise 
PWC was as a face-saving pretext and thus as a counter-tool to minimise the damage 
to their reputation. Indeed, after the commissioning, the Executive frequently 
referred to PWC in their public discourses so as to deflect criticism by shifting 
responsibility onto PWC. It was no longer the government who would take a 
decision on Dracula Park, but the PWC experts, who now became ‘the only ones 
qualified to recommend re-siting’.614
Agathon backed down as soon as PWC reported on the 3rd October 2002. Sighisoara 
was assessed second-best; Dracula Park would be more profitable if built near 
Bucharest. Dracula Park at Sighisoara was ‘inopportune’,615 it was concluded, 
because a theme park opposed by organisations such as UNESCO and built on a 
nature reserve was likely to deter foreign investors.616 On 22 October Agathon tipped 
the press to a possible re-siting, and in March 2003 officially announced that the Park 
would in fact be build at a site near Bucharest. Agathon remained bitter. 
Sighisoara had been abandoned, he admitted, ‘because of the international and
£ 1 o
internal pressures, because of the rabid and threatening attacks’.
Agathon was dismissed from his post as Minister in June 2003 and the Tourism 
Ministry subsumed under Miron Mitrea’s Transportation Ministry. Many have 
conjectured that the Dracula Park fiasco, together with other blunders -  such as 
buying expensive palm trees and planting them where they do not thrive, which drew
614 Dan Matei-Agathon paraphrased in Nicoleta Burtan and Lidia Moise, ‘Dracula Park - pe un teren nesigur’, 
Evenimentul Zilei, 2 July 2002.
615 Email communication with Dan Danesan (Mayor o f Sighisoara), 6 February 2006.
616 Carol, Popa, ‘Actionarii nu mai au nici un control la Dracula’, Capital, 11 July 2002.
617 FrOhlich, Only God Can Stop.
618 Dan Matei-Agathon quoted in Ovidiu D. Popica, ‘Teapa lui Dracula’, Evenimentul Zilei, 3262, 23 January 
2003.
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fire even from the US ambassador, -  persuaded Nastase to dismiss him together with 
the European Integration Minister, Hildegard Puwak, accused of diverting EU funds 
to her husband’s business.619 Nastase was reluctant to dismiss these Ministers, but 
the politics of the situation gave him little choice. Now that the accusations and 
demands for accountability from the domestic civil society elite were receiving wide 
coverage by the press and reinforcement from the European Commission, only a year 
before the general elections the two had become too costly.620 The dismissed 
Ministers were nonetheless looked after. Agathon, for example, was promoted to 
become Executive Secretary of the Social Democrat Party. This implies that, close 
enough to elections, civil society may also be empowered by the Executive’s fear of 
the electorate. Their empowerment may piggyback on accession conditionality 
externally and on the nearness of elections internally.
In July 2003 Mitrea, now the Minister in charge of tourism, deprioritised Dracula 
Park. The Executive and other PSD power-brokers, however, who had speculated in 
adjacent land were able to recoup their losses ahead of any possible PSD election 
loss. Close observers of Romanian politics claim that the route of the Transylvanian
£9  1Motorway was altered in 2004, not coincidentally, to pass near the Breite Plateau. 
These well-connected speculators then had the opportunity to profit after all from
£ 9 9land expropriations for the sake of the motorway.
The Executive tried to revive Dracula Park near Bucharest in October 2004, just one 
month before the general elections. They proceeded surreptitiously this time, giving 
it a different name -  The Snagov Touristic and Entertainment Park -  and
619 Tismaneanu and Mihaies, p. 224.
620 Frdhlich, interview, 14 December 2005.
621 FrOhlich, interview, 14 December 2005; Gota, interview, 10 November 2006.
622 Interview by the author with senior official, European Commission Delegation in Bucharest, 10 May 2006.
623 ‘Dracula Park la Snagov’, BBC Romanian, 13 October 2004.
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mandating it by Government Decision, a mere administrative act addressed to an 
Executive body which need not pass Parliament. The Liberal Party MPs who had 
lobbied for Dracula Park to have been sited in the Bran area claimed that the reason 
the park was revived so near the elections was because the PSD were ‘trying to fill 
up their pockets before the end of their mandate’.624 In 2006 the same Liberals 
brought the Dracula Park affair to the attention of the National Anti-Corruption 
Department, charging Nastase and Agathon with damages amounting to €1 
million. Dracula Park was finally scrapped by the new Liberal Party PM 
Tariceanu.
Conclusions
Dracula Park shows how, ten years after the fall of Communism, domestic civil 
society were still labouring under a closed domestic opportunity structure that gave 
them little chance to participate in Executive decisions affecting themselves and the 
general public. They rose to mobilise because they perceived a misfit between the 
Executive’s plans and behaviour and those of the West whom they had contact with, 
either directly or through trans-national norm entrepreneurs. It was this motive of 
improving the status quo that fired these domestic norm entrepreneurs to reach 
beyond Romania and connect up with trans-national allies. These allies, not Brussels, 
were the first to enhance their capacity to act. Together the allies drew into the 
controversy European and international actors more powerful, at least at that 
juncture, than the Romanian Executive. Without them, domestic civil society would 
have been highly unlikely to have obtained any concessions at all from the Romanian 
Executive. Neither persuasion nor the rhetorical threat of non-accession, however
624 Eugen Nicol&escu (National Liberal Party MP) quoted in BBC Romanian, 13 October 2004.
625 BBC Romanian, ‘Dosarul Dracula Park la Direcjia Anticorup(ie\ 16 March 2006.
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extensively deployed by domestic civil society, would have exerted any significant 
influence over the Executive.
The Executive exhibited behaviour that was still dominated by the Communist 
executive legacy, tempered with a few formal attempts at modernisation and 
Europeanization; e.g. the ‘new public management’; the mention of EU standards in 
the Emergency Ordinance. This reflects well Tismaneanu’s cogent characterisation 
of the Romanian political system as ‘baroque combinations of Leninist residues with 
nationalistic-populist vestiges, combined with a more or less cosmetic liberalism’. 
Indeed, Ministers still took advice from an entourage of personal cronies, instead of 
professional civil servants; civil society was ‘off the radar screen’; decisions were 
taken autocratically and planning could be quite amateurish, as evidenced by Dracula 
Park; and, as Agathon’s dismissal shows, the Party elite was still being rotated in lieu 
of being held to account.
The Romanian Executive strongly resisted the pressures coming from external 
Europeanized actors. One intervener after another ‘piled on’, increasing the 
constraints until a tipping point was finally reached. No single cause, like ‘the EU’, 
tipped the balance, but multiple causes cumulating and reinforcing one another, 
though ultimately piggybacking on the Executive’s incentive to accede to the EU. It 
was this incentive and their perception that the costs, including the cost to their 
accession prospects, of pursuing Dracula Park in the teeth of so much combined 
opposition would outweigh the benefits.
Their cost-benefit analysis seems to have begun with the assumption that only one 
game mattered -  the domestic one (game 1). They were oblivious of all benefits
626 Tismaneanu and Mihaies, p. 44.
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except the domestic ones (bl) and expected to incur no domestic costs (cl=0). 
External costs were not on the ‘radar screen’ at first. Once Dracula Park became a 
pan-European controversy, it dawned on them that other games interplayed with the 
domestic one which they controlled, and that each of them had costs and benefits for 
the Nastase government. These included the game with UNESCO (game 2); the 
game with the EU (game 3); and the game with the Prince of Wales (game 4). 
Sticking with their decision to build the Park at Sighisoara would have entailed costs 
in all of their external games (c2+c3+c4>0) and no benefits (b2=b3=b4=0). The 
successive intervention of opponents in each of these games incrementally 
heightened the external costs until they finally topped the domestic benefits (c2<bl 
... c2+c3=bl? ... c2+c3+c4>bl). Dracula Park was given up when the total external 
costs outweighed the domestic benefits (c2+c3+c4>bl). It is also worth pointing out 
that the game with the EU was the key game, in that the stakes in that game were so 
high as to exert what one might call a ‘multiplier effect’ on the other games, all of 
which were linked into it including the domestic one.
However, even after reaching this breakpoint, the Executive still managed to draw 
upon superior power resources to find ways to evade liability and save face as well as 
pursue the project, albeit at a different site. Had the controversy emerged at a 
different stage in the process, e.g. after accession had became assured, or had the 
cost-benefit ratio of re-siting been different, e.g. had they too much to lose at the 
elections, the Nastase Cabinet might have stood firm against the domestic and 
external pressures [see the Transylvania Motorway case].
The Executive’s self-constraint empowered an elite minority amongst Romanian 
civil society by default. They were empowered only because they, their trans­
national allies, and even UNESCO ‘piggybacked’ their influence on the Executive’s
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sensitivity to loss of reputation before the EU and Great Britain, from whom they 
sought recognition and acceptance. Domestic civil society empowered itself through 
trans-national alliances only because their norms, values and paradigms resonated 
with those of the interveners. The civil society that got empowered comprised a thin 
upper crust of domestic cultural elites and Romanian expatriates operating trans- 
nationally. The constrained were the majority of the local population and the Social 
Democrat Executive. This suggests that the EU has already in the pre-accession 
phase begun to create a cleavage between the ‘modem’ and ‘traditional’ elements of 
Romanian society.
There is no evidence to suggest that the Social Democrat Executive’s ‘traditional’ 
values, norms and paradigms, which triggered the clash in the first place, were 
changed by the process or outcome of the Dracula Park controversy. Many of the 
Party’s leaders having been socialised and conditioned under Communism [see 
Chapter 2], it is not surprising that their behaviour reflected Communist rather than 
European norms; e.g. the populist utilisation of the Church, the conditioned reaction 
of persecuting opponents rather than dialoguing with them. Executive behaviour may 
well have been merely an one-off tactical concession to external and domestic 
pressures, and ultimately to EU norms and values -  the rule of law, the right of 
individuals to freely express their opinion, sustainability and the value of cultural 
heritage, -  and only because of the delicacy of the moment. It remains to be seen 
whether this affair marked the beginning of a long-term trend toward 
Europeanization in the sense of the Romanian Executive’s internalisation of 
(presently contested) European and international norms and values. Meanwhile, 
Dracula Park remains a single instance; it may therefore be treated methodologically
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as a case to be ‘verified’ or ‘falsified’ by the cases to follow: -  the Rosia Montana 
gold mining project and the Transylvania Motorway.
Tracing the process of the rise and fall of Dracula Park has revealed that, although 
the net outcome of the contest was zero-sum -  i.e. civil society won and the 
Executive lost -  this elite civil society would have been marginally empowered even 
had they lost. Through contact with civil society from EU member-States, they were 
able to access expertise and resources and gain valuable information, visibility and 
prestige, because they advocated what the external authorities whom the Executive 
respected or feared also advocated. By receiving reinforcement from so many 
European authorities, the values and expectations of an elite in Romanian civil 
society were reshaped or reinforced, and their confidence boosted. Such social 
learning and the consequent fundamental changes in their cognates are likely to 
empower them again in the future to constrain the Executive.
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4. Positive-sum gamesmanship: The Executive compromises with trans-
and supra-nationalism 
-The Rosia Montana Gold Mining Project (2002-2004) -
This chapter re-engages with the Rosia Montana case study (see Chapter 2) so that 
by tracing the evolution of one case study over time the Europeanization effects 
stand out more clearly. The process traced is that of empowerment of Romanian civil 
society after several Western norm entrepreneurs joined Albumus Maior, the local 
group protesting the gold mining project. Together they transformed the project into 
a controversy that spilled over Romania’s borders, capturing the attention of the 
Western media and civil society, and of the supranational organs in Brussels. This 
unexpected mobilisation contrasts starkly with the inertia that had characterised the 
evolution of Romanian civil society’s reaction to the project before the advent of 
Europe [see Chapter 2].
The ensuing controversy peaked in the period 2002-2003, coinciding with the height
of acquis negotiations between the Commission and the Romanian Executive over
the Environment Chapter. At such a critical juncture the Romanian Executive may be
expected to be more than usually sensitive to signals from the EU organs, and more
willing to make concessions to smooth the progress of the negotiations. Their fresh
memory of the disastrous gold mining accident at Baia Mare in northwest Romania
in January 2000, and their loss of face over Dracula Park also suggest an expectation
that, this time, the Executive might proceed more cautiously, both with implementing
the project and with how they treat domestic civil society in opposition. They might
even become more open to civil society input. If in fact the Executive should be
found to have proceeded in these ways, that would suggest that the concessions made
over Dracula Park indeed marked the beginning of a deeper shift in the Executive’s
values and norms of behaviour, the better to fit in with the EU and its values. On the
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other hand, if fear of EU sanctions is what forced them to heed to civil society 
pressure then this would suggest that they have merely learnt how to deal with civil 
society and the EU strategically, while resisting any substantial change in their 
values or norms of behaviour. The expectation about domestic civil society is that 
their recent success in Dracula Park might have boosted their confidence, galvanising 
them to mobilise again and perhaps exert influence over Executive decisions.
Section One of this chapter documents the empowerment of Albumus Maior by West 
European norm entrepreneurs. Once empowered at the most basic material and 
cognitive level, Albumus is traced as they take further steps to influence Executive 
decision-making in Rosia by drawing in the supranational EU institutions (Section 
Two). Once alerted, these EU organs are traced as they act to prevent the Executive 
from approving the project in the expected way {e.g. little respect for the rule of law 
or much concern for environmental consequences) (Section Three). Section Four 
focuses on the actual behaviour of the Executive, showing how they took the EU into 
account in their decision to postpone the approval of the Rosia Montana project and 
how they tried to utilise it to empower themselves.
4.1. Western norm entrepreneurs empower the grassroots
By the beginning of 2002 Albumus’s inward-looking and ineffective campaign had 
led them nowhere. The chances were that they would have utterly failed had they not 
been joined by norm entrepreneurs from the West. The latters’ intervention 
transformed Albumus’s campaign by providing them with resources, both material 
and cognitive. These efforts and their effects were little facilitated by the political or 
administrative organs of the EU, and can only be explained within the wider pan- 
European and global context in which the Rosia controversy evolved.
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4.1.1 The material effects 
Transnational alliances and visibility 
The first Western norm entrepreneur to get involved in the Rosia Montana affair was 
Stephanie Roth a Cambridge-educated Swiss who had previously worked for The 
Ecologist magazine as a journalist. Roth arrived in Romania in 2002 to help with the 
anti-Dracula Park campaign, after learning about it from Jessica Douglas-Home, the 
Chair of the Mihai Eminescu Trust (MET) [see Dracula Park chapter]. The two met 
in London at a public presentation on Romania’s cultural heritage, suggesting that 
they were part of an epistemic community of shared ideas, norms and values about 
environmental protection and sustainability, and about civil rights and lawful 
government behaviour.
Roth was further incentivised to join Albumus to help them escape the closed 
domestic opportunity structure they were operating under including abusive State 
behaviour. Particularly outrageous for a Westerner was the fact that the Romanian 
authorities were breaching and ignoring all laws silently approving large-scale 
mining in an area where archaeological monuments were in theory protected by 
Romanian law.627 Indeed following archaeological discoveries of Roman and Dacic 
mining galleries in 1999, Rosia Montana’s Camic Massif as well as it historic centre 
became protected as ‘cultural monuments of national importance’ under 
Parliamentary Act 5/2000. The large-scale cyanide heap-leaching operation was 
likely to destroy most of this heritage.
By initiating Albumus into the ways and means of the Western new social
movements., Roth enabled them to mount a professional anti-gold mining campaign
/
that succeeded largely due to her blend of shrewd communications, pioneering
627 Interview by the author with Stephanie Roth, Campaign Manager, Albumus Maior, 7 July 2005.
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lawsuits, empowering trans-national alliances and lobbying of international organs 
like the World Bank and the EU. A new world of opportunities was thus opened up 
not only for Albumus, but also for the other Romanian civil society organisations 
that joined later. New campaigning tactics were imported to Romania, and domestic 
civil society initiated into using them. Some, like lawsuits and lobbying, were 
entirely novel not only to Albumus but to most of Romanian civil society at the time. 
The success of their new fundraising efforts allowed Albumus to employ technical 
experts and lawyers who could challenge the legality and soundness of the project.
Civil society alliances, until then far beyond Albumus’s reach, were made 
strategically ‘with everybody who could make a contribution’. The result was an 
unprecedented mobilisation that attracted trans-national actors such as Greenpeace, 
CEE BankWatch and MiningWatch. Greenpeace contributed their expertise in 
lobbying EU organs and utilising EU law, and their extensive experience of direct- 
action tactics. These were alien enough to Romania to attract much domestic media 
attention, rendering Albumus’s campaign much more visible. MiningWatch, a 
Canadian-based NGO campaigning against mining abuses across the world, initiated 
Albumus in how to lobby the World Bank against lending money to the Rosia 
Montana Gold Corporation (RMGC). The negative publicity they created around the 
project in Canada, where RMGC was registered on the Toronto stock exchange, led 
to much lobbying of the European Commission against the project.
In the beginning of the controversy, except for Terra Mileniul III, most Romanian 
NGOs had remained passive. Once Albumus was reinforced by its alliance with
628 Vice President RMGC, interview, 20 September 2005; David, interview, 2005.
629 Roth, interview, 2005.
630 Interview by the author with DG Environment, European Commission, 6 July 2005.
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• • • 631trans-national and international civil society, they too joined the campaign. In June 
2002 34 Romanian NGOs formed an anti-gold mining coalition that subscribed a 
‘Rosia Montana Declaration’ -  one of the first such declarations ever adopted by 
Romanian civil society.632 The coalition not only augmented Albumus’s campaign, 
until then handicapped by feeble mobilisation and a lack of resources,633 it 
subsequently became a model that the rest of Romanian environmental NGOs strove 
to imitate; as witness the many copycat mobilisations, such as the ‘Save Varna 
Veche’ and ‘Save the Danube Delta’ coalitions.634 The collaboration of so many 
domestic and trans-national organisations on an environmental issue, was 
unprecedented in the context of Romanian politics and society, as the mining 
company, RMGC, itself admitted: ‘Albumus’s campaign did wonders in providing a 
catalyst for civil society development in Romania which until then had nothing like 
an NGO network’. The purpose of this heightened mobilisation was to render the 
campaign visible, credible and legitimate, enhancing the likelihood that Romanian 
and international authorities would give Albumus the attention they believed they 
deserved.636
That attention was not slow in coming. Indeed, the coalition’s campaign having 
captured their attention, other Romanian and trans-national actors mobilised to 
challenge the gold mining project, in a way that reinforced Albumus’s coalition. In 
November 2002, at the initiative of CEE BankWatch, more than a 1,000 
archaeologists from all over Europe petitioned the Romanian government not to
631 Interview by the author with Codruta Nedelcu, geologist and environmentalist (ARIN), 13 September 2005.
632 Stephanie Roth, email posted on Discussion List on Environment, mediu@ngo.ro. 2 June 2003.
633 Roth, interview, 2005.
634 Interview with Anamaria Bogdan, Greenpeace Romania, 23 August 2005.
635 Email communication with Vice President, RMGC, 23 September 2005.
636 Roth, interview, 2005.
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allow mining to destroy ‘the highest concentration of antique relics of Europe’.637 
Around the same time the NGO coalition managed to persuade638 the Catholic, 
Protestant and Unitarian Churches -  the largest landowners in Rosia Montana -  to 
turn against the project and refuse to sell out their vicinal land to the company 639 
This was followed, a year later, and after much NGO lobbying, a similar decision by 
the Romanian Orthodox Church, which had originally agreed to sell its properties to 
RMGC.
With so much mobilisation, Rosia Montana started to receive unprecedented press 
coverage. Roth’s role was crucial in this. Having previously been an environmental 
journalist, she understood the importance of communication and the mobilisation 
potential of the Internet.640 A polyglot Swiss citizen, she could communicate with the 
world beyond Romania, which Albumus’s founding members, who only spoke 
Romanian, were incapable of.641 According to both allies and enemies, Roth indeed 
was a ‘very good communicator’ who knew how to persuade by appealing to human 
emotions, using evocative images like ‘lakes of cyanide’ and hard-hitting labels like 
‘genocide’.642 The mining company characterised her as being a ‘specialist in outrage 
management’ and accused her on basing her campaign on incorrect information and 
of using a ‘good mixture of lies and truth’.643
The campaign came to receive extensive coverage from Formula AS -  a very popular 
Romanian family magazine -  but also from Evenimentul Zilei and Romania Libera,
637 loan Piso quoted in Albumus Maior, Press Communique, 11 December 2002. 
<http://www.rosiamontana.org/documents/english/press/communiquedec 11 .htm>
638 Bogdan, interview, 2005.
639 Albumus Maior, Anticipating Surprise -  Assessing Risk Investors. Guide to Gabriel Resources Rosia Montana 
Mine Proposal (Report), 8 October 2004, http://www. rosiamontana. org/ .
640 Vice President, RMGC interview, 20 September 2005.
641 Roth, interview, 2005.
642 Bogdan, interview, 2005; Vice President, RMGC interview, 20 September 2005.
643 Vice President, RMGC interview, 20 September 2005; Former Environment Director, RMGC, interview,
2005.
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Romania’s foremost broadsheets. As in Dracula Park, the media played a role crucial 
to Albumus’s success, as the mining company itself also admitted.644 The press 
brought Rosia out of obscurity and into the national and international public arena, 
transforming it from a parochial matter of a few villagers’ concern for their own 
property to an issue of much wider importance.645 This is what Albumus under Roth 
had wanted: if the project would have stayed only in Romania than the government 
would have found it easy to approve it.646 Now, with so many watchdogs monitoring 
Rosia, it became impossible for the authorities to shortcut the legal pathway,647 
which would have been likely to happen.648
Two other consequential civil society actors that mobilised against Rosia were the 
Romanian Academy of Economic Studies (ASE) and the Romanian Academy (RA), 
Romania’s most prestigious institutions in the field of economics and of science 
respectively. In August 2002 eighty-two ASE academicians called on the Executive 
‘to take action to stop the Rosia Montana project ... which has all the ingredients of 
an economic failure and an ecological disaster’.649 ASE demanded that the Romanian 
government justify their decision to exempt the RMGC from taxes and customs 
duties, declare the legal basis for the State’s indirect subsidy of RMGC (through 
MinVest) and give an account about why the State continues this subsidy when these 
must be reduced as required by the EU and other international organs.650 ASE’s calls 
were reinforced by the Romanian Academy, which in November 2002 wrote an open 
letter to PM Nastase asking him to do everything he can ‘to avoid irreparable
644 Former Environment Director, RMGC, interview, 2005.
645 Nedelcu, interview, 13 September 2005; Interview by the author with Laszlo Potozky, Director,
Environmental Partnership Foundation, 22 September 2005.
646 Interview by the author with Herwig Schuster, Greenpeace in Central and Eastern Europe, 12 September 2005.
647 Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry Romania, interview, 11 November 2005.
648 DG Environment, 6 July 2005.
649 Romanian Academy o f Economic Studies, ‘Memoriu in problema Rosia Montana’, 14 February 2005.
650 Ibid.
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damage’ at Rosia.651
The intervention of the Academies, Romania’s two most prestigious scientific 
bodies, has been alleged to have made a difference to the Rosia affair, (as for 
example admitted by a former RMGC director).652 Furthermore, their intervention 
boosted the efforts and legitimacy of Albumus and its coalition who could now show 
that they were not the only ones who believed the project was ill-conceived and must 
be stopped. Yet, neither the incentive behind the academies’ intervention nor their 
strategy and tactics can be traced to having been caused or inspired by the EU at this 
juncture.
Judicial review, for the first time 
Western norm entrepreneurs brought with them not only new resources, ideas and 
expectations but also new routines. If in the West, using the courts is a routine 
method used by civil society, in Romania, prior to Roth’s intervention there have 
been very few instances of civil society fighting the authorities in the court on 
environmental issues. Rosia Montana changed this. Soon after Roth joined, Albumus 
attempted several times to assert their legal rights to dialogue with the authorities and 
to argue their position in public. Yet at all governmental levels the authorities’ 
response typified business as usual in Romania:
In the beginning, when we requested information, they did not give it to 
us. Then we demanded it under Act 544 [on Access to Information] 
according to which they ought to have given it to us ... We also set up 
our application such that they could not refuse (because the authorities 
will always find a reason not to respond). And then they needed 30 days, 
they could never do it in 10 days, no matter how little the document you 
needed from them, even if it was trifling ... only a scrap. According to 
law, the 30 days applies only if you request a lengthy document,
651 Romanian Academy, ‘Open letter addressed to PM Nastase by the Romanian Academy [Scrisoare deschisa a 
membrilor Academiei Romane, primului ministru Adrian Nastase]’, Revista 22, no. 667, 15 November 2002.
652 Former Environment Director, RMGC, interview, 2005; Valentin Vasilescu (Greater Romania Party MP), 
‘Intervention’, Chamber o f Deputies, Romanian Parliament, 3 June 2003.
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otherwise it is only supposed to take 10 days. Then they come back and 
say: ‘Oh, you did not formulate it like this, you formulated it like th a t...
I didn’t understand [your request], I didn’t see, I know nothing’.653
So many frustrating experiences convinced Albumus that the authorities would never 
behave as they ought -  {viz. obey the law and serve the citizen rather than themselves 
and their political masters, as the Romanian bureaucracy has always done654) -  
unless sued in court.655 Resorting to courts of law was, as Roth learnt while working 
for The Ecologist, a particularly powerful strategy. Lawsuits can take a long time, 
which Albumus, made of locals, had plenty of. For the company, however, time 
meant money.656 By 2005, Albumus had initiated scores of lawsuits against the 
company and the authorities. In 2005 Albumus struck gold for the first time -  taking
( L c n
the company by surprise (as one of its directors admitted ) by winning two court 
cases. One challenged the Culture Ministry’s decision in 2004 to annul the Camic 
M assifs archaeologically protected status. The other challenged the local Council for 
disregarding their own land-use planning law. These rulings were ‘without
f i C O
precedent’ in Romania and were particularly surprising given that Albumus had 
faced ‘the most celebrated’ law firm in Romania (Musat & Associates), who even 
represented PM Nastase.659
Albumus had prevailed in the teeth of the expected conformism and incompetence of 
Romanian judges, who are notorious for giving in to economic and political 
pressures. In 2006 80% of Romanian magistrates acknowledged having been under 
political or economic pressures; of whom 60% acknowledged having given-in.660
653 Roth, interview, 2005.
654 Vladimir Pasti, The Challenges o f Transition. Romania in Transition, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1997).
655 Roth, interview, 2005.
656 Ibid.
657 Former Enviomment Director, RMGC, interview, 2005.
658 Albumus Maior, Carnic -  arie restrictionatal, Press release, 21 June 2005, <www.ngo.ro/rosiamontana>
659 Email communication, Maria Hambasan, Romanian judge, 14 February 2006.
660 Radio Free Europe, 10 March 2006.
146
Good lawyers are also known to get judges ‘tied up in knots’ due to their own ‘nearly 
absolute lack of professionalism’ and incognisance of legal substance and 
procedure.661 In 2006 alone President Traian Basescu received 50,000 complaints 
from Romanian citizens against the incompetence and un-professionalism of 
judge. As Albumus themselves acknowledged, what spelled the difference in these 
cases was the exceptional ‘quality’ of the judge: ‘We were lucky that in Camic, for 
example, we had a very good judge who actually listened’.663
Lobbying
Lobbying was another routine that the Western norm entrepreneurs that joined 
Albumus taught to Romanian civil society. Together with ‘exposing the project to 
the whole world’ and suing in courts, lobbying would prove to be the most important 
tactics accounting for Albumus’s eventual success.664 Lobbying in general, and 
lobbying an international organisation in particular, was not, before the Rosia affair, 
a practice which Romanian civil society was accustomed to. Of Western origin were 
both the idea of, and a feasible plan for lobbying organisations of the calibre of the 
World Bank and the EU. On its own Albumus would have been unlikely to have ever 
considered lobbying.665 Not even the representative of Terra Mileniul III who joined 
Albumus in 2002, and who had been active for years in the Romanian environmental 
movement, ‘had a clue about how these things worked’.666
The coalition began by trying to lobby the central Executive in Bucharest, but, with
(\£\H  • •the exception of a few replies from the Environment Ministry, the Executive either
661 Interview with Calin Avramescu (Romanian Political Scientist) by BBC Romanian, 22 February 2006.
662 Radio Free Europe, 10 March 2006.
663 Roth, interview, 2005.
664 Ibid.
665 Interview by the author with with Petr Hlobil, CEE Bankwatch, 7 December 2005.
666 Nedelcu, interview, 13 September 2005.
667 Interview by the author with former Secretary o f State, Environment Ministry, 11 October 2005.
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ignored their letters, petitions and reports or answered them perfunctorily. 
Disappointed, the coalition sought ways of circumventing Bucharest’s opaqueness 
and unresponsiveness by indirect but more powerful means: by lobbying the World 
Bank, the EU supranational organs, and the Hungarian government (because in case 
of an accident at Rosia Montana like the one at Baia Mare, Hungary would suffer the 
most). Had the relationship between the Romanian government and civil society 
been different -  i.e. more co-operative and open to negotiation of differences, -  the 
need to mobilise EU and international organs might have never arisen.
The first international organ to empower civil society was the World Bank. In 2002, 
the RMGC applied for a loan with International Finance Corporation (IFC), the 
private-lending arm of the World Bank. If the IFC approved the loan, nothing would 
have stopped the mining from going ahead. The loan would not have only provided 
much of the necessary capital, but would have also attracted other, commercial banks 
and private investors who would automatically perceive the risks to be within 
reason.669 Cutting off the project’s funding was deemed by the NGOs to be crucial 
before anything else. An IFC-approved loan would have also made it easier for the 
Romanian government to grant the company the requisite permits. Already, during 
the 2001 local public consultations on Rosia, the local authorities were using 
misinformation about the World Bank’s involvement in the project to strengthen
7fttheir position against their local opposition. Local officials allegedly tried to 
convince Albumus that the World Bank had already conducted an Environmental
668 Roth, interview, 2005; Interview by the author with former Task Officer for Romania, DG Environment, 
European Commission, 5 July 2005.
669 Nedelcu, interview, 13 September 2005; Bruce Marsh (RMGC Vice president, Environment and Regulatory 
Affairs), quoted in Tijn Sadee, ‘Romanian goldmine “new Chernobyl”’ Volkskrant, 13 July 2002 
<http://www.rosiamontana.org/documents/english/press/volksl3iulv2002.htm> (accessed January 2005); Roth, 
interview, 2005.
670 Nedelcu, interview, 13 September 2005.
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Impact Assessment that showed the project posed no environmental problems.671 The 
officials apparently had confused the World Bank’s own environmental and social 
guidelines with the Environmental Impact Assessment for the gold mining project.672 
Civil society were apprehensive that, if the IFC got involved, the Romanian 
authorities would use IFC approval to legitimise their decision: -  ‘we must listen to 
the World Bank: if they support Rosia, then we must approve what they want’.673 
The loan negotiations between the IFC and the RMGC collapsed in November 2002. 
The conditions imposed by the IFC were too stringent for RMGC to accept. This 
event had the side-effect of empowering the domestic civil society in opposition.
Emboldened by the collapse of the loan negotiations, the coalition proceeded to 
empower themselves further by lobbying Brussels to intervene. They -  mainly Roth 
and Greenpeace -  targeted these ‘as deliberately as possible’.674 They expected that 
the European Commission would be more sympathetic to civil society than the 
Romanian government, and hoped that the Commission would provide the ‘missing 
link’ that would ‘network’ them with the Romanian authorities. Letters were sent to 
DG Enlargement and DG Environment, to MEPs and even to the EU Presidency 675 
The coalition had reasonable expectations of success in attracting the attention of EU 
organs. They had learnt that the Romanian government, whatever its party 
orientation, was so sensitive to pressures stemming from organisations or 
personalities outside Romania, that even ‘a word [from somebody influential] may 
be sufficient’ to alter a course of action taken or planned by the government. This 
would achieve more than Romanian civil society could ever do acting on their
671 Ibid.
672 Ibid.
673 Ibid.
674 Schuster, interview, 2005.
675 Schuster, interview, 2005; Interview by the author with Mercedes Echerer, former Green Austrian MEP, 5 
October 2005; Roth, interview, 2005;
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The short-term goal of the Albumus coalition’s lobbying was merely to put Rosia on 
the Commission’s negotiations agenda with the Romanian government’, which 
hopefully would prevent the project becoming a fa it accompli.611 The coalition did 
not expressly ask the Commission to tell the Romanian government to stop the 
project. They had leamt that this would overstep the Commission’s and European 
Parliament’s formal powers over the government of an accession country.678 Partly 
through their own previous experience of trying to involve the Commission in 
Romanian controversies over EU funds fraud, and partly through social contact with 
and initiation by Western norm entrepreneurs, the domestic coalition understood that 
so long as Romania remained an accession country, no EU organs could be expected 
to command the Romanian government to take any particular decision in the case of
67Qgold mining at Rosia Montana. They did hope, however, that the Commission 
might use leverage it held through accession- and funding conditionality to pressurise 
the Romanian government discreetly to heed the environmental acquis it had recently 
transposed.680
The coalition demanded that the EU investigate the project, in particular those 
aspects of the decisional proceedings which had been ‘inadequately addressed by the 
Romanian government’.681 To whet the EU’s interest in engaging the issues, the 
NGOs formulated discourses and arguments around respect for the rule of law and
676 Potozky, interview, 2005.
677 Mititean, interview, 2004; Roth, interview, 2005.
678 Bogdan, interview, 2005; Former task officer, 2005; Potozky, interview, 2005.
679 Roth, interview, 2005; Former task officer, interview, 2005.
680 Interview by the author with Ionut Apostol, Project Co-ordinator, Terra Mileniul III, 3 September 2004; DG 
Environment, interview, 6 July 2005; Potozky, interview, 2005; Roth, interview, 2005.
681 DG Environment, interview, 6 July 2005.
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6 8 7other values commonly espoused by the Commission and MEPs. The coalition 
claimed, for example, that EU environmental law had been ignored or breached by 
the company with the connivance of the Romanian government, including the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Directive, certain provisions of other EU 
environmental directives, and the principle of sustainable development.683 The EU 
ought to interest itself in a mining project, the coalition argued, which could become 
‘an “ecological bomb” ... which would threaten the EU if Romania becomes a
fLQA
member State’. In case of an accident ‘you [the EU] are going to have to pay for
£QC
it’. The coalition also invited MEPs and the Commission to visit Rosia and see
with their own eyes the social and environmental havoc already caused by the
project, and to picture the further environmental destruction that would surely
follow.686 The coalition hoped that an official visit by representatives of the EU
would embarrass the government -  which was trying so hard to prove its accession-
worthiness -  by making it look as if the government were so incompetent as to call
for outside intervention to mediate Romania’s internal conflicts: ‘We hoped that the
EU would come again and tell the Romanian government what to do’. The
coalition widely publicised at home their ostensibly ‘informative’ letters and
messages to Commission and Parliament. This made part of a ‘sabre-rattling’
strategy, which the coalition resorted to in hopes that the government might be
688intimidated by the fact that ‘powerful foreigners had become aware of Rosia’.
The coalition also lobbied Hungary, whose government and civil society were still 
anxious after the 2001 cyanide spill at Baia Mare, which had ‘spilled over’ into
682 Potozky, interview, 2005.
683 Mititean, interview, 2004.
684 Ibid.
685 Roth, interview, 2005.
686 Apostol, interview, 2004; Mititean, interview, 2004; Roth, interview, 2005.
687 Bogdan, interview, 2005.
688 Mititean, interview, 2004.
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Hungary. In the summer of 2002 17 Hungarian NGOs, including CEE BankWatch 
and Friends of the Earth, Hungary lobbied their Environment Ministry to ‘activate 
the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context’.689 The Romanian government had obligated itself under Espoo to consult 
potentially affected neighbours, including of course the Hungarian government and 
public, before granting environmental permits like the one the gold mining company 
had applied for. Whether or not because of this lobbying, the Hungarian government 
did become more actively involved in the Rosia Montana case after 2003. With 
Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004, the Romanian Executive became even more 
sensitive about how it proceeded in Rosia, for fear of upsetting a neighbour and now 
EU member-State who would have a vote on Romania’s own accession to the EU.
4.1.2 The cognitive effects
The civics lesson
The Western norm entrepreneurs who empowered Albumus with material resources, 
tactics and strategies also empowered them with cognitive resources. They 
broadened the scope of the campaign beyond mining issues alone, in order to 
empower the local citizens to participate in this and all future decisional proceedings. 
When Roth first met them, Albumus’s membership were not only unaccustomed but 
actually fearful of the whole notion of challenging State authority. Like most 
Romanians, Albumus’s founders had been conditioned over a lifetime of growing up 
under the Communist dictatorship to think of themselves as powerless serfs before an 
almighty State whose decisions were immutable and to whom ‘they must sacrifice
689 CEE Bankwatch, Hungary to Invoke Espoo Convention towards Romania in Response to Proposed Gold  
Mine, Press release, 12 August 2002.
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themselves’.690
Roth was already familiar with this ‘defeatist’ Romanian mentality691 having
CM
encountered it pervasively during the campaign against Dracula Park. She 
awakened Albumus to the actuality that they enjoyed political and civic rights under 
Romania’s new democratic Constitution: the right to challenge the authorities’ 
decisions (including on Rosia); the right to express their personal viewpoint; the right 
to obtain from the State information of public interest; the right to hold public 
officials accountable -  whom they had elected to represent them; and the right and 
freedom to communicate their concerns to the international community.693 This ways 
of thinking were later reinforced by Romanians interaction with other international 
civil-society entrepreneurs who joined the campaign. These new ways of thinking 
about the role of government and democratic accountability, and about the exercise 
of civil and political rights, had profound influences on the mentality of Albumus 
and their allies amongst Romanian civil society.694
Reframing the campaign’s discourses 
Western norm entrepreneurs also re-framed Albumus’s dominant discourses, 
initiating them into previously unheard-of discourses. In achieving this, they 
strategically co-opted and elaborated Albumus’s own members’ knowledge about 
mining, which until then had lain un-mobilised. Albumus came to oppose the project 
because: (1) it was to use the dangerous cyanide heap-leaching technique; (2) it 
would entail large-scale strip-mining; (3) it would force the removal of at least 800 
settlements housing 2000 people; and (4) it would mar a historically and
690 Roth, interview, 2005.
691 Jessica Douglas-Home, Once Upon Another Time. Ventures Behind the Iron Curtain. (Michael Russel, 2000).
692 Roth, interview, 2005.
693 Ibid.
694 David, interview, 2005; Roth, interview, 2005.
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archaeologically delicate and valuable site.695 Later, Albumus’s goals and discourses 
widened to include sustainable alternatives to local economic development: small- 
scale gold mining without cyanide, eco-tourism, agro-commerce, traditional 
handicrafts, and infrastructure development.696 It is highly unlikely that Albumus 
would ever have conceived such concepts by itself.
The change in the nature of Albumus’s discourses likely reflected a strategic choice 
on the part of the Western norm entrepreneurs. By downplaying private property and 
linking their cause to environmental and cultural heritage protection, Albumus and 
their Western allies intended to broaden the campaign’s appeal to a wider range of 
national and international interests who valued sustainability and environment. This 
would mobilise more powerful allies and increase Albumus’s chances of success 
better than the original narrow focus on the property rights of a few farmers in a
i'Q'7
remote village in Romania. Nevertheless, Albumus was to remain an association 
of property owners. This was likely a compromise between Albumus’s grassroots 
base and what the Western norm entrepreneurs thought the international community 
cared about. Emphasising ideas like environmentalism and sustainability was 
reckoned to have the power of persuasion at this point in time only because of 
changes in Romania’s environment, the biggest being accession to the EU. Such
• /JQO
ideas would have fallen on deaf ears in Ceausescu’s time (had anybody dared to 
protest), or even a few years before the start of accession negotiations.
Deploying EU rhetoric 
One of the cognitive effects of Europeanization is the rhetorical construction of the
695 Roth, interview, 2005.
696 Alexandra Bara, The decision-making process fo r  the gold mine project o f  Rosia Montana, Romania, MSc. 
Dissertation, Central European University, Budapest, 2002, p. 89
697 Nedelcu, interview, 13 September 2005.
698 David, interview, 2005.
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EU by domestic actors, and the utilisation of these constructs for the purpose of 
legitimising their domestic goals and agendas. The literature of Europeanization 
contains relatively little documentation of such effects for the accession countries of 
CEE. The evidence presented herein shows that, at least during the acquis 
negotiating phase, domestic civil society entrepreneurs and their trans-national allies 
were actively engaged in constructing the EU rhetorically. Their discourses 
combined an ethical EU699 -  made up of formal and informal norms, values, and 
principles that are to be respected at least as much as, if not above any others -  with a 
‘punitive’ EU that would use accession conditionality to condemn the Romanian 
government if they ‘misbehaved’. Albumus’s coalition expected and intended such 
discourses to legitimise themselves before domestic and international audiences; to 
mobilise domestic and international actors; and to threaten the Executive and their 
other domestic opponents.700 The deployment of discourses featuring the EU is a 
signal example of ‘bottom-up’ Europeanization, a cognitive effect whose occurrence 
depends entirely on actors having the ability of making use of the EU as a resource 
without the EU doing anything.
Romanian civil society’s first deployment of EU discourses in the case of Rosia 
Montana -  in the June 2002 Rosia Montana Declaration -  coincided with the arrival 
of Western norm entrepreneurs, suggesting that this deployment was likely 
influenced by them. The Declaration pledged the subscribers not only to support 
Albumus’s campaign to stop the project and find sustainable development 
alternatives for the region, but it also threatened the project’s supporters with 
involving the EU and other international organs in ‘finding solutions for this
699 suggested by Donatella della Porta, EUI workshop on Discourse Analysis, 13 June 2006.
700 Schuster, interview, 2005.
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region’.701 By committing themselves to seeking support from the EU, its member- 
States, and other international bodies, the coalition had constructed the EU and the 
other international organs as a gamut of unidentified but not unreal sanctions with 
which to threaten the Romanian government -  then in the midst of accession 
negotiations over the Environmental Chapter of the acquis.
The civil society actors knew that the EU could not formally threaten the Romanian 
government with accession conditionality because of Rosia.702 Nevertheless, they 
calculated that the Romanian Executive would fear the EU’s reaction.703 Such a 
calculation was based on a socially constructed, universally assumed power 
asymmetry between the EU and the accession countries. It also reflected the 
hierarchical, authoritarian nature of specifically Romanian society and politics, 
where the stronger lashes the weaker forward -  as opposed to, say, leading the 
weaker by example. Such a construction would resonate with how Romanian civil 
society generally perceives the EU: as Romania’s saviour who will punish corruption 
and inefficient government.704
The NGO coalition made deployment of discourses featuring the EU an integral part 
of their gamut of strategies and tactics throughout their campaign. A threatening EU 
featured in the discourses that accompanied the first-ever Greenpeace direct-action in 
Romania in December 2002, which was intended to pressurise the Nastase 
government, and to gather signatures on a petition against the project from Romanian 
MPs and the general public. Greenpeace activists from Europe carried banners 
reading ‘Stop cyanide exploitation at Rosia Montana’ and ‘Don’t risk Romania’s
701 The Rosia Montana Declaration, < http://www.greenagenda.org/rosiamontana/indexen.htm>. (accessed 10 
April 2004).
7°r Ibid.
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integration into the EU’. The protesters charged that the mining at Rosia would 
contravene EU environmental law, and that Greenpeace and Albumus were ready if 
necessary to appeal to the EU to guarantee the civil liberties and interests of those 
affected by it.707 The rally drew unprecedented coverage of Rosia from the national 
press and from international media like the BBC and Reuters.708 The rally, in which 
the coalition rhetorically deployed the EU as a threat, was repeated several times 
over the next couple of years, and strategically timed to coincide with junctures when 
the Romanian government would be particularly vulnerable, as for example just 
before the Presidential and Parliamentary elections of 2004.
By the middle of 2003 not only the Romanian NGOs but also the two Academies had 
learnt to use EU discourses to back up their opposition to Rosia. If in 2002 the EU 
had been absent from the Academies’ public declarations about the project, by 2003 
they were amply deploying references to EU law, norms and values. Some of the 
most inert and conservative Romanian institutions -  since 1989 none of them have 
ever spoken out against a government project -  even the Academies were waking up 
to the new opportunities created by Romania’s accession to the EU. In their report 
issued in May 2003, for example, the Romanian Academy of Economic Studies 
justified their opposition to Rosia on the grounds that it would breach European 
environmental law709 -  though no concrete evidence was offered on this point. A 
whole section of the report was devoted to the damage to Romania’s external 
credibility and image that the mining might cause, particularly after the Baia Mare 
accident, which has also been widely blamed for marring Romania’s image
706 Greenpeace, Greenpeace Protest a Canadian Gold mine project in Romania (Press release), 5 December 
2002.
707 Greenpeace website, www.greenpeace.ro. 5 December 2002.
708 BBC Romanian, ‘Greenpeace opposes Romanian Gold Mine’, 6 December 2002; Bogdan, interview, 2005; 
Reuters, ‘Greenpeace Slams Canadian Gold mining project’, 4 December 2002.
709 BBC Romanian, ‘Premierul T&riceanu face prima sa vizitS in strain&tate’, 17 January 2005.
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71 nabroad. Taking the wrong course in dealing with the Rosia affair, the report 
claimed, might cause the EU to cut its financial support to Romania, and ultimately 
compromise her accession-worthiness. The report accompanied the Academy’s 
demands for Executive accountability: PM Nastase was asked to make public the 
Executive’s analysis of the Rosia Montana project, and to divulge who had
71 1determined, and on what basis, that Rosia Montana was of ‘economic importance’.
717As of 2005, the Academy was still awaiting a reply.
Interestingly, by the end of 2002 not only the opponents of the mining, but even the 
company were intensifying their rhetorical deployment of the EU, adapting their 
public discourse to the new environment. The failure of their negotiations with the 
IFC-World Bank in October 2002 had taught the company what international 
organisations expect a project to demonstrate from the social and environmental
71^
standpoints. Having lost some legitimacy and credibility in what the NGO 
coalition were portraying as the ‘loan fiasco’, the company used every occasion to 
announce to the wider world that it intended to demonstrate that its mining project 
would conform to all applicable EU law and international conventions. The reference 
to EU law was likely intended to signal both the Romanian government and the EU 
that all was well with their project, and that it would not be permitted to burden 
Romania’s accession to the EU. Nevertheless, the company was constructing a very 
different EU from that of their opposition. Their EU was one of rationality and legal 
certainty; a can-do EU who would approve any project that showed it could meet 
businesslike standards of corporate responsibility.
710 Vlad Gabriel Hogea (Greater Romania Party MP), Intervention o f  Mr. Deputy Vlad Gabriel Hogea, PRM, 
Sittings o f the Chamber o f Deputies, Romanian Parliament, 11 February 2003.
711 Email communication with Affodita Iorgulescu, Professor, Romanian Academy o f Economic Studies, 8 
November 2005.
712 Ibid.
713 Former Vice President, RMGC, email, 11 October 2005; Vice President, RMGC interview, 20 September 
2005.
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This section has shown that the EU could be discursively constructed and deployed 
by any domestic actor. These discursive constructs are not mere verbal ornaments, 
but rather ‘speech-acts’ carefully timed and intended to affect events, whether they 
actually do or not. If EU rhetoric does become a weapon that domestic actors can use 
to gain relative advantage at home {i.e. ‘differentially empower’ themselves), this 
can only be because they have the competence to craft it and deploy it at the right 
time. What’s more, actors appear to learn from each other how to construct such 
rhetoric, which appears to diffuse and become more sophisticated over time. The 
content of the discourse might differ from actor to actor, depending on what they are 
trying to achieve. Yet, often, even when discourses are deployed by actors with 
opposing interests, they will be found to have been made of the same EU ‘building 
blocks’; viz. organs, authority, law.
4.2 European Parliamentarians rattle their sabres
The coalition’s lobbying and discourses had the effect of bringing Rosia to the 
attention of the EU organs in Brussels. Until then neither the Commission nor the EP 
had heard of it.714 Socialist and Green MEPs were the first to intervene, prodding the 
Commission to act, and themselves undertaking action to signal to the Romanian 
government that the EU organs were beginning to pay attention to Rosia. Their 
interventions, however weak, did in fact have the effect of empowering civil society 
and constraining the Executive.
The first ‘signal’ came in August 2002 from Dutch MEP Erik Meijer from the 
Nordic Green Left who queried the Commission over whether or not it intended to 
‘establish contact with Albumus Maior and take measures to prevent a Chemobyl-
714 Interview by the author with DG Enlargement, 1 July 2005; DG Environment, interview, 6 July 2005; 
Interview by the author with Jonas Sjostedt, Green MEP, 7 July 2005.
159
*7| c
type accident?’ The second and more active intervention was that of Austrian 
Green Mercedes Echerer, a member of the EP’s Culture Committee. Alerted by 
Stephanie Roth, with whom she had become acquainted in the campaign against
71 ( \Dracula Park, Echerer took immediate steps to intervene. She prevailed on the
717Culture Committee to send her as an EP representative to Rosia Montana. 
Echerer’s intention was by her visit to signal all Romanian parties that the 
environment matters to the EU, and those therefore who care about it in Romania
71 Q
have legitimate concerns which will be listened to in Brussels. She hoped that her 
visit as an EP delegate would give ‘a hopeful signal’ that would hearten the
710Romanian civil society opposed to the project, and raise concerns in Bucharest.
Echerer’s visit did have an effect on the Romanian environmental authorities, on 
whom she called after visiting Rosia Montana on 16 November 2002. Environment 
Minister Petre Liflciu and Secretary of State for the Environment loan Jelev 
responded very promptly to her calls, making ‘visible efforts’ to convince her of the
7 7 0government’s intention to respect EU environmental and safety standards. Echerer 
challenged Lificiu and Jelev with queries about alternatives to cyanide, public safety 
and contingency plans, but these were left unanswered.721 The purpose of the queries 
was to make them think about the potential impacts of the project, in hopes they 
might realise it could become a controversial issue with the EU. Echerer expressed 
concern over the project, and warned them that if the project was not designed from 
the outset to comply with EU standards, then as soon as Romania acceded to the EU,
715 European Parliament, ‘Written Question (E-2449/02) by Erik Meijer (GUE/NLG) to the Commission’,
Official Journal o f  the European Union, C 33 E/6 EN 6.2.2004.
716 Roth, interview, 2005.
717 Echerer, interview, 5 October 2005.
718 Ibid.
719 Echerer, interview, 2005; Roth, interview, 2005.
720 Echerer, interview, 5 October 2005.
721 Ibid.
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it would be required to overhaul and upgrade the whole thing, which would surely 
prove very expensive. She suggested that they clarify the company’s willingness to 
pay the costs of compliance with EU standards. She also prodded them to consider 
applying for a PHARE grant to fund a commission of international experts who 
could help assess the environmental impact of such a project, with which Romania 
had had little experience.
Echerer left Romania with the impression that on balance the authorities, including 
the environmental ones, favoured the project, although the Baia Mare accident, 
which had happened in 2000, had made some of the Executive -  certainly some of 
the senior civil servants in the Environment Ministry,724 -  more cautious than they
77*5would have been otherwise. Indeed, Echerer was reassured that the gold mining 
company would be required to lower the cyanide concentration below the maximum 
limit allowed by European and international law before introducing it into the
77  Atailings-pond at Rosia.
Had such preventive measures been taken at Baia Mare, the spill would have been 
less disastrous. Described by environmentalists as ‘the worst environmental disaster
7 7 7in Europe since Chernobyl’, the accident had happened when a tailings-pond dam 
burst, releasing 100,000 cubic meters of concentrated cyanide solution and heavy 
metals into the Tisa and Danube rivers.728 The ecological damage had conspicuously 
provoked concern from the EU with which the Romanian government was then
722 Echerer, interview, 5 October 2005; Roth, interview, 2005.
723 Ibid.
724 Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 11 November 2005.
725 Echerer, interview, 5 October 2005.
726 Former senior official, Mineral Resources Agency, interview, 2005.
727 Stephanie Roth, 5 June 2002, http://www.corporatewatch.org/news/romania.htm.
728 Ibid.
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77Qnegotiating the Environmental acquis.
Baia Mare seems to have made the Romanian Executive more environmentally 
aware and more cautious. It impinged upon business as usual amongst the Romanian 
political elite with their conventional ignoring of the environmental risks of large- 
scale industrial operations. Baia Mare may not have supplanted the Executive’s most 
fundamental values, but it must have at least compromised them through the 
apprehension and the expectation of the risk of such an operation, and of the 
international repercussions of another industrial disaster. This is evidenced by the 
number of safety standards that were enacted into Romanian domestic law in the 
wake of the accident. These included the Dam Safety Act, to be found in only two 
other EU member-States at the time, making the new Baia Mare dam one of ‘the 
safest in the world’.730
Back in Brussels, Echerer reported the findings of her visit to the EU Commissioners 
on Environment, Enlargement and Agriculture, as well as to the MEPs in charge of
7^  1drafting the EP’s annual report on Romania’s progress towards accession. She
7^ 7hoped that Rosia would be mentioned in the EP’s 2003 annual report. In the event, 
Rosia was left out; other issues like corruption and freedom of the press proved 
higher priorities for the EP than sustainable development, and were given more space
7 ' j ' i
and consideration.
With hindsight, Echerer’s intervention was only one ‘small event’ in the overall story 
of Rosia Montana.734 Even so, her visit did influence the final outcome. It was the
729 Hogea, Intervention, 2003.
730 Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 11 November 2005.
731 Echerer, interview, 5 October 2005.
732 Ibid.
733 Ibid.
734 Ibid.
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first publicly visible act on the Rosia affair undertaken by an EU official; it
7^  crecognised Albumus and thus legitimised it, firing up its efforts. The mere fact 
that the EP had sent a representative to check up on Rosia, and that she had appeared 
unsympathetic, aroused concern within the Romanian government -  as witness 
Lificiu and Jelev’s visible efforts to present themselves to her in the best possible 
light. Evidently, they felt obliged to reassure the EU of their keenness to hold the 
project to EU legal standards and to the principle of sustainability.737 That Echerer 
did have an influence was confirmed by a former director of RMGC, who claimed to
*710
have had a good relationship with Lificiu. Her visit ended up being one of the 
main causes that prodded the Executive to pro-act on Rosia before it become 
controversial with the EU. The EP was to become more actively involved in Rosia as 
Romania approached the close of negotiations. In December 2003, for example, the 
Environment Committee sent another fact-finding delegation to Rosia. Again, the 
MEPs endeavoured to include Rosia ‘in all matters to do with Romania’s 
accession’;739 however, amendments critical of the Executive’s conduct in the Rosia 
affair were never included in the EP’s reports on Romania’s progress towards 
accession.
The EP’s interventions, weak though they may seem, did empower the civil society 
opposition both over time and relative to other actors in the controversy. By 
themselves the MEPs did not redistribute domestic power in any obvious way; they 
nevertheless provided much needed moral support, confirmation and legitimacy to 
domestic civil society. These less tangible forms of empowerment were delivered
735 Echerer, interview, 5 October 2005; Roth, interview, 2005.
736 Ibid.
737 Echerer, interview, 5 October 2005.
738 Former Vice President, RMGC, email, 11 April 2005.
739 Sjostedt, interview, 2005.
163
largely through symbolic action (viz. visits and probing questions), the meaning of 
which was left to domestic actors to interpret themselves. But even these weaker 
forms of empowerment mattered to the Romanian environmental civil society, who 
normally have no domestic allies and who since 1989 have played insignificant roles 
in Romanian environmental politics. Empowerment occurred partly because 
accession to the EU made available new supranational organs to appeal to, and partly 
because Albumus’s coalition were competent enough to utilise them and interpret 
their interventions to their own advantage. Such competence, however, was 
concentrated in a mere handful of individuals, many of whom were the Western 
norm entrepreneurs.
4.3 The Executive Plays a Two-Level Game
4.3.1 Pro-acting to Temporise 
By contrast with Dracula Park, in Rosia Montana the Executive not only did not 
resist the protestors, they even pro-acted to forestall the Rosia Montana affair before 
it became too controversial. In November 2002, PM Nastase asked Environment 
Minister Lificiu to draft a plan of action for deciding the case.740 Nastase was moved 
by the bad publicity the NGOs and media had created around Rosia, which had 
capturing the EU’s attention, as MEP Echerer’s visit in mid-November indicated. 
Her visit resulted from Romanian civil society’s lobbying of EU organs and their 
success in transforming Rosia from non-issue to an ‘extraordinarily controversial’ 
affair in Romania.741 The Executive was keen to forestall yet another turbulent 
situation that might draw-in trans-national actors, with all the ensuing unpleasant 
consequences -  damage to reputation and external image, especially -  which they
740 Interview by the author with Petre Lificiu (Environment Minister, 2000-2004), 17 June 2005.
741 Ibid.
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had recently experienced. Dracula Park had peaked only a few months earlier, and 
the Baia Mare gold mining accident, which happened the year before, was also still 
fresh in mind.
The Executive was also moved to pro-action by RMGC, which had begun to lobby 
the government for an environmental permit. The company submitted its Technical 
Memorandum (a non-technical description of the project)742 to the Environment 
Ministry at the end of October 2002, declaring its intention to obtain the permit, 
begin building in 2003, and start up production in 2006.743 The company’s permit 
petition came mere months before Romanian law was due to be overhauled to 
harmonise its Environmental Impact Assessment regulations with the EU’s. RMGC’s 
timing was likely driven by a strategy to be ‘ grandfathered-in’ under the older, less 
demanding regulatory regime.
Indeed, transposition of the environmental acquis had speeded up after the Nastase 
government submitted its Position Paper on the Environment in October 2001, in 
which they committed themselves to full transposition of the EIA Directives by the 
end of 2002. This meant amending not only the domestic EIA regulations (Order 
125/1996 being the most important one) but also the main environmental statute, 
Parliamentary Act No. 137/1995. These changes -  wholly driven by Romania’s 
accession to the EU -  had important repercussions for the Rosia Montana project by 
making the permit process more cumbersome and ultimately costly for the company.
The new regulations, introduced in January 2003, featured the most extensive 
provisions ever introduced into Romanian law for public participation and
742 Council o f Europe, Rosia Montana, Report. 21 December 2004, p. 12. Doc. 10384; Rompress, Statement by 
Minister Lificiu’, 30 October 2002,
<http://www.rosiamontana.Org/documents/english/press/lficiustatement.htmhttp://www.rosiamontana.org/docum 
ents/en gl ish/press/lficiu statement. htm>
743 Romanian Academy o f Economic Studies, Memoriu, p. 4.
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consultation in environmental decision-making, expanding and clarifying the 
previous regulations, and specifically mandating that decision-makers take public 
opinion into account.744 They further mandated that Affected Parties (neighbouring 
countries) were to have an input in the decision on any project that might affect 
them. This meant, concerning the Rosia project, that the governments and publics of 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Moldavia and Ukraine would have to be consulted and their 
views taken into account as part of the permit proceedings.745 This additional layer of 
public consultation with Romania’s neighbours risked drawing-out the permit 
process for the company, possibly more than a year, delaying the start-up of gold 
mining. The acquis had thus introduced new constraints on the company and for that 
matter on the Executive’s freedom of action, and created new opportunities for civil 
society.
Likely, then, the company deemed the end of 2002 to be a brief window of 
opportunity in which to obtain an environmental permit under the old law. They 
therefore rather hastily demanded an environmental permit on the basis of a weak 
application746 which was not up to the Romanian (and likely EU and other 
international) environmental regulatory regime. Company directors themselves 
admitted that at that point they had been technically unprepared for the 
environmental permitting process.747 Yet, they must have hoped at the same time that 
the support they could expect from powerful members of the Executive (e.g. the 
Industry Minister) would suffice to get the project grandfathered-in and thus 
exempted from new EIA regulations to be introduced in January 2003. Indeed, had 
the Nastase government been doing business as usual for Romania -  that is,
744 Personal communication with Dimitrie Clepan, Director, Alba Environment Protection Agency, 11 June 2005.
745 Former Secretary o f State, interview, 2005.
746 Vice President, RMGC interview, 20 September 2005.
747 Ibid.
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exercising entire discretion unchallenged -  the company might have got the permit
74ftregardless of their weak application.
It was in response to the pressures described above that the PM urged Lificiu to 
propose a plan of action for approving or disapproving Rosia.749 Being the 
Environment Minister, Lificiu in theory had sole responsibility for deciding RMGC’s 
permit petition; at that time only decisions on environmental permits for nuclear 
power devolved on the whole Cabinet. Lificiu and the senior civil servants in the 
Environment Ministry appear to have been afraid to take such a momentous decision, 
which could well perturb the accession process itself.750 It was for this reason that the 
plan Lificiu came up with featured a proposal to involve the European Commission 
and the World Bank in the decision. This would have entailed: briefing Environment 
Commissioner Margaret Wallstrom about the Rosia affair and the government’s 
plan; inquiring in particular whether any EU mining directives were applicable, and 
whether the EU had banned cyanide-based gold mining (both inquiries deriving from 
the claims of Albumus in its communiques);751 soliciting the Commission’s and the 
World Bank’s opinion on Rosia’s suitability; and having them help set up and be part 
of a special body of international experts on environment and mining to assist the 
Environment Ministry.752 Such a commission, Lificiu claimed, would enable 
Romania to learn from EU member-States who had more experience with handling 
complex, large-scale mining projects like Rosia.753 Lificiu hoped that by getting the 
Commission to express ‘some opposition, give [him] some direction, or just box [his] 
ears’, he would have ‘something to cling onto’, rather than having to take the
748 DG Environment, interview, 6 July 2005.
749 Lificiu, interview, 2005.
750 DG Environment, interview, 6 July 2005; Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 3 
June 2006; Senior official, negotiations team, interview, 2006.
751 Former Secretary o f  State, interview, 2005.
752 Lificiu, interview, 2005.
753 Lificiu, interview, 2005; Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 11 November 2005.
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decision all by himself.754
Lificiu’s arguments convinced the Cabinet to adopt the plan. It had several 
advantages for the Cabinet. First and foremost, it postponed taking a decision on 
Rosia. Gaining time was desirable since the costs and benefits of the project were 
uncertain and subject to change with the changing price of gold. The project did not 
seem robust at that time, given the low price of gold on the world market in 2002. 
And the company had convincingly forecast neither the revenues the project was 
supposed to yield nor the jobs it was supposed to create. On the other hand, the 
Ministers of Employment and Industry would have liked to see the project go ahead: 
they were feeling pressure from the trade unions and wished to avoid being seen to 
discourage foreign direct investment.755 It is quite plausible, too, that somebody in 
the Cabinet thought that if the price of gold were to appreciate in the foreseeable 
future -  which did in fact happen a few years later when the price of gold increased 
from US$300 to $650 per ounce,756 -  then the case for going ahead would become 
stronger. The Environment Minister believed that little was to be gained from 
‘approving this private project’,757 since under the licence agreement approved by the 
previous government, the State owned only 19% of the shares, the other 80% being 
owned by Gabriel Resources. The State’s 19% stake and the relatively little tax 
revenue projected were minor incentives, and did not justify granting the
ncQ
environmental and other permits at all costs. He and other members of the Cabinet 
feared that ‘we are going to have our gold taken away’ and be ‘left with an
754 Lificiu, interview, 2005.
755 Ibid.
756 Ovidiu Hategan, ‘Gabriel Resource does not have money to build the Rosia Montana mine’, Romania Libera, 
24 Iulie 2006.
757 Former Secretary o f State, interview, 2005; Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 11 
November 2005; Lificiu, interview, 2005.
758 Albunus Maior, Anticipating Surprise -  Assessing Risk; Mediafax, 18 June 2003
759 Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 11 November 2005.
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nf\(\ecological disaster’. Besides, the Cabinet could not predict how the European 
Commission might react if they were to permit the project under the old domestic 
law, or on the basis of so weak a permit application as RMGC had submitted. Indeed, 
‘everybody [in the Cabinet] wanted to know whether the Commission was for or
nf%\against Rosia Montana’. Whatever divergent tendencies might have existed inside 
the Cabinet over Rosia were not enough to divide it. (Indeed, the Nastase Cabinet 
was known for a cohesiveness and a sub-ordination to the PM that were unusual for
7  f i JRomanian politics). As Lificiu himself admitted, ‘there was no real opposition’; 
the Cabinet were eager to avoid conflict, either amongst themselves or with the 
EU.763
The Executive also doubted the company’s seriousness and its capacity to finance the 
project. Gabriel Resources’ inability to raise or unwillingness to invest more than 
US$100 million in a project costing US$400 million, and the collapse of the loan 
negotiations between the company and IFC-World Bank raised serious doubts about 
the robustness of the company.764 As for their credibility, the Executive is likely to 
have wanted to avoid being seen to help a company whose Director, Frank Timis, 
had been exposed as a drug dealer. Had the company been more robust financially 
and more reputable -  like Bechtel in the Transylvania Motorway case -  the 
Executive might have felt empowered by that and pushed the project harder, even in 
the teeth of opposition.
In sum, although the Cabinet were not keen on the gold mining project, neither were
760 Lificiu, interview, 2005.
761 Ibid.
762 Tismaneanu and Mihaies.
763 Lificiu, interview, 2005.
764 Ibid.
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they totally indifferent. The benefits were too uncertain at that juncture (the end of 
2002) for the Cabinet to risk any political capital to see the project through in the 
teeth of troubled EU negotiations and raging controversy in the press.766 The one 
thing they did decide was that the project ought not to be a national priority.767 By 
temporising, the Cabinet stood to gain time to wait and see whether for them any 
actual benefits would turn up. In the meantime, negotiations on the Environment 
chapter would not be burdened further, and the pressures from civil society might 
ease off. They were helped to this decision by the fact that Rosia Montana had been 
the pet project of the Social Democrat Party’s rivals, the previous centre-right
7/0
government. In Romanian politics this means that the Social Democrats would 
have perceived themselves as gaining little credit from it. It is part of Romanian 
political culture that projects initiated by one government are discontinued by the 
next, as political capital and public credit rarely transfer from party to rival party. 
(Indeed, ‘every new cabinet has a tendency to downplay the achievements of its 
predecessor and to spend time and effort to re-write a substantial amount of laws and
IftQ •regulations without running any public program assessment’). Had the project 
been ‘theirs’, the Executive might have fought harder for it (as they did in Dracula 
Park).
4.3.2 Pro-acting to avoid loss 
Lificiu’s proposal to involve the Commission had several advantages not only for 
him but also for the whole Cabinet. If they were to succeed in involving the 
Commission and EU experts, they would gain both domestically and in their
766 Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 11 November 2005 and 3 June 2006.
767 Former Secretary o f State, interview, 2005; Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 11 
November 2005 and 3 June 2006; Lificiu, interview, 2005.
768 Lificiu, interview, 2005.
769 Ionita, The Cargo Cult.
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relations with the EU -  in several ways. They could have assurance that their 
decision on Rosia would not frustrate relations with the Commission and upset the 
acquis negotiations. At the same time they would enhance their credibility before the 
EU and burnish their external image before the Environment Ministries of the EU
77ftmember-States. They would be demonstrating their willingness to co-operate, their 
earnestness about environmental protection, and their reliability as a future EU 
member-State.771 Domestically, they were hoping that the involvement of the EU 
would convince civil society, in particular the media, to ease off the pressure, as 
suggested by a comment of Nastase’s: ‘If this project is not validated by international 
experts, we are going to have all the Greenpeaces in the world on our head. This is a 
hot topic, and we don’t like having it in our hands’.772
Lificiu’s plan suited Nastase, the ultimate Executive and powerbroker, who had the 
real power to approve or disapprove the mining project. At the time, he appeared 
ambivalent. Those who observed Nastase closely have inferred that he ‘never 
focused on [Rosia]’,773 as he had on Dracula Park and the Transylvanian Motorway. 
Nastase apparently decided that his involvement in Rosia was unlikely ‘to bring clear 
benefits’.774 Likely distracted with other, more significant matters,775 he ‘simply 
preferred to let others handle it and slow progress down without his personal
77Ainvolvement’. And yet Rosia could not have been entirely unimportant to him, as 
witness the several years of vacillation, when no concrete steps were taken to stop it 
-  which many agree he easily could have done.
770 Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 11 November 2005 and 3 June 2006.
771 DG Environment, interview, 6 July 2005.
772 Adrian Nastase (PM Romania) quoted in Albumurs Maior, ‘Nastase cere expertiza intemationala pentru Rosia 
Montana’, Evenimentul Zilei Online, 29 Noiembrie 2002.
773 Email communication, senior official (1), European Commission Delegation in Bucharest, 10 May 2006.
774 Ibid.
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Having decided to postpone the project for the time being and to involve the 
Commission, Nastase and Cabinet tasked Lificiu with working out the tactical 
details: ‘They were extremely happy that this is Lificiu’s job and that he has to think 
and come up with a solution ... and that they do not have to get involved’.777 He 
must find a solution that would reassure the Commission that EU environmental law 
had been respected and ecological rehabilitation factored in,778 while leaving open 
the option of pursuing the project at a later date in case the Commission and civil 
society could not be placated. That the Cabinet decided to temporise is also 
confirmed by a senior civil servant in the National Agency of Mineral Resources:
The EU put pressure on the government leadership and the Presidency to 
stop [the Rosia project] ... They [the Cabinet] said, we are not going to 
stop it, let’s do something else. Let’s delay it until we get into the EU. In 
other words we proceeded in the Romanian way of ‘we befriend the 
devil until we cross the bridge’. So until we get into the EU I don’t think 
this project will be approved; and the delay will come from the 
Environment Ministry. It [the Environment Ministry] has been moved 
like a pawn to delay the approvals for a while, and after Romania’s 
entrance into the EU, ‘we’ll see’. Then we’ll discuss the matter on 
different terms.779
780The Commission guessed Lificiu’s strategy and declined to get involved. His 
proposal to involve them, which he actually submitted to the competent 
Commissioners, was interpreted as an attempt to dump responsibility on the 
Commission: ‘If the EU had been represented on the committee [proposed by 
Lificiu], it would have been difficult for the EU not to take a position either for or
781against the project’. The Romanian government could have blamed the
• 787Commission, had the resulting decision proved controversial. Wallstrom, replying 
to Lificiu, disclaimed any applicable EU regulations on mining or ban on cyanide
777 Lificiu, interview, 2005.
778 Ibid.
779 Former senior official, Mineral Resources Agency, interview, 2005.
780 DG Environment, interview, 6 July 2005.
781 Ibid.
782 Former task officer, interview, 2005; DG Environment, interview, 6 July 2005.
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heap-leaching. Because no such EU laws applied and because the EU was also 
uninvolved in the project financially, the Commission lacked competence to advise 
Romania, a sovereign state, whether to permit or not. Wallstrom only asked that the 
government take care that Romanian law conforms to EU law, and that the EIA 
procedure is strictly followed. Furthermore, if Romania wanted to impose
7 fid.conditions more stringent than EU law, she had the right to do so. Wallstrom 
further declared that the EU could provide the Romanian government no funding for 
the project, a private one, and suggested the government resort to the Baia Mare Task 
Force, a body of experts created in the aftermath of that accident.785 Wallstrom also 
asked that the Romanian government keep the Commission updated on the evolution
7RAof Rosia Montana and of the environmental permitting process. The decision was
thus to remain firmly in the hands of the Environment Ministry.
4.3.3 Using the Commission to diffuse responsibility 
Having failed to dump the responsibility on the Commission, the Environment 
Ministry proceeded to find other ways to delay the project on the one hand, and to 
avoid taking any positive decision by itself on the other. To diffuse responsibility, 
they appropriated some of the PHARE money, which the EU had granted them in
non
order to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Environment, and 
used it to set up an independent commission of experts. They were to issue 
guidelines clarifying which EU procedures and conditions RMGC must comply with. 
To placate the media and civil society, Lificiu publicised the Ministry’s demands that
783 Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 11 November 2005 and 3 June 2006; Lificiu, 
interview, 2005.
784 Former Secretary o f State, interview, 2005.
785 Former Secretary o f State, interview, 2005; Former task officer, interview, 2005.
786 Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 11 November 2005 and 3 June 2006; Former 
Secretary o f State, interview, 2005.
787 Former Director, RMGC, interview, 2005; Lificiu, interview, 2005.
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the company guarantee its financial capacity to rehabilitate the mining site. Lificiu 
stipulated that the company must either undertake rehabilitation every six months 
under monitoring by a commission made up of Romanian academicians and experts, 
or else deposit in the national treasury a certain amount of all the gold that the 
company extracted.789 The deposits were supposed to have covered the risk that at 
project’s end the company would disappear, leaving ‘an environmental mess’ behind 
them.790 It was also stipulated that the company was to rehabilitate mining works that
7Q1had previously been exploited by MinVest, in addition to their own works.
Such requests might be interpreted as evidence that the Executive genuinely cared 
about environmental rehabilitation; however, this does not appear to have been the 
case. As a senior civil servant in the Ministry admitted, Lificiu’s demands on the 
company were not ‘technical’ but ‘political conditions’.792 Asking the company to 
rehabilitate an open-cast operation every six months was a ‘technical
7QTimpossibility’. The demand was merely a ‘political declaration’ in response to 
pressure from journalists.794 In reality, when the time should have come, this 
condition would have operated more as a principle ‘within a deadline that was 
actually technically possible’.795 This meant (most likely) that when the six months’ 
deadline should have come, the Ministry ‘would have looked the other way; that
70 f%rehabilitation was not required every six months’.
The Environment Ministry also found other ways to diffuse responsibility. In 2003 
the Environmental Act 137/1995 had to be amended to further harmonise Romania’s
788 Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 11 November 2005 and 3 June 2006
789 Lificiu, interview, 2005.
790 Ibid.
791 Former Secretary o f State, interview, 2005.
792 Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 11 November 2005 and 3 June 2006.
793 Ibid.
794 Ibid.
795 Ibid.
796 Former Vice President, RMGC, email, 31 May 2005.
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law with the EU’s. The Ministry took the opportunity to introduce a new clause -  not 
required by EU law -  that all decisions on large-scale, complex, open-cast mining 
projects above a certain production limit shall be taken by the whole Cabinet, and not 
the Environment Ministry alone, as had been the case until then.797 (The 1995 Act
7QQ
contained a similar provision, but applicable only to nuclear power). Rosia 
Montana fell into the new category -  hardly surprising given that the senior civil 
servants in the Environment Ministry who drafted the clause had Rosia in mind.799 
Indeed, by their own admission, they wanted to guarantee that in future the whole 
government should be responsible for projects which, like Rosia, might become 
highly controversial and/or might pose highly complex social, environmental and 
economic issues.800 They may also have deemed it advisable insofar as they sensed 
that the almightiness of the Romanian Executive was ebbing away, that it was being 
increasingly called upon to give an accounting to others. As this new accountability 
would be prone to devolve on the ministry deemed to have competence of the 
controversial matter, the Environment Ministry, or more precisely its senior echelon, 
may have been ‘writing insurance’ against anyone amongst them taking the blame if 
another, similar project became as controversial.
4.3.4 All sides keep up the pressure 
By June 2003 it had become clear that civil society had no intention of relenting. The 
two Academies had become even more aggressive in their criticism. In May 2003 
each issued lengthy, unfavourable reports that made ample use of references to the 
EU. By now the European Commission, too, had become involved in monitoring the
797 Former Secretary o f State, interview, 2005.
798 Ibid.
799 Ibid.
800 Former Secretary o f State, interview, 2005; Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 3 
June 2006.
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Rosia project. The many communications the Commission received from the NGO 
coalition, from MEPs, and, beginning in November 2002, from the Romanian
OA1
government, moved it to intervene in the matter. The Commission had, at least in 
theory, very limited formal authority over Rosia. They could not tell the Romanian 
government whether to permit the project or not; that decision rested entirely with
OAA
the Romanian authorities. The only thing they could do was to monitor the project 
and demand that the authorities make it comply fully with all relevant EU 
environmental legislation.
Throughout 2003 both DG Enlargement and DG Environment used every formal and 
informal channel of influence at their disposal to let the Romanian government know 
that they were monitoring Rosia Montana closely. It was put on the agenda of most 
of the political and technocratic meetings of EU-Romanian joint bodies; the 
Commission would ask their Romanian counterparts about developments in Rosia, 
particularly the progress of reform of environmental permitting procedures. DG 
Enlargement, going far beyond what it could ever have demanded of a member- 
State, demanded that the Romanian government apply the draft EU Directive on 
Mining Waste,804 notwithstanding that this had not yet been adopted by the EU itself. 
DG Environment ‘encouraged’ the Romanian government to hold the company to all 
relevant EU law.805 The project must not only go through a ‘full and complete El A’, 
but also comply with all other applicable Directives, including the ones on waste
801 Echerer, interview, 5 October 2005.
802 DG Environment, interview, 6 July 2005; DG Enlargement, interview, 2005; Former task officer, interview, 
2005.
803 DG Environment, interview, 6 July 2005; DG Enlargement, interview, 2005; Former Secretary o f State, 
interview, 2005.
804 DG Enlargement, interview, 2005
805 DG Environment, interview, 6 July 2005; DG Enlargement, interview, 2005; Interview with Margot 
Wallstrom, Environment Commissioner by Tuca Victor Iulian, ‘Un capitol neincheiat: protectia mediului’,
Dilema Veche, 13 Aug 2004, no. 31.
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management, industrial pollution control, and water protection.806 The government 
was expected to allow the Romanian public to participate in the decisional processes 
and to take its concerns into account. The government was also frequently 
reminded of the disastrous consequences of the gold mining accident at Baia-Mare in 
2000, where cyanide heap-leaching had also been used, warning that if another such 
accident happened at Rosia, it would certainly harm Romania’s negotiations with the 
EU.808 Rosia was brought up for discussion by name at all Environmental Sub­
committee meetings involving representatives of the Romanian government, the 
Commission, and member-States. Rosia was, however, never formally discussed 
during meetings to negotiate the Environmental Chapter.
The Commission tried to exert influence both at the administrative and at the
political levels. At the administrative level, officials of DG Environment and
Enlargement would ask the Romanian State Secretary for Environment -  the highest
administrative post in the Ministry of Environment -  to keep the Commission
informed about developments at Rosia.809 At the political level, Rosia was raised at
the level of the Prime Minister.810 By making Rosia a ‘permanent topic of
discussion’ in informal as well as formal meetings, the Commission not only kept
itself up-to-date on the affair, but also (and especially) conveyed to the Romanian
811government the message that the EU was monitoring their behaviour. The hope
817 _ .was that the government would ‘feel under threat’ and proceed with caution. The 
Commission did not explicitly threaten Romania with non-accession, but rather used
806 Former task officer, interview, 2005.
807 DG Environment, interview, 6 July 2005; DG Enlargement, interview, 2005.
808 DG Enlargement, interview, 2005.
809 DG Environment, interview, 6 July 2005.
810 Ibid.
811 Email communication with DG Enlargement, 1 July 2005.
812 Former task officer, interview, 2005.
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diplomatic language like ‘we invite you to pay attention to The Romanian
government were to read between the lines that if EU law was not fully implemented 
in the Rosia case, or if another accident happened, their credibility before the EU 
could be compromised, and accession negotiations negatively affected.814
Because the Commission refused to give a formal ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the project, 
Romanian civil servants resorted to seeking out DG Enlargement’s candid opinion 
informally. At one meeting between the Commission and the Romanian delegation, 
the State Secretary for Environment informally asked one of DG Enlargement’s Desk 
Officers in charge of Romania what the Commission thought about Rosia. The 
Secretary was ‘reminded’ that once the landscape was destroyed, which a large-scale 
open-cast mining operation would do, it was destroyed for ever. Romania should 
think very carefully about local economic development alternatives to cyanide-based 
gold mining that did not mar the prospects of sustainability. The Secretary was 
reminded, too, that the EU provides generous PHARE grants to help accession 
countries develop sustainably, and suggested that Romania might consider applying
QIC
for some. In sum, informally, civil servants in the Commission seem to have 
suggested to their Romanian counterparts that they had rather not see Rosia 
permitted.
In spite of the Commission’s activism, Romanian negotiators perceived them as 
paying only limited attention to Rosia, and then only toward the end of the
QIC
Environment Chapter negotiations. This was due partly to the not very advanced 
state of the Rosia project itself and partly to the Romanians having proceeded exactly
8,3 ibid.
814 Ibid.
815 Former task officer, interview, 2005.
816 Senior official, negotiations team, interview, 2006.
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ft 1 7as the Commission had asked. Indeed once Romanian EIA regulations had been 
fully harmonised with those of the EU as of January 2003, and once the Romanian 
government had begun to apply the Espoo convention, inviting all interested States to 
take part in the EIA consultations, the issue was no longer a sensitive one for the 
Commission. They more or less dropped their expressions of concern, although
• • ft 1 ftcontinuing their monitoring.
In addition to the Commission and civil society, the Hungarian government also 
appear to have exerted some influence over the Romanian Executive. Having been 
stricken the hardest by the cyanide spill at Baia Mare, Hungary became particularly 
active on Rosia in 2003, near the close of their own negotiations with the EU. Rosia
ft 10found herself discussed in the Council of Ministers. Although at the time the 
Hungarians could not vote in the Council, the EU member-States, because of the 
proximity of Romania, did listen to the Hungarians’ concerns. Thereafter, the 
Council regularly asked questions of the Commission about the progress of the
ft"? 1project, which prodded the latter to continue its monitoring. Following Hungary’s 
intervention, Hungary and Romania set up a number of bilateral commissions and
ft^^
working groups to facilitate information exchange and consultation. Once it 
became an EU member-State in 2004, Hungary became even more active and
ft<in
influential -  it now had a vote on whether the EU should close the environmental 
acquis negotiations with Romania. Indeed, Hungary insisted that Romania should 
commit herself, before closing the Environment Chapter, to transposing the Mining
8.7 ibid.
8.8 Ibid.
819 DG Environment, interview, 7 June 2006.
820 Ibid.
821 Ibid.
822 Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 11 November 2005 and 3 June 2006.
823 Ibid.
824 Ibid.
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Waste Directive by the time of her accession in 2007. This would guarantee the 
neutralisation of the cyanide-bearing tailings-pond, and lower the risks to Hungary of
R9 canother cyanide spill.
The Romanian Executive was well aware of Hungary’s ‘extremely negative’ view of 
the project, and, wanting to maintain good relations,826 took this into account in
R97reaching their decision to proceed cautiously with Rosia. Romania’s negotiators 
with the EU came to perceive Rosia Montana as posing ‘an extraordinary political 
risk’, creating not only ‘very serious problems of image’ for Romania but also 
‘political problems’ with EU member-States like Hungary.828 This must be avoided 
at all costs, given that ‘every member state has a vote, and such things [as Rosia] 
matter within the entire framework of the process deciding [Romania’s 
accession]’.829
But the PSD Executive’s regard for Hungary’s worries was not motivated solely by 
fear that Hungary might create difficulties for Romania’s accession; they also wanted 
to preserve their good relations with their Hungarian counterparts for its own sake. 
Lificiu admitted that he and the Hungarian Environment Minister ‘worked together 
extremely well’, and that he perceived him to be a ‘colleague and neighbour’. This 
suggests that it was not only the ‘rational’ fear of sanctions but also non-coercive 
influences such as socialisation within a European community and within the 
Socialist International that played a role in determining the Executive’s stance on 
Rosia.
825 Ibid.
826 Ibid.
827 Senior official, negotiations team, interview, 2006.
828 Ibid.
829 Ibid.
830 Lificiu, interview, 2005.
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Given these manifold pressures, the Romanian Executive resolved that they wanted 
no further complications with the EU and maintained their prudent course 
notwithstanding that some powerful Cabinet members favoured Rosia.831 On 5 June 
2003, for the first time since the controversy began, Nastase publicly declared, ‘This 
project is not a priority for us’, because ‘the risks to the environment are very 
high’. He also asked Parliament to form a special committee to investigate Rosia 
and to make recommendations.
Nastase’s very public de-prioritisation of Rosia seems puzzling at the first glance. 
There was no need to do this, as the government had followed the letter of the law 
strictly, and the Commission had stopped pressurising them once they had shown 
that they were proceeding lawfully. However, viewed in a wider trans-national 
context, Nastase’s declaration was likely intended to boost their public image both at 
home and abroad. The declaration was widely reported in the Romanian press, which 
members of the Executive regarded as have been ‘very good for the NGOs’, by
Q '2 ‘3
giving them ‘grist for the mill’. The declaration came to be regarded by insiders as 
essentially a ‘political declaration’, in that Nastase and his Cabinet continued to 
harbour the intention to go ahead with Rosia at some later date. His own 
Environment Minister, Lificiu, noted that the declaration was ‘a very shrewd and 
diplomatic statement’: Nastase had parlayed the word ‘now’, which meant, according 
to Lificiu, that the project ‘is not a priority now, at 6.20, but it might become a 
priority at 6.30’. On this interpretation, the Executive had decided to await the 
opportune moment for going ahead with Rosia.
831 Senior official, negotiations team, interview, 2006.
832 www.ngo.ro. ‘Romanian prime minister criticizes Canadian gold mine project’, June 2003.
833 Lificiu, interview, 2005.
834 Former senior civil servant, Environment Ministry, interview, 11 November 2005 and 3 June 2006.
835 Lificiu, interview, 2005.
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Given that Nastase’s declaration was made just before the Social Democrat Ecologist 
Forum was held on International Earth Day, Nastase may also have intended to win 
over environmentalist civil society to the Social Democrat Party, likely with a view 
to the forthcoming elections. This idea might have come from Lificiu, who has made 
repeated attempts over the years to co-opt the environmental movement under 
various green political formations set up by him.
Nastase’s declaration had the effect of constraining the company and thus 
empowering the civil society opposed to the project, even if perhaps only 
temporarily. Indeed the declaration had an immediate effect on the environmental 
permitting process, as admitted by the company itself:
[After Nastase’s declaration] nobody in the administration would do 
anything. There were continual apologies and moves designed to block 
every attempt by RMGC to obtain the necessary permits ... Every civil 
servant wants to keep his/her job. When the PM says that ‘we don’t like 
the project’, what do you expect? Never mind what the Industry 
Ministry was saying -  ‘This is a good project, the government wants it’ 
and so on -  never mind all the documents we possessed, signed by the 
government... .836
With keen supporters like the Industry Minister inside the Cabinet, the Rosia 
Montana Gold Corporation had been hoping that they would eventually convince 
Nastase to give Rosia the green light. But once Nastase spoke out against it, they 
understood that the project would not be permitted before the 2004 elections. 
Consequently, the company announced in June 2003 that it was withdrawing their 
Technical Memorandum submitted in October 2002, and would petition the 
government to cease processing its documentation. The withdrawal was portrayed by 
the Albumus coalition as a major setback for RMGC, and by the European
836 Former Director, RMGC, interview, 2005.
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Commission as ‘significant for the progress of the project’.
0^ 0
The company itself admitted that the withdrawal cost it money and credibility -  
the latter having already been damaged by Albumus’s campaign. On the other hand, 
they may have gained credibility by showing their willingness to respect the law and 
submit a better proposal.839 By constantly reiterating their eagerness to comply with 
EU and international law, the company endeavoured to turn failure into a strategic 
opportunity to reconstruct their public image. Displaying commitment to EU law 
would foil the bad publicity generated by the coalition, particularly regarding the 
dubious circumstances in which the Rosia project had been started up. Thereafter the 
company re-branded itself as a respectable Western investor fully committed to EU 
and international norms.840 The company resubmitted its documentation in December 
2004, more than a year later, immediately after Nastase had lost the elections to the 
Democrat Party candidate, Traian Basescu. The company hoped that Basescu, who in 
his electoral campaign had declared support for the Rosia project, and his 
Democratic Party, which had originated it in the first place, would be more 
sympathetic.
This section has traced how, no less than civil society, the Executive exploits the 
opportunities offered by Europe and the EU. Just like the NGOs, they make shift 
with whatever of the EU they can utilise -  supranational organs, funds, authority, law 
-  to circumvent the constraints of others and empower themselves. The constraints 
they strove to circumvent were domestic (pressures both from civil society and from 
the company) and also external (the anticipated EU reaction). The empowerment
837 DG Environment, interview, 7 June 2006.
838 Vice President, RMGC interview, 20 September 2005.
839 Lificiu, interview, 2005.
840 Bogdan, interview, 2005.
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they sought after was: room for manoeuvre; opportunity for pursuing the project at a 
later and more convenient date; opportunity for gaining credibility before the EU 
member-States; and, in the case of the Environment Ministry, an outlet for diffusing 
responsibility. In the end, the Executive compromised with domestic and trans­
national civil society, with the EU organs and with the Hungarian government. They 
did this, however, only because they perceived that they had little to gain 
immediately from the Rosia project, compared to the immediate costs to Romania’s 
accession which they feared they might incur.
The Executive acted to constrain the company, not because their values and 
expectations regarding the environment or civil society had changed, but because, at 
that point in time, the costs of permitting the project ran higher than the benefits. Had 
the controversy occurred at a less vulnerable juncture for the Executive (e.g., after 
the close of negotiations, or after accession itself) or had they had more to gain 
immediately from permitting it, the Executive might well have behaved differently. 
A proxy for this latter scenario is presented in the Transylvania Motorway case 
study. Nonetheless, some of the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that, 
aside from these rational calculations, the Executive also worried about their image 
and their credibility before Hungary and before the EU more generally. This would 
suggest that the effects of socialisation within EU institutions and the European 
framework may have played a role, too -  albeit (it might seem) a less important one.
Conclusions
After Dracula Park, Rosia Montana is the second instance since 1989 where civil
society exerted any influence over the Romanian Executive concerning an economic
development project. The outcome of the contest between civil society on the one
hand, and the Executive and the company on the other, ended with the
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empowerment, at least temporarily, of the former. As in Dracula, an initially 
powerless and resource-less civil society opposition managed to find leverage over 
the Executive. But the leverage was possible only because the grassroots group was 
initiated into basic competences by the intervention of Western civil society 
environmentalists, and empowered by them with material and cognitive resources 
unprecedented for Romanian civil society. Their intervention transformed the 
original protest, until then largely motivated by private material interests.
Moreover, civil society empowerment piggybacked on the Executive’s self- 
constraint. The latter’s behaviour is best explained ‘rationally’ by their perception of 
the prospective costs and benefits of gold mining, which included an anticipation of 
accession woes. These perceptions in turn were heavily influenced if not created by 
trans-national civil society and the media, and by the Executive’s own construction 
of how EU supranational organs and the Hungarian government would react.
The nested-games model elegantly captures the Executive’s calculations. In contrast 
to Dracula Park, the Executive by then had become quite aware of the importance of 
the external games they were engaged in. They factored into their domestic 
calculations estimates of the external costs and benefits entailed. Besides the 
domestic game (game 1), the Executive was involved in the EU game (2), and in a 
game with the Hungarian government (3). By contrast with Dracula, the domestic 
benefits of the gold mining to the Nastase government were instantly very low 
(bl[ti]>0), but liable to increase in the foreseeable future (bl[t2]>bl[tj] >0), for 
example, if the price of gold were to rise, or if labour unrest were to urge job 
creation. Their domestic costs were also low at first (cl>0), but increased over time 
as Rosia became more controversial. The balance of domestic costs and benefits was 
thus always precarious, risking that, at any time, the domestic costs might come to
185
outweigh the domestic benefits, or vice versa. The external games offered no 
comfort. In the EU game, played with the Commission, proceeding with the mining 
yielded no benefits (b2=0). The costs, although apparently low once the government 
was seen to obey the EU law of Environmental Impact Assessment, remained greater 
than zero, in that Commission personnel privately continued to express implicit or 
explicit reservations about the project (c2>0). This meant that the costs in this game 
must have outweighed the benefits (c2>b2=0). A similar logic applied to the game 
with the Hungarian government, who also expressed misgivings (c3>b3=0). The 
estimated future costs in this third game rose considerably after Hungary acceded to 
EU membership, and after Nastase had cemented a personal friendship with the 
Hungarian PM. At this point the Nastase government might have been expected to 
abandon the project (c2+c3>bl[ti]>0). The possibility of a large future increase in 
domestic benefits nevertheless remained (bl[t2]>c2+c3>bl[ti]>0 ?). This was 
probably what motivated the government to postpone rather than cancel the project.
Importantly, Executive’s room for manoeuvre was also narrowed from the top down 
by the transposition of the acquis. This revised domestic environmental law, opening 
up the decision-making process not only to the public and civil society but also to 
neighbouring countries. This increased the number of veto points constraining the 
Romanian Executive, which was no longer free to exercise the same discretion as it 
had before.
Although constrained, the Executive was less so than in Dracula Park, in that, first, 
they had less to lose, and second, they found a ‘win-win’ alternative in 
temporisation. Their values as regards the environment and civil society seem not to 
have substantially changed, but they had learnt how to handle these issues and 
persons more strategically. They also learnt to handle the European Commission
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more strategically, even attempting to exploit it to shift the blame off of themselves 
while enhancing their image before the member-States.
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Chapter 5: The Executive strikes back: the flowering of Romanian inter-
governmentalism 
- The case of the Transylvania Motorway -
This chapter traces the processes of a political contest in Romania over the 
accountability of the Nastase government for their breach of the EU law of public 
procurement. This law was breached when, without the public tendering that the law 
required, the government let a motorway-building contract -  Romania’s largest-ever 
infrastructure project -  to the American firm Bechtel International. Because the law 
and its breach involved the Single Market, so fundamental to the EU project, the 
expectation must be that the European Commission will intervene to constrain the 
Executive more forcefully than it did in the other cases studied herein. As the 
Nastase government was only a year away from closing negotiations on the whole 
acquis, they may be expected to be more susceptible than before to the pressures of 
accession conditionality. Under these circumstances, domestic civil society, provided 
they mobilise, may be expected to be empowered even more than in the other cases.
On the other hand, the elections were very near and the Nastase government may be 
expected to do whatever they think will get them re-elected. If any of their election- 
driven decisions come into conflict with accession conditionality, they must keep 
within the limits of Brussels’ tolerance. If circumstances force them to proceed in 
ways that might upset Brussels, they may be expected to act strategically to forestall 
or minimise any consequent difficulties with accession.
By contrast with the other case studies, the Nastase government in this case operates
under the pressures of two separate conditionalities: the domestic ‘election
conditionality’ and the EU’s accession conditionality. These two conditionalities
may be expected to compete with the other as the main motive driving Executive
behaviour. Whatever course they decide, the government must take care to strike a
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winning balance between these possibly opposing pressures.
Certain expectations also arise on the side of civil society. The controversy in this 
case was primarily over procedure rather than substance; therefore, the pattern of 
environmental civil society mobilisation and its interaction with the Executive may 
be expected differ from that in Rosia Montana or Dracula Park. Environmental civil 
society may be expected to mobilise, but not so much around the issue of public 
tender as around the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure and the 
specifically ecological issues raised by the Motorway. An infrastructure project on so 
large a scale is bound to impact Transylvania’s cultural heritage and ecological 
balance significantly. It will likely displace more people than all the other projects 
studied herein combined. That the motorway was to pass though Transylvania, 
Romania’s most civically active region, is further reason to expect at least as much 
civil society mobilisation as in the case of the Dracula theme park or the Rosia 
Montana gold mining project. Moreover, the successes in Dracula Park and Rosia 
Montana reasonably raise expectations that environmental civil society should have 
learnt by now how one deploys Europe to constrain the Executive. Lastly, the 
comprehensive harmonisation of Romania’s EIA regulations with those of the EU 
may be expected to have opened up the domestic political system and its decisional 
processes to civil society influence.
Section One provides a background to the case study, identifying domestic and EU 
constraints on the Executive. Section Two traces step by step the Executive’s tactical 
moves toward realising the project. Section Three traces Brussels’ reaction, and the 
factors that constrained them in their endeavours to offset or correct the Executive’s 
circumvention of EU supranational constraints. Section Four, the last section, traces 
the feeble and opportunistic reaction of Romanian civil society, analysing the reasons
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why, in this case, they could exert no influence over the Executive.
5.1 The Executive in check
This section presents the political situation confronting the Romanian Executive and 
why it determined them to let the contract for a large-scale infrastructure project 
without any public tender. By doing so, they flouted rules only just agreed with the 
European Commission. With less than a year to go before the November 2004 
elections and before the scheduled close of the acquis negotiations, the Executive 
stands revealed as operating under tighter constraints than in Dracula Park or Rosia 
Montana. Domestically, the Social Democratic Party (PSD)’s overriding priority was 
re-election, but their odds of forming a majority were slim. They would have little 
choice but to cultivate the loyalty of their lone likely coalition partner, the 
Democratic Union of the Magyars in Romania (UDMR), the party representing 
ethnic Hungarian interests. One of the bargains the PSD had already struck with 
them was to build a motorway linking the isolated Hungarian-dominated areas of 
Transylvania with Hungary. The volatile Transylvanian electorate and their 
traditional suspicion of the PSD also contributed to forcing the PSD’s hand, obliging 
them to commence construction before the elections.
However, to bring this off, the Executive must obviate a formidable EU constraint, 
 ^ the Trans-European Network (TEN) routes agreement negotiated under the previous 
Romanian government. This agreement had etched in stone Romania’s transportation 
priorities in order of fiscal allocation, putting the TEN first. The negotiations on the 
TEN network could have been re-opened but this was a solution unfavoured by the 
Romanian government since it would have given the Commission the opportunity to 
raise other contentious transportation issues.
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5.1.2 The shifting sands of the coalition with the Hungarians 
By the time the elections loomed, the promised motorway through Transylvania had 
become a necessity for UDMR, the PSD’s main coalition partner. The UDMR were 
facing a rebellion within their own ranks from a minority within the Hungarian
041
minority, the Szekely. The Szekely are East Transylvanian Hungarians of Turkish 
origin who had been brought in by a Hungarian king in the 13th century to guard the
£4}
eastern marches. Constituting 670,000 out of the 1.4 million ethnic Hungarians in 
Romania, they are nowadays concentrated in just a few counties of Transylvania: -  
Covasna (where they are 74% of the population), Harghita (85%) and Mures (53%). 
Throughout the centuries past, the Szekely had counted as a constituent nation of the 
Transylvanian polity, distinct from either Hungarians or Saxons. They had even 
allied themselves with the Romanians against the Hungarians in the period of 19th 
century nationalism. Even today, the Szekely perceive themselves as a distinct ethnic 
group from the Hungarians, notwithstanding that they have lost most of their
£4^
distinctive customs and speak Hungarian.
Under Ceausescu this group, like all ethnic minorities, had been aggressively 
marginalised from both the economic and social standpoints; for example, education 
in the Hungarian language was forbidden, and a former Autonomous Magyar Region 
abolished.844 Their situation did not significantly improve after 1989, most areas 
continuing to be poor and isolated from the Romanian transportation network. This, 
and the feeling that UDMR, their political representative, had not done enough for
841 Called Secui in Romanian.
842 Razvan Amariei, ‘The Unsettled Szeklers’, Transitions Online 26 January 2004.,
http://www.tol.cz/look/BRR/article.tpl?IdLanguage=l&IdPublication=9&NrIssue=l&NrSection=:l&NrArticle=l 
1495 (accessed January 2005).
843 Ibid.
844 Michael Schafir, The political party as national holding company: the Hungarian Democratic Federation o f  
Romania in Jonathan P. Stein (ed.), The Politics o f  national minority participation in post-communist countries, 
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), p. 101; Michael Schafir, Romania. Politics, Economics and Society. Political 
Stagnation and Simulated Change (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), p. 162.
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them, was causing, by the end of the 1990s, the ‘biggest wave of radicalism in the 
Hungarian community’. The UDMR had come to be viewed as too moderate by 
the Szekely, who were upending the Party platform by demanding the status of an
OAf.
ethnic minority separate from Hungarians, as well as autonomy for their enclave. 
The Szekely were also dissatisfied that the UDMR were ‘collaborating’ with rather
o A n
than confronting the political parties dominated by ethnic Romanians. Only a year 
before the elections, the Szekely were threatening to break away from UDMR and 
form their own party, which eventually did happen but not until just before the 
2004 elections.849
The UDMR’s leadership worried about the Szekely radicalisation and their threat to 
defect. If the Szekely formed a party of their own, they would become the UDMR’s
OfA
main competitor for Hungarian votes. Moreover, without Szekely votes, estimated 
at between 20,000 and 50,000, UDMR risked failing to cross the 5% threshold 
necessary for being seated in Parliament.851 The UDMR’s electoral prospects were 
further darkened by the rapid dwindling of the Hungarian population in 
Transylvania, which between 1989 and 2002 had dropped by all of 200,000 (15% of 
the total population).852 These internal problems prompted the UDMR’s leader, Bela 
Marko, representing Mures (the ‘capital’ of the Szekely area), to ‘do something’ for 
the Szekely that would help to ‘disenclave and de-radicalise’ them. The UDMR
845 Interview by the author with senior official (1) European Commission Delegation in Bucharest, 26 June 2006.
846 Raluca Crisan, ‘Secuii in hora PRM’, Evenimentul Zilei Online, 29 Octombrie 2004; Sorin Dragomir, 
‘Autonomia Tinutului Secuiesc in disputa’, BBC Romanian, 19 November 2004.
847 Crisan, 29 Octombrie 2004; TCkes Laszlo (Szdkely Leader) quoted in Dragos Bardosi, ‘TOkes indeamna la 
lupta pentru Ardeali, Evenimentul Zilei Online, 11 Martie 2004.
848 Dragos Bardosi, ‘Separatism intre autonomisti’, Evenimentul Zilei Online, 26 Ianuarie 2005.
849 The Sz6kely would go so far as to sign, in October 2004, only a month before the national elections, a protocol 
o f electoral collaboration with Romania’s most nationalist party, the Greater Romania Party (Crisan, 29 October 
2004).
850 Dragomir, 19 November 2004.
851 Crisan, 29 Octombrie 2004; Dragomir, 19 November 2004.
852 Gallagher, Theft o f  a nation, p. 328.
853 Senior official (1), Delegation, interview, 26 June 2006.
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leadership insisted before and after the 2004 elections that a Transylvanian motorway 
should be routed through the Szekely area and built sooner rather than later.854
Inasmuch as UDMR were the PSD’s margin of control in Parliament, its problems 
became the PSD’s problem as well. Opinion polls had indicated that the PSD were 
likely to win the 2004 elections but not with a majority: of the 43% of the vote they
Off o r /
were forecast to receive, they could only count on a nucleus of about 20-22%. 
Their main opponent, the Liberal-Democratic Alliance, was forecast to win 28% of 
the votes. What is worse, Romanian voters are notoriously volatile: studies have
oro
shown that undecided voters are unpredictable all the way up to election day. In 
these circumstances, none of the contenders could have any certainty of forming an 
absolute majority on their own; thus the necessity of coalescing with lesser parties.
Their choices, however, were extremely limited. The PSD was shut out of a coalition 
with either party that formed their main opposition. The Democrats and the Liberals 
who made up the Alliance had pledged to each other to ‘build a united front before 
the PSD’,859 hoping to win votes by distancing themselves from ‘a corrupt party and
O/A
government’. They signed and published a protocol committing themselves to
Q/1
remain in opposition {i.e. to refuse a coalition with the PSD) if their Alliance lost. 
For that matter, the PSD as well as the Alliance had also committed themselves to 
refusing a coalition with the Greater Romania Party (GRP), a party tainted with 
nationalistic extremism. This had made it an outcast in Europe, and both the Alliance
854 Bela Marko (UDMR Leader) quoted in ‘UDMR insists pentru contractul cu firma Bechtel’, BBC Romanian, 2 
Aprilie 2005; Senior official, negotiations team, interview, 2006.
Razvan Braileanu, ‘Mizele electorale ale anului 2004’, Revista 22, March 2004, no. 732.
856 Traian Basescu (Leader o f the Democratic Party) in Braileanu, 2004.
857 Braileanu, 2004.
858 Theodor Stolojan (Leader o f the National Liberal Party) in Braileanu, 2004.
859 Braileanu, 2004.
860 Email communication by the author with Raimonda Boian, Spokeswoman for Emil Boc, Leader o f the 
Democratic Party, 16 March 2006.
861 Basescu in Braileanu, 2004.
862 Petru Clej, ‘Cum aratS viitorul Parlament?’, BBC Romanian, 1 December 2004; Stolojan in Braileanu, 2004.
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and PSD feared that a coalition with the GRP would make a bad impression on the
O iC 'I
EU. The Humanist Party (PUR), a junior partner in Nastase’s governing coalition 
between 2000 and 2003, could not be counted on by either the PSD or the opposition 
Alliance. In 2003 the PUR broke with the PSD, citing the latter’s ‘permanent 
arrogance’, and announced that they would stand as an independent party in the 2004 
local and general elections.864 Besides the PUR, all of the other micro-parties put 
together held a mere handful of seats in Parliament. Under these circumstances the 
UDMR was the only viable coalition partner left standing for either the Alliance or 
the PSD.
UDMR never enters into pre-electoral alliances, lest they betray or give the 
impression of betraying the interests of the Hungarian minority.865 Like most 
Romanian political parties, UDMR is renowned for its pragmatism and lack of 
ideological commitments, being ‘open to collaboration with all democratic parties in 
Romania’866 that ‘accept its very specific agenda’.867 For example, in the 2004 local 
elections, which preceded the general elections by a few months, UDMR supported 
indifferently either the PSD or the Liberal-Democratic Alliance, depending on who 
won. The unpredictability of the UDMR’s opportunism makes it especially difficult 
for the main parties to reckon the odds of forming a majority governing coalition. 
Both main contenders were wooing UDMR before, during and after the elections. 
(Indeed, after the local elections the Alliance is said to have been negotiating with 
UDMR ‘on its knees’.868) The stakes were higher for the PSD than for the Alliance,
863 Petru Clej, ‘AnalizS a alegerilor din Romania’, BBC Romanian, 26 November 2004.
864 ‘puR  a mpt protocolul cu PSD’, Evenimentul Zilei, 31 August 2003.
865 Gyorgy Frunda (UDMR Leader) quoted in ‘UDMR colaboreazS §i cu PSD §i cu Alian(a D.A’, BBC 
Romanian, 23 June 2004.
866 Ibid.
867 Monica Ciobanu and Michael Shafir, ‘The 2004 Romanian elections: a test for democratic consolidation?’, 
RFE/RL Reports, 7 April 2005, vol. 7, no. 3.
868 BBC Romanian, ‘UDMR s-a aliat cu alian(a PNL-PD la Cluj’, 23 June 2004.
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because they needed only the UDMR to form a majority coalition by a comfortable 
margin.869
The PSD had already formed a coalition with UDMR right after the 2000 elections, 
and had been bargaining with them throughout their joint tenure. UDMR’s agenda 
was topped by three main demands on the PSD: the restoration of the Freedom 
Statue of Arad; the re-establishment of the two separate universities in Cluj -  Victor 
Babes in Romanian and Bolyai in Hungarian; and facilitation of economic 
development of the Hungarian minority region by improving its infrastructure
871links. The goal was improve the conditions of the Szekely so as to de-radicalise
877them. The PSD was prepared to concede on the first and the third points but not on
87*5
the second, arguing that a linguistically separate university would encourage 
ethnic segregation and even separatism. It was thus that the Transylvania Motorway 
resulted from pork-barrel bargaining between the PSD and the UDMR, in hopes both 
of shoring-up the UDMR’s base and of securing its loyalty to the PSD in the run-up
on a
to the 2004 elections. The PSD was all the more prepared to deliver on the 
motorway, as this might help them win over to their side some of the non-Hungarian 
component of the Transylvanian electorate.
5.1.3 Brussels constrains the Executive 
To pacify the Hungarians, however, would oblige the Nastase government to finesse 
one of the settlements negotiated between the previous Romanian government and
869 Petru Clej, ‘Rezultatul alegerilor prezidenfiale §i viitorul govern’, BBC Romanian, 8 December 2004.
870 Radio Free Europe, Romanian Hungarian Leader Demands Hungarian-Language Faculty at University, 22 
February 2005 vol. 9, no. 34, http://vyww.rferl.org/newsline/2005/02/4-see/see-2202Q5.asp.
871 Senior official (1), interview, Delegation, 26 June 2006.
872 Ibid.
873 Ibid.
874 Ionita, email, 2006; Senior official (1), Delegation, interview, 26 June 2006; Interview by the author with 
European Commission senior official (2), 12 April 2006; Interview by the author with DG Enlargement,
European Commission, 13 April 2006; The Economist, 15 April 2004, ‘Romania and the EU. Don't count your 
chickens: 2007 may be too early an entry date for a big, poor country’.
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the EU. The corridor routes through Romania had been agreed in 1997 and 1999, 
when Romania was ruled by the PSD’s arch-rivals, the centre-right Alliance, who 
conformed the routes to their own preferences.875 The siting of the routes had been 
driven by a concern common to all Romanian Transportation Ministries throughout 
the 1990s, who had been ‘focused on transportation links to, from and through 
Bucharest’ so as to keep the capital from being isolated from the Pan-European
R7ANetwork. Led by Transportation Minister Traian Basescu, who in 2004 was to 
contest the Presidency with Nastase, the centre-right government had actually 
skewed the routes, marginalising Transylvania.877 Of the two TEN corridors that 
were to cross Romania, Corridor IX would link Helsinki through Kiev to Iasi, 
Bucharest and Giurgiu, in Moldavia -  the eastern margin of Romania, -  and thence
070
to Dimitrovgrad, Bulgaria and Alexandropoulos, Greece. Corridor IV would link 
Vienna through Budapest to Arad, Bucharest and Constanta, mostly in Wallachia -
R7Qthe southern margin, -  and thence to Sofia, Bulgaria and Istanbul. Only one branch 
of Corridor IV was to cut the southern comer of Transylvania, leaving most of it, 
including the areas inhabited by the Szekely, isolated and unserved.
By submitting a Position Paper on Transportation to the European Commission the 
centre-right coalition had committed Romania to building the Corridors before any
Q Q  A
other comparable transportation infrastructure. The Corridors would benefit from 
EU funding schemes, and must be given fiscal priority by the Romanian
875 Senior official (1), Delegation, interview, 26 June 2006.
876 Ibid.
877 Ibid.
878 Romanian Government, Transylvania Motorway Project will continue as soon as the legal issues are solved 
through the contract renegotiation between the Romanian authorities and the construction company (Press 
release), 30 November 2005 <www.gov.ro> .
879 European Commission, Regular Report -  Romania (Brussels, 1999), p. 44.
880 Antal Istvan (UDMR MP and President o f the Committee on Industries and Services), Parliamentary Debates. 
Sittings o f  the Chamber o f  Deputies, 10 February 2004; Email communication by the author with Andra 
Mihalcioiu, Romania’s negotiations team, 16 June 2006.
196
o n  i
government. The routes were codified by Executive decree (Emergency Ordinance 
16/1999), which mandated Romania’s first Priority Programme for Motorway 
Building. It transpired only with the publication of this Ordinance in 1999 that the 
core of Transylvania had been shut out of the Trans-European Network.
The routes immediately became contested. Greatly dissatisfied, Transylvanian 
politicians from all parties mobilised to lobby the government for changes.883 The 
MPs’ reaction to this agreement with the EU reflected the excessive discretion that 
the Romanian polity allows to whichever government currently holds the Executive 
power. It is this that allowed the previous government to negotiate a very one-sided 
TEN that did not reflect the interests of the whole country. Particularly vociferous 
were the Liberals, the Democrats and the UDMR, who up till then had always 
dominated Transylvanian politics. In June 2001 MPs of these parties reached a 
common position, which they published as the Oradea Declaration, demanding the 
inclusion in the Priority Programme of a motorway linking Oradea on the Hungarian 
border with Bucharest. Such a motorway would ‘develop Romania’s economic 
relations with the West and the European Community’, and therefore ought to be a 
priority, because: (a) Hungary is currently planning a corresponding motorway 
terminating in Bors, potentially linking up any Romanian motorway terminating 
there to Budapest and beyond; (b) the state of Transylvania’s roads was utterly and 
unfairly wom-out, and does not repay the region’s contribution to the national 
economy; and (c) Transylvania is the bedrock of any ‘multi-functional relationship’ 
between Romania and the EU, hence no transportation network without Transylvania
881 Ibid.
882 Paul Magheru (Greater Romania Party MP), ‘Declation: The Truth about the Transylvanian Motorway’, 
Sittings o f  the Chamber o f  Deputies, Romanian Parliament, 8 March 2005.
883 Magheru, 2005.
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would be ‘viable’. The Oradea Declaration was also signed by those Members of 
the Hungarian Parliament representing districts near the border with Romania885 -  a 
trans-nationalism that would have been unlikely before accession to the EU had 
facilitated to such an extent the construction of common interests between the two 
countries.
The Romanian government changed in 2001, and the routes negotiated by the centre- 
right coalition in 1997 were found to clash with the preferences of the new coalition 
made up of the PSD and UDMR. The new Executive tried to work with its allies in 
Parliament to rebalance the Programme’s priorities. When in January 2002 the 
Parliament finally adopted the 1999 Priority Programme (Act 1/2002), it had been 
amended to include certain items not negotiated with the EU. One of these was a 
167-kilometre motorway linking Bors on the border with Hungary to Cluj in the
QO£
heart of Transylvania. But this Bors-Cluj motorway was only a spur running more 
or less parallel to Corridor IV, only deeper inside Transylvania. This inclusion 
reflected only the UDMR MPs’ preferences. The interests of the rest of the 
Transylvanian caucus were ignored, as Parliament was now dominated by the PSD- 
UDMR coalition, from which the other, non-Hungarian Transylvanian MPs were 
excluded. The latter were disappointed,887 but their fragmented majority presented no 
significant challenge. The PSD-UDMR ruling coalition claimed in justification that a 
Bors-Cluj motorway was but the first step toward one comprehending all of 
Transylvania and ending in Bucharest. The coalition may have perceived that
884 Cornel Popa (National Liberal Party MP), Interpellation addressed to the PM Nastase regarding the critical 
state o f  infrastructure in Bihor county, 2 June 2003, National Liberal Party website 
http://www.pnl.ro/?id=par 154: Cornel Popa (National Liberal Party MP). 2002. ‘Proiecte uitate [Forgotten 
projects]’, www.pnl.ro. 17 June 2002.
Cornel Popa (National Liberal Party MP), Autostrada Oradea-Bucuresti Chamber o f Deputies, Romanian 
Parliament, 22 October 2003.
886 Cornel Popa, Marginalizarea judetului Bihor, Romanian Parliament, 16 April 2003; Magheru, 2005.
887 Damian Brudajca (Greater Romania Party MP), Meeting o f the Chamber o f Deputies, 11 September 2001.
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planning comprehensively would at this point be too conspicuous a departure from 
what had been negotiated with the EU.
These amendments aroused the European Commission. The Romanian government 
was going to implement a different Priority Programme to what had been agreed, but 
which would entail an obligation by the EU to fund it all the same. The TEN 
agreement had not forbidden Romania to build other motorways, provided that she
Q O O
could finance them without prejudice to the Pan-European Network. However, the 
Priority Programme adopted in 2002 by the PSD government broke these promises, 
particularly given that a branch of the Corridor IV had already been planned to pass 
through the south of Transylvania parallel to the offending Bors-Cluj motorway. In 
1997, and again in 1999, the TEN Corridor had been judged by European experts the
O Q Q
most advantageous and cost-effective, all things considered. Besides cost, another 
important consideration for routing Corridor IV through the south of Transylvania, at 
least in the early 1990's, had been to bypass -  on the way to Bulgaria and Istanbul -  
the conflict zone in Yugoslavia, which had blocked West-East traffic.890 A motorway 
through the south was thought best to circumvent these problems.
The European Commission demanded that the government exclude the Bors-Cluj 
Motorway from their 2002 Priority Programme.891 It was a demand that tightly 
constrained the PSD-UDMR government. The Bors-Cluj Motorway was de­
prioritised in November 2002, when Act 1/2002 was amended again to harmonise the 
whole of Romania’s transportation law with the acquis. In Parliamentary debates 
over the new bill, UDMR fought to keep the Bors-Cluj Motorway in. Transylvanian
888 Mihalcioiu, email, 16 June 2006.
889 Ibid.
890 Senior official (1), Delegation, interview, 26 June 2006.
891 Popa, 2 June 2003; Senior official, Negotiatons team, interview, 2006.
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MPs of the Liberal and Democratic Parties, too, objected that the Programme was 
unfair. The south of the country would be ‘webbed’ in motorways before 2007, while
QQOmotorway-building in the north was to be postponed until after 2015. All 
amendments, even those moved by UDMR, were nonetheless rejected. Miron Mitrea, 
the Transportation Minister, told MPs that Romania had more important 
commitments with the European Union, and that ‘a motorway through the centre of
QQl
Transylvania will remain a dream until financial support is found’.
5.1.4 The Romanian Executive plays inter-govemmentalism from the bottom up 
The dream of a motorway through Transylvania, however, was never given up. The 
government continued to seek ways of circumventing the supranational constraints 
imposed on it. A motorway linking Bucharest with Budapest through Transylvania 
reappeared in the context of the Partnership that PM Nastase forged with the newly 
elected Social Democrat Hungarian PM Peter Medgyessy in 20002. A motorway 
project was discussed in July 2002, when the two PMs had first met. Nastase’s aide- 
memoire ‘On the Strategic Romanian-Hungarian Partnership for the 21st century 
Europe’ included cooperation on infrastructure between Romania and Hungary.894 It 
was in November 2002, after the Bors-Cluj Motorway had been excluded from the 
Priority Programme, that the two PMs began to discuss in earnest a motorway 
linking their countries through Transylvania.
Nastase and Medgyessy decided that they shared common interests as new members 
of both the European and Euro-Atlantic communities; therefore, a ‘new way of
892 Popa, 2 June 2003.
893 Miron Mitrea (Transportation Minister for Romania, 2000-2004) paraphrased in Popa, 2 June 2003.
894 Liviu Alexa, Ioana Tiganescu, and Sorin Rosca-Stanescu, ‘Premierii Nastase si Medgyessy au vorbit trilingv’, 
Ziua, 8 July 2002.
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approaching [their] bilateral relations’ was needed to further these interests.895 
Nastase’s July 2002 aide-memoire became consolidated in a Partnership centred on
OQZ
EU and NATO integration, minority relations, and economic co-operation. A 
motorway linking Bucharest to Budapest would ‘foster [this economic] co­
operation’.897 A month later, in December 2002, Nastase and Medgyessy announced
O Q O
a joint plan to link Bucharest and Budapest by motorway. Both countries agreed 
on the crucial importance of transportation to the development of the EU internal 
market and to their own economic growth within it.899 The motorway also had 
symbolic value: ‘the building of a motorway can, at times, say much more than the 
many agreements left in the drawers’.900 The announcement heralded a 
rapprochement between the two countries, whose relations had been tense 
throughout the 1990s over the civil rights of the Hungarian minority in Romania and 
the Romanian perception of a threat of a revision of its borders with Hungary.901
The motive on the Romanian side for the rapprochement was likely that, without it, 
Hungary might well have complicated Romania’s accession to the EU. But the fact 
that the new Hungarian Prime Minister was a Socialist like Nastase also contributed. 
Indeed, relations between the two countries improved markedly after the Hungarian 
Socialist Party won the 2002 elections and Hungary’s new Prime Minister cemented
895 Adrian Nastase (PM Romania, 2000-2004), Common press conference Nastase-Medgyessy, 30 November 
2002, http://arhiva.informatia.ro/Article7832.phtml (accessed January 2005).
896 Ibid.
897 Peter Medgyessy (PM Hungary), Common press conference Nastase-Medgyessy, 30 November 2002, 
http://arhiva.informatia.ro/Article7832.phtml (accessed January 2005).
898 Razvan Amariei, ‘Deals Without Tenders’, Transitions Online, 23 February 2004,
http://www.tol.ez/look/B RR/article.tp1?IdLanguage=1&IdPub1ication=9&NrIssue=l&NrSection=I&NrArticle=l 
1625: ‘Autostrada Prieteniei’, Adevarul, 2 December 2002, no. 3870.
899 Conference on Accession, Brussels 5 March 2001 to the European Union (Romania) RO 6/01. Romania’s 
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900 Adrian Nastase (PM Romania, 2000-2004) quoted in Hungarian Prime Ministerial Office, ‘Prime Minister in 
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a friendship with his fellow Socialist, Nastase.902 This improvement of relations was, 
therefore, the result of bottom-up inter-governmental co-operation, which effectively 
supplanted the not very successful 2000 co-operation pact between Romania and a 
Nationalist-led Hungary -  which had been driven from the top down by Brussels.903
In the spring of 2003 Nastase and Medgyessy despatched a joint letter to 
Commission President Prodi asking him ‘to convince the European Union to grant 
some special funds for this [motorway] route’.904 Prodi’s reply was: ‘“yes” [but only] 
when the project’s turn comes’.905 Apparently he told them to wait until Romania 
and Hungary acceded, or else to finance the project from private sources.906 Thus, 
Brussels’ supranational agenda ran counter in this case to domestic priorities.
Neither PM was discouraged by Prodi’s refusal. In June 2003, when they met again 
and discussed the motorway plans, Medgyessy stressed that ‘Hungary wanted to see 
the road run through the middle of Transylvania, and not simply skirt it’.907 For his 
part, the Hungarian PM had decided that they would ‘use loans and their own 
[financial] resources so as to accelerate the process of building motorways’.908 
Nastase, too, decided to find another way of financing a motorway through 
Transylvania.909 The de-prioritisation of the Bors-Cluj motorway by the 
Commission, and Prodi’s rejection of Nastase’s and Medgyessy’s pleads for financial 
support, made it harder for the PSD to satisfy the UDMR’s demand for
902 Lificiu, interview, 2005.
903 Gallagher, Theft o f  a nation, p. 327.
904 Miron Mitrea (Transportation Minister, 2000-2004). Response to parliamentary questions on the Emergency 
Ordinance 120/2003, Chamber o f Deputies, Romanian Parliament, 12 February 2004.
905 Ibid
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908 Interview with Helga Repassy, Vice-President o f the Hungarian National Office for Territorial and Regional 
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infrastructure. As the alternative of setting up Hungarian-language faculties at Babes- 
Bolyai University continued to be unacceptable, the PSD was forced to look for 
alternative sources of finance for building the motorway and thus secure the 
UDMR’s loyalty.
5. 2 The Executive moves out of check
This section traces the process of how the Executive found a way of financing the 
Transylvanian Motorway alternative to the EU, and how they exploited not only their 
own domestic power resources but even the very EU to get around those EU 
constraints that might have prevented commencing its construction before the 
elections. Two constraints in particular impeded them more than any others. The first 
was the Priority Programme for Motorway Building agreed with the European 
Commission, insofar as it precluded the engagement of credit to build the 
Transylvania motorway at the expense of the Pan-European Corridors. The second 
was the Romanian Executive’s agreement with the Commission to act as if the EU 
public procurement rules were applicable before they had in fact become domestic 
law.
5.2.1 The window of opportunity 
In pursuit of a way out of the Pan-European Agreement fiscal straightjacket, Nastase 
sent representatives of the Romanian External Trade Department to the US to sound 
out the five biggest US construction companies about building that Motorway.910 The 
idea that the Bechtel Corporation might build it gelled around July 2003. At that 
time, Romania and the US signed a Declaration of Intent to co-operate in the field of 
transportation. Samuel Bodman, the US Deputy Secretary of Commerce expressed
9,0 ibid.
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interest in helping Romania develop its transportation infrastructure, as a first step in 
‘strengthening’ their bilateral relationship.911 It was also to be seen as ‘a token of 
appreciation for the support given by the Romanians in the fight against international 
terrorism’.912 At this point, it was also apparently agreed that the Export-Import Bank 
of the United States (EXIMBANK) would act as guarantor in the financing of
Q l *2
projects generated by the Romanian-US cooperation. The Executive thus hoped 
that hiring Bechtel would bring EXIMBANK along as guarantor of the project’s 
finances.914 The US and Bechtel had thus opened a financial window of opportunity 
which the Cabinet could exploit to go around Brussels’ competing priorities and slip 
out of its supranational constraints.
Nothing prevented the Cabinet from signing the contract with Bechtel immediately 
except for Romania’s previous undertaking with the Commission to submit all major 
infrastructure projects to a public tendering process.915 The Commission ‘had insisted 
very strongly’ on this.916 The EU public procurement procedures would have 
changed the general rules of the Romanian game radically. Consequently, the
Q1 7Cabinet for their part had dragged their feet in fulfilling this undertaking. The new 
procedures were resisted because they impinged on many economic interests of the
Q 1  O
ruling party elite. Despite their reluctance, the Cabinet had been obliged in the end
911 Ibid.
9,2 Oana Branzan, ‘Romanian-American Agreements for Transports’, The Railway Journal, no. 8 <www.cfr.ro>  
(accessed January 2006).
913 Mitrea, 12 February 2004.
914 Laura Griesmer (Economic Attach^ o f the American Government in Romania) quoted in Iulia Roibu, 
‘Guvemul american, lobby pentru Bechtel’, Evenimentul Zilei, 13 February 2004.
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to agree being bound by the new procedures before the Commission would agree 
closing negotiations on the Transportation Chapter by the end of 2003.919
This commitment created an enormous difficulty for the Nastase government’s 
pursuing a contract with Bechtel. A year would have to pass from the opening of 
negotiations with Bechtel in July 2003 to the actual commencement of building in 
June 2004. A public tender would delay this timetable for a minimum of six more 
months, and maybe for as much longer as 18920 -  making it impossible to commence 
before the elections in November 2004. The PSD and UDMR’s expected electoral 
difficulties in Transylvania strongly motivated the Cabinet to look for ways of 
obviating the delay to be caused by a public tender. They had to wait, however, until 
after they had closed negotiations on the Transportation Chapter, and until after the
091EU Summit in December 2003. The awaited events happened on schedule: the
099Transportation Chapter was closed in December 2003, and the EU Summit that 
took place soon thereafter saw Romania given the concrete accession date of 2007, 
‘if ready’. This opened up a brief window of opportunity for the Cabinet to slip 
through. It was a narrow one, which would close before the end of 2004 when the 
public procurement acquis had to be fully transposed and the general elections faced. 
They had to shoot rather than amble through it.
The close of the Chapter and the EU Summit created an opportunity which on its 
own might not have sufficed to move the Executive to act. Further necessary was 
competence in the Executive to take it up, including especially the confidence to act.
919 Senior official (2), Delegation, interview, 2006.
920 Representative o f Transportation Ministry quoted in Iuliana Roibu, ‘Autostrada Bors-Brasov, construita de 
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At the Summit the member-States, for the first time, had given Romania and 
Bulgaria a concrete accession date. The sole condition that all acquis negotiations 
must be closed by 2004 seemed fulfilled by anticipation. Verheugen, the 
Enlargement Commissioner, had already hinted in May 2003 that this deadline 
would indeed be met.924 Where the EU had before spoken only of ‘support’, 
Verheugen had used the word ‘commitment’, echoing Romano Prodi, the 
Commission President, who had hinted much the same two weeks before. These 
acts of the EU made the Romanian Executive confident of accession. The Summit 
had boosted their confidence and their willingness to take risks; thereafter they 
proceed quickly and decisively.
In getting so close to membership, the Nastase government had benefited from the 
support of the Heads of many important EU member-States. By the end of 2002 the 
PSD government had secured ‘consistent’ and ‘strong support’ from Britain, Italy 
and Spain in particular.926 Driven by its self-interest in obstructing the creation of an 
EU superstate, Britain had from the beginning strongly supported enlargement to the
Q77 0 9 8East. Romania had unexpectedly ‘found in [Britain] a selfish, yet welcome ally’. 
Tony Blair ‘permanently supported’ Romania, and ‘kept all his promises and even 
more’.929 Indeed, it was his ‘bolt from the blue’ speech in 1999 that may well have 
moved the member-States to begin negotiating with Romania in 2000.930 (Blair also
923 Radio Free Europe, 14 December 2003.
924 EUbusiness.com, ‘Romania accession talks to end by October 2004 says EU’s Verheugen’, 2 May 2005.
925 Ibid.
926 Senior official, negotiations team, interview, 2006.
927 Dimitris Papadimitriou, Negotiating the New Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), p. 104-5.
928 Ibid. p. 111.
929 Tismaneanu and Mihaies, p. 260.
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supported Nastase in integrating the PSD into the Socialist International. ) Already 
by 1992 Spain had become a supporter of Romania; as had Italy, which had 
conceived a strategic interest in Romania’s accession. Italy’s support was driven by 
security fears for the closeness of the Balkans and by special economic interests in 
Romania, where Italy is one of the largest foreign direct investors. Language 
affinity and a shared Roman history also contributed to the mutual sympathy 
between the two countries.934 Berlusconi became Romania’s ‘most vocal 
champion’. Indeed, during the Italian Presidency of the Council, the Italian 
government imposed an end-of-2004 timetable for the close of all negotiations with 
Romania. These were indeed closed -  (‘under pressure’) -  just before the November
Q'3/'
2004 elections. Besides Britain, Spain and Italy, the Romanian government also 
enjoyed some support from France, although surprisingly, France proved to be a
0 ^ 7  Q ^omuch more ‘reluctant patron’ than the Romanians had hoped for. Although 
President Chirac had vehemently denounced Romania’s support for the US invasion 
of Iraq, he appeared to have put his anger aside by the end of 2003, when he 
‘publicly reverted to being a strong supporter of Romania’.939
Such alliances had been the result of years of intense bilateral diplomatic effort by 
the Romanian government on all levels. Romania’s negotiators themselves admitted 
that they learnt relatively late in the accession process that it was business as usual in 
Brussels for weaker countries to seek patrons amongst the more powerful member-
931 Radio Free Europe, ‘Romanian Premier Meets Blair’, RFE/RL Newsline, 9 November 2001, 
http://www.rferl.Org/newsline/2001/l 1/091101.asp (accessed March 2005).
932 Papadimitriou, p. 112.
933 Papadimitriou, p. 114.
934 Interview by the author with Arie Oostlander MEP, 11 April 2006.
935 Gallagher, Theft o f  a nation, p. 349.
936 Senior official (2), Delegation, interview, 2006.
937 Papadimitriou, 2002, p. 97.
938 Adviser for EU and NATO affairs, 31 October 2003.
939 Gallagher, Theft o f  a nation, p. 327.
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States. As a result Romania lost precious time at the beginning of the accession 
process for failure to realise the importance of patronage. Once they did realise it, 
although a bit tardily (sometime in 1999), the Romanians strove to make up lost 
ground by shifting from ‘poor diplomacy’ to ‘professional lobbying’ of EU member- 
States.940
Since coming to power, Nastase had also been building bridges to key players in the 
Commission and Parliament, creating ‘a powerful lobby in Brussels [that was] 
pleading for half-measures’.941 As an European Commission official put it: ‘They 
[the Nastase government] had lobbied at high levels and cemented good relations -  
never done what was necessary, but relied on good relations’.942 Several sources 
inside the Romanian Executive and the Commission have indicated that Verheugen 
was permissive toward the Nastase government,943 and that this was helped by the 
personal friendship Nastase had built with him.944 Outside political commentators 
also opined that, at least through 2003, Romania had been benefiting as well from a 
‘too permissive’ Foreign Affairs Committee in the European Parliament. The 
Committee’s Vice-President and rapporteur for Romania, Emma Nicholson, was 
sympathetic to the Nastase government, even at a personal level.945 All these 
relationships buoyed Nastase’s confidence to proceed with the motorway in the way 
he did. ‘They took the risk ... [because they] were too confident in the good relations 
they had with certain individuals in the EU, including our former Commissioner 
Verheugen’.946 Nastase was likely relying on these relationships to buffer him 
against any untoward consequences of the Bechtel contract.
940 Adviser for EU and NATO affairs, 31 October 2003.
941 Tom Gallagher, Radio Free Europe, 30 November 2004 (audio recording).
942 Senior official (2), Delegation, interview, 2006.
943 Interview by the author with Gelu Trandafir, BBC journalist, 24 February 2006.
944 Senior official (2), Delegation, interview, 2006; Mihalcioiu, email, 2006.
945 Nicolae Manolescu (Romanian Political Analyst), Analysis, Radio Free Europe, 5 February 2004 (audio).
946 Senior official (2), Delegation, interview, 2006.
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5.2.2 Executive discretion 
In planning how to commence the building of the motorway before the looming 
elections, the Nastase Cabinet utilised not only their domestic power resources but 
even the EU itself. They first drew on their Constitutional power to issue Emergency 
Ordinances and define matters of ‘national importance’. Then they utilised their 
prerogative of Government Decision to commit the State before creditors. Next, they 
exploited the vagueness and loopholes of the existing Romanian law of public 
procurement. Because they controlled Parliament, they were able to ram through 
nonce legislation exempting their negotiations with Bechtel from any public 
procurement rules. Finally, they used the EU discursively from the bottom up to 
justify their proceedings.
The Cabinet, interpreting what constituted ‘public safety and national security’ 
without consulting anyone else, classified the motorway as being one such project. 
This classification invoked one of the many exemptions from public tender provided 
in the Romanian law of public procurement. The exact reasons for classifying this 
Motorway were never made clear, and indeed, the law as written did not obligate the 
Cabinet to justify themselves. Miron Mitrea, the Transportation Minister, made no 
more than a few vague references to ‘regional security’, which the Motorway would 
allegedly promote.947 The right of the Executive to make such classifications without 
accountability is a weak point of Romania’s institutional framework that allows wide 
latitude for abuse. Apparently, it was the ‘usual practice’ under Nastase to overuse 
the ‘national security’ justification to shield projects from public scrutiny.948 Once
947 Transportation Ministry quoted in Roibu, 16 December 2003.
948 Ionita, email, 2006.
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they had classified the motorway, the details of the contract could be concealed 
behind a veil of secrecy.
In making the contract a State secret, the Cabinet had found the legal technicality -  
the Executive power to decree -  that allowed them to circumvent all existing public 
procurement procedures. This power of decree comprises Emergency Ordinances 
and Government Decisions. Emergency Ordinances have the effect of laws, and 
although they have to be debated and approved by Parliament eventually, they take 
effect in the meanwhile. The Executive’s power to issue such Ordinances is 
contained in Art 115(4) of the Romanian Constitution, which provides that the 
Government may adopt Emergency Ordinances only in ‘exceptional cases’.949 What 
constitutes an exceptional case is left up to an undefined discretion. Government 
Decisions, on the other hand, are commands of the Executive addressed to other 
executive organs of the State, which need not to be approved by Parliament. 
Legislation by Executive decree has been commonly practiced by all Romanian 
governments since 1989, leading many observers to claim that is has been abused. It 
is a particularly powerful tool when the Executive controls Parliament. Even organic 
laws have been amended by Ordinance, notwithstanding the Constitution provides 
that organic law may be amended only by Parliament. By reason of such abuses the 
European Commission during the acquis negotiations endeavoured unsuccessfully to 
constrain the Executive’s resort to decrees. When in June 2003 the Romanian 
Constitution was amended, this loophole was purportedly narrowed, although in 
practice it continued to be exploitable and exploited.
On the 27th November 2003 the Cabinet issued Emergency Ordinance 120/2003, 
mandating that negotiations over a Transylvanian Motorway shall be carried on only
949 Constitution o f Romania (amended 2003).
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with Bechtel International Inc.950 The Ordinance exempted the negotiations from the 
public tender proceedings mandated under Romania’s domestic public procurement 
law (Emergency Ordinance 60/2001, as modified and approved by Parliamentary Act 
212/2002), which was not, at that time, fully harmonised with the acquis. Two days 
later (29th November 2003) the Cabinet issued Government Decision 1362/2003 
directing the Transportation Ministry to ‘contract external credit’ of €2.8 billion for 
building the Motorway. The Public Finance Ministry was directed to guarantee the 
credit 100%, as well as insurance premiums, interest rates, charges and other related 
costs necessary to the execution of the contract.951 Four weeks later, on 18th 
December, Government Decision 1513/2003 directed the regie for national roads to 
sign with Bechtel. It further directed the Transportation Ministry to expedite the 
permitting and thus the commencement of the works, and to pay customs duties on 
all equipment and machinery imported by Bechtel from the US 953 In practice, the 
latter directive meant that Bechtel would be exempt from custom duties, an important 
exemption for any company, and which in fact breaches the free market competition 
principle -  thus constituting State aid.954
In the period of the Parliamentary review of the Emergency Ordinance, before the 
contract had been finalised, almost no MPs had risen to challenge this exemption of 
the negotiations with Bechtel. Those who did stood no chance, given the Social 
Democrat-UDMR coalition’s control of Parliament. But even had the Executive not
950 Romanian Government, ‘Emergency Ordinance 120/2003’, Official Journal, 27 November 2003, no. 846. 
http://www.autostradatransilvania.ro/www/files/mo/MQ846.pdf
951 Romanian Government, ‘Hotarare privind aprobarea contractarii de catre Ministerul Transporturilor, 
Constructiilor si Turismului a unor credite exteme, garantate de catre Ministerul Finantelor Publice, destinate 
realizarii Autostrazii Brasov-Cluj-Bors’, Official Journal, 29 November 2003, no. 851, 
http://www.autostradatransilvania.ro/www/files/mo/MQ851.pdf.
952 Romanian Government, ‘Hotarare No. 1513 priving mandatarea Companiei Nationale de Autostrazi si 
Drumuri Nationale din Romania -  S. A. sa semneze Contractul de proiectare si construire a autostrazii Brasov- 
Cluj-Bors’, Official Journal, 19 December 2003, no 912,
http://www.autostradatransi lvania.ro/www/fi les/mo/MQ912.pdf.
953 Ibid.
954 Email communication by the author with Radu Mititean, 1 November 2006.
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controlled Parliament, it is unlikely that the Ordinance would have been vetoed, so 
broad was support for the Motorway across all political parties. Parliament did 
nothing to investigate the facts, swallowing whole the Executive’s claim that Bechtel 
would handle the finances. The Cabinet’s Notice of Grounds (justification for the 
Ordinance) clearly implied this: Bechtel would ‘mobilise ... financial resources’, as 
they had for a similar motorway in Croatia; Bechtel would ‘work together’ with the 
Romanian government to ‘ensure the necessary finance’.955 In the end this was not to 
happen, and Romania was ‘left in the lurch’ to finance the Motorway alone.
The few MPs who did challenge the Executive -  only about 20 from the Greater 
Romania Party -  deployed the EU discursively to try and buttress their otherwise 
poorly argued position. Notwithstanding that they probably did not genuinely believe 
the exemption would delay Romania’s accession, these MPs found it advantageous 
to posit accession conditionality as their standard of accountability. Constantin Biciu, 
MP from the Greater Romania Party, for example, warned that the Ordinance would 
constitute ‘a blot, probably the decisive one, against the EU’s granting Romania the 
status of a “functioning market economy’” ,956 a status that had been denied to 
Romania the year before, in 2002. The Cabinet’s disregard for the principle of 
market competition, the MPs denounced, proved that they were only paying lip- 
service to EU principles.
tliThe contract was signed on the 19 December 2003. The Motorway was to start in
955 Romanian Government, ‘Notice o f Grounds for Emergency Ordinance no. 120/18-11-2003 pentru aprobarea 
demar&rii de c&tre Compania Nationals de Autostr&zi §i Drumuri Nationale din Romania - S.A. a procedurii de 
negociere cu o singurS sursi cu firma Bechtel International Inc., !n vederea incheierii contractului de proiectare, 
construire §i finantare a autostrazii Bra§ov - Cluj -  Bor§’, Official Journal M.Of. nr. 846/27-11-2003 
http://www.guv.ro/notefundam/afis-nota.php?id=419.
956 Constantin Biciu (Greater Romania Party MP), ‘Intervention during Parliamentary debates over the 
Emergency Ordinance 120/2003 approving the start o f negotiations between the National Company on 
Motorways and National Roads and only Bechtel’, Chamber o f Deputies, Romanian Parliament, 17 December 
2003.
957 Ibid. -
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the centre of Romania, northwest of Brasov, and end in Bors, a town on the border 
with Hungary. It would traverse the whole of Transylvania from southeast to 
northwest, a distance of 415-kilometres.958 Its southern-most terminus would connect 
to the Brasov-Bucharest motorway which also began to be upgraded in 2004. The 
segments linking the Hungarian community in Romania to Hungary proper were 
expected to be completed by 2008, and the rest by 2012.959
The contract was thus ‘signed, sealed and delivered’ before the full Parliament had a 
chance to ratify the Ordinance, which only happened in March 2004. In February 
2004, when the debate in Parliament heated up following Brussels’ critical reaction, 
the challengers were still few, except that now the leadership of the Liberal and 
Democratic Parties joined in. Imitating Brussels, they opposed not so much the 
Motorway itself as the circumvention of public tender proceedings. Other than this, 
however, Nastase held onto strong cross-party support for the Motorway. To 
outsiders, the political class appeared to have ‘acted as one’ in approving the
„  • . 960project.
Thus, a few power-brokers in the Cabinet, acting essentially at their own discretion, 
committed the Romanian State to repaying a loan of more than €2.8 billion, with 
interest. The Executive’s acts, far-reaching though they were, drew surprisingly little 
domestic public attention before the intervention of Brussels. But for the rarest of 
exceptions, the decision passed unremarked by civil society watchdogs and by the 
media.961 Even major broadsheets like Evenimentul Zilei or Romania Libera reported 
perfunctorily the content of the legal instruments by which the contract had been let,
958 The Transylvania Motorway web site, www.autostradatransilvania.ro (accessed June 2004).
959 Amariei, Deals Without Tenders.
960 Email communication with Alex Gota, former leader o f Sustainable Sighisoara, 24 January 2006.
961 Interview by the author with Bogdan Chiritoiu (Presidential Councillor to Basescu), 15 March 2005; Mititean, 
interview, 10 May 2006.
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merely listing the government’s arguments without inquiring into their motives or the 
contract’s consequences. This passivity is surprising, given that the Nastase 
Cabinet had just let -  to a foreign company, under the most opaque circumstances -  
the biggest contract in Romania’s history, for which Romanian taxpayers must foot 
the bill for years to come.
In a festive atmosphere regaled by the music of Vivaldi, Nastase himself inaugurated 
the Transylvania Motorway on the 15th June 2004. The ceremony was held close to 
Cluj in Transylvania rather than in Brasov to the south, though the latter would have 
been much easier to reach from Bucharest and was one of the Motorway’s terminus 
points. The inauguration was timed only two weeks before the local elections of 
2004. In Cluj these were expected to be tightly contested between the PSD and the 
Liberal-Democrat Alliance. The inauguration was obviously intended to bolster 
the PSD candidate in Cluj.964 Nastase’s gesture was also interpreted as intended to 
symbolise the PSD’s concern for the Hungarian minority and perhaps their 
rapprochement with the Hungarian government.965 Indeed, once the contract became 
controversial within the EU, the Hungarian government proved more favourable to 
the motorway than other EU actors,966 reflecting Hungary’s mutual interest in linking 
up with Romania.
5.2.3 The EU deployed against the EU 
Despite all their plenary domestic powers, the Cabinet nevertheless felt the need to 
justify themselves by reference to an EU framework. Their justificatory discourse to
962 Miron Mitrea (Transportation Minister for Romania, 2000-2004) quoted in Evenimentul Zilei. 17 Decembrie 
2003; Representative o f Transportation Ministry quoted in Roibu, 16 December 2003.
963 M.P. ‘Boc si Funar fara atestate’, Evenimentul Zilei Online, 15 June 2004; Elena Toporcea, ‘Vivaldi 
acompaniaza primele excavatii pentru magistrala Brasov -  Bors Adrian Nastase: Autostrada Transilvania va fi 
legatura Romaniei cu Uniunea Europeana’, Curierul National, 17 June 2004. 
http://www.curierulnational.ro/?page=articol&editie=549&art=40521 (accessed January 2006).
964 Boian, email, 2006.
965 DG Enlargement, interview, 2006.
966 Ibid.
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Parliament conflated references to Europe with references to the Atlantic Alliance, 
and to Romania’s need to modernise and to achieve a growth economy:
Romania belongs de facto in the family of European countries, and is 
committed to integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures.
In this context modernisation of the system of motorways and national 
roads is an extremely important condition imposed by international 
bodies, and which has to be met, given the necessity of integrating 
Romania into the Euro-Atlantic structures ... The project of building a 
motorway between Bucharest and Budapest will constitute a first step 
toward physically connecting our country to the space dominated by 
NATO and the European Union, a space within which we play an 
important political and economic role.96
In this the Executive was appealing to the national pride and sentiment of Romanians 
who like to identify themselves with civilised Europe rather than with anywhere else 
(i.e. ‘the Balkans’, where Romania is often placed, much to Romanians’ displeasure). 
On another occasion the Prime Minister even argued that the Motorway was ‘an
Q/O
obligation of Romania toward the European Union’. These claims constituted the 
Nastase government’s interpretation of Romania’s priorities in the context of 
accession, though they were in fact contrary to what had been agreed with the 
Commission to be Romania’s priorities in the field of transportation.
The Cabinet’s justificatory discourses also referenced the European development 
banks, claiming vaguely that the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) had promised 
Romania ‘development credit’, which would be lost if not taken up quickly (hence 
the need to proceed by Emergency Ordinance)969. Whether this development credit 
applied specifically to the motorway was strategically passed over in silence and left
967 Romanian Parliament, Exposal o f  Reasons, 2004. http://www.cdep.rO/proiecte/2003/700/50/2/em752.Ddf 
(Accessed December 2004).
968 Press release o f the Romanian Transportation Ministry quoted on Radio Free Europe, 20 Feb 2004.
969 Representative o f Transportation Ministty quoted in Roibu, 16 December 2003.
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to the audience’s imagination.970 It was later revealed that the government had indeed 
tried to obtain low-interest rate loans from these banks, but were refused because
071they had let the contract without public tender.
The Cabinet’s discourses generally reflected a Homo economicus view of the EU. 
They also urged that Romania, the seventh largest country in Europe, should not 
enter the EU with a mere 150 kilometres of motorways built by Ceausescu in the 
1960s.972 In addition to the humiliation to Romania, it would also be too 
disadvantageous a position from which to profit from trade within the Single 
Market.973
Interestingly, the Cabinet’s justificatory discourses before Parliament also referred to 
EU member-States who had allegedly breached EU public procurement rules. Miron 
Mitrea, the Transportation Minister admitted, for example, that the Cabinet had 
inquired into the ways and means that other EU candidate countries and member- 
States utilise to get around the EU public procurement procedure. The lesson drawn 
had been that not only new EU member-States, like Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Slovenia, but even old and reputable ones like France and Germany had 
breached the procurement rules, granting contracts through nonce legislation.974 By 
deploying examples of worst practice in their discourses, the Executive was trying to 
empower themselves relative to their (few) domestic challengers.
970 Miron Mitrea quoted in Evenimentul Zilei, 17 Decembrie 2003.
971 Senior official (1), Delegation, interview, 26 June 2006.
972 Adrian Nastase (Prime Minister o f Romania, 2000-2004) interviewed by Mihnea Berindei and Arielle Thedrel, 
‘For a Modem Romania: Interview with Adrian Nastase’, Revista 22, December 2004, no. 770.
973 Eckstein Kovdcs-Pdter (UDMR MP), Sittings o f the Senate, Romanian Parliament, 17 December 2003.
974 Mitrea, Repy to Questions, 12 February 2004.
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5. 3 The endgame
Alerted by Romanian civil society and by the Commission Delegation in Bucharest, 
the supranational organs intervened to constrain the Romanian Executive. The 
Bechtel contract was conflated with other scandals involving high-level corruption, 
triggering an uproar in Brussels in February 2004. This brought Romania closer than 
any other accession country has ever come to having its accession negotiations with 
the EU suspended.975
5.3.1 The European Parliament calls for suspension of negotiations 
The controversy began in January 2004 with the submission to the European 
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee of a routine report on Romania’s progress 
towards accession. This had had been prepared by British Liberal MEP Emma 
Nicholson, the Committee’s rapporteur for Romania. It was Arie Oostlander, a 
Dutch Christian Democrat MEP, who first drew the ‘political conclusion’ from
076Nicholson’s report. Citing Romania’s breach of the moratorium on international 
child adoptions, imposed by the EU in 2001, and ‘orphan children’s catastrophical 
situation’, he censured Romania’s ‘frightening corruption’ and denounced it ‘a State
Q77without the rule of law’. Oostlander demanded that ‘negotiations with Romania 
are stopped so as to allow concentration [of effort] on remedying its most 
fundamental problems’.978 On 4 February Nicholson chimed in with Oostlander, 
adding that Romania must have a ‘genuinely independent’ and ‘impartial’ judicial 
system.979 She called for immediate implementation of the transposed acquis:
975 Heather Grabbe quoted in Eugen Tomiuc, ‘Romania: Brussels’ Tough Stance Sends Clear Signal to Other EU 
Hopefuls’, Radio Free Europe, 5 February 2004.
976 Interview by the author with Arie Oostlander MEP. 11 April 2006.
977 Arie Oostlander, quoted in Simona Gheorghe, Gelu Trandafir and Ovidiu Nahoi, ‘Guvemul Nastase, in corzi’ 
Evenimentul Zilei, 6 February 2004.
978 Ibid.
979 Radio Free Europe, 4 February 2004.
217
‘Integration means new laws and these cannot remain on books with nothing 
happening’.980 If these were not remedied, Nicholson threatened, there was ‘a serious
QO 1
possibility’ that the EP might ‘recommend the freezing of accession negotiations’. 
Nicholson claimed that she ‘had proofs’ to support her accusations, but declined to
QO^
make them public to avoid provoking a ‘massive storm’. Nicholson and 
Oostlander reiterated their demands for suspension when the Foreign Affairs
Q O 'l
Committee met on 17 February.
Two days later the Committee voted for a toned-down report. Under pressure from 
the Socialist Deputies on the Committee, the call for suspension was replaced by the 
more conciliatory language of ‘reprogramming’ and, in its final form, ‘reorientation 
of the accession strategy’.984 Besides the Socialists, British and Italian Conservative
Q Q C
MEPs (the Tones and Forza Italia) also insisted on watering down the language. 
Nastase’s bridge-building, not only to the Heads of powerful member-States but also
Q O /'
to his ideological confreres inside the EU organs, had thus proved its worth. The 
Committee singled out the Bechtel contract in its report, after certain member-States 
and European companies, sensitised by their exclusion from the re-building of Iraq, 
signalled their anxiety over being excluded from building contracts in Eastern 
Europe. There was also a fear that Bechtel might profit from EU funds earmarked
Q Q O
for public infrastructure in Romania. The Committee requested the Commission to
980 Emma Nicholson quoted by Sabina Fatti, Radio Free Europe, 9 Feb 2004.
981 Radio Free Europe, 4 February 2004; Nicholson, quoted in Gheorghe, Trandafir and Nahoi, 6 February 2004.
982 Radio Free Europe, 12 March 2004.
983 Ziua, ‘Tunurile Uniunii Europene’, 6 February 2004.
984 Dan Alexe, Radio Free Europe, 18 February 2004.
985 Oostlander interview, 11 April 2004.
986 Tismaneanu and Mihaies, p. 165.
987 Dan Alexe, Radio Free Europe, 20 February 2004.
988 Ibid.
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investigate the conditions under which the contract had been let, and to report 
back.989
Notwithstanding the Committee’s tone-down, Nicholson and Oostlander considered 
their mission accomplished.990 The MEPs had intended their strong language (like 
‘suspension’) as ‘an alarm signal for Romanian politicians’.991 Oostlander had also 
hoped that his comments would be heard in Romania and wake the public up to the 
government’s misconduct.992 Once these goals had been accomplished, they agreed a 
softer stance with less threatening language.993 Indeed, Oostlander himself was 
‘amazed’ at the effect his and Nicholson’s criticisms had on Nastase and his Cabinet, 
who reacted with great promptitude to the report.994
The day after it was published, Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister Mircea Geoana 
flew to Brussels to breakfast with Nicholson and Oostlander and sound them out995 
Nastase himself soon followed, meeting with the President of the European 
Parliament and with Verheugen, and presenting a plan of action with deadlines: a 
new Penal Code; a reform of the judiciary to eliminate any possibility of intervention 
by a Minister; and a draft bill on adoptions to be submitted to the Romanian 
Parliament by 15 March.996 This was to tighten adoption procedures so much that 
international adoptions became all but impossible in practice.997 Nastase himself 
ordered the Romanian National Anti-Corruption Department to investigate all
989 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defense Policy, 
Raport on Romania’s progress towards accession, 24th February 2004, (COM (2003) 676 - C5-0534/2003 - 
2003/2203(INI)), http://www.urr.ro/en/documents/officials/nicholson/nicholson.shtml: and BBC Romanian, 
‘Presedintele Iliescu sustine ca parlamentarii europeni nu au dreptate in cazul Bechtel’, 11 March 2004.
990 Arie Oostlander interviewed by Radio Free Europe, 24 February 2004.
991 Ibid.
992 Ibid.
993 Ibid.
994 Oostlander, interview, 11 April 2006.
995 Ibid.
996 Nicolae Manolescu, Radio Free Europe, 26 February 2006.
997 Senior official, Negotiatons team, interview, 2006.
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international adoptions in Romania over the previous 10 years.998 Nastase ‘pulled out 
all the stops’, enlisting the efforts of all Romanian political parties. At his behest, 
even members of the opposition Liberal Party lobbied their counterparts in the EP.999 
To top it all, he reshuffled his Justice Minister with such alacrity that when a Turkish 
minister arrived in Bucharest for meetings with his counterpart, he was surprised to 
find that the latter had been removed since his departure from Turkey.1000
There is thus a striking contrast between this solicitude for all of Brussels’ other 
concerns, and the cavalier way the Nastase government dismissed criticism of the 
Bechtel contract. Nastase and his Cabinet firmly dug in their heels over Bechtel, 
going so far as to counterattack Brussels in public. The Romanian Transportation 
Ministry, for example, responding rather tartly to the EP Foreign Affairs Committee, 
insisted that the contract conformed to the Romanian law of public procurement and 
had been approved in Parliament by special enactment.1001 Nastase himself retorted 
to the media that Brussels should ‘mind its own business’, as the Romanian State 
was paying for the Motorway.1002 He also implicitly criticised Brussels’ tardiness in 
coming to Romania’s aid: ‘We have had a lot of promises, but to be frank nothing 
has moved very fa s t... Romania cannot wait for decades and decades for projects to 
begin’.1003 Vasile Puscas, the Chief Negotiator with the EU, similarly cited in 
justification the ten years’ procrastination of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in 
financing Romania’s transportation infrastructure.1004 Deploying inter-
998 Radio Free Europe Newsline, 6 February 2004, vol.8, no. 24.
999 Sabina Fatti, Radio Free Europe, 5 February 2006.
1000 Oostlander, interview, 11 April 2006; Sabina Fatti, Radio Free Europe, 10 February 2006.
1001 Vasile Puscas (Chief Negotiator for Romania) paraphrased in Ana-Maria Cadis, ‘Vasile Puscas crede ca 
negocierile cu UE nu vor fi suspendate’, Evenimentul Zilei, 7 Februarie 2004.
1002 Adrian Nastase (PM Romania) paraphrased in Iuliana Roibu and Alina Voaides. ‘Moftul lui Nastase ne costa 
2.500.000.000 dolari’ Evenimentul Zilei, 7 Februarie 2004.
1003 Adrian Nastase (PM Romania) quoted in ‘Romania says it is committed to the US$2.5 billion Bechtel deal’, 
Reuters, 12 February 2004.
1004 Ana-Maria Cadis, Vasile Puscas crede ca negocierile.
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govemmentalism against supranationalism, Puscas reminded Brussels that the 
European Council in December 2003 had already decided to support Romania in 
closing negotiations by the end of 2004.1005 For his part, President Ion Iliescu called 
the EU criticism ‘unfair’, given that European firms had already received from 
Romania many motorway-building contracts.1006
Thus, the most powerful Romanian politicians did not defer to Brussels over the 
Bechtel contract, and, unlike their responses regarding international adoptions, they 
deployed an alternative construction of Europe to justify themselves before Brussels. 
They refocused the debate in Brussels and in Bucharest away from the misfit 
between EU and Romanian norms and values and onto Romanians’ shared 
understanding of the EU as an engine of economic development for Romania. 
Romania needed motorways to take advantage of the new world of opportunity 
opened up by accession, and the EU should be helping rather than hindering this. 
They cunningly deployed the EU’s own institutional weakness -  the slowness of its 
decisional procedures -  which they converted into a legitimising opportunity.
In the event, the European Parliament avoided making a big issue out of the Bechtel 
contract, although it had been responsible for starting the controversy. Mention of the 
Bechtel contract was in the end excluded from the March 2004 Plenary’s overall 
favourable report on Romania.1007 The Parliament preferred to focus instead on more 
general, endemic problems of Romania which had concerned them throughout the 
acquis negotiations. The relatively low profile the EP gave to the Bechtel contract in 
the controversy may to some extent be explained by the EU’s culture of consensus as
1005 Dan Alexe, Romanian Political Analyst, Radio Free Europe,_5 February 2004.
1006 BBC Romanian, ‘Presedintele Iliescu sustine ca parlamentarii europeni nu au dreptate in cazul Bechtel’, 11 
March 2004.
1007 EurActive, ‘MEPs to vote on controversial reports on Romania’, 19 February 2004..
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manifested through the general policy of avoiding criticism of individual countries 
on individual issues.1008 More important, however, must have been the Council’s 
decision to admit Romania into the EU by 2007, a decision which most MEPs 
supported.
5.3.2 The Commission denies funding for the motorway 
The Commission took a tougher line on the Bechtel contract than the EP, probably 
because they had more tools for sanctioning the Nastase government. Throughout the 
acquis negotiations, the Commission had treated compliance with domestic and EU 
public procurement law as a proxy for progress in ‘the fight against corruption’.1009 
Public money has been a major temptation for Romanian politicians, and public 
procurement is the State practice most susceptible to diversion of public funds.1010 
For these reasons DG Enlargement insisted that the Nastase government comply with 
EU public procurement rules -  transparency and a fair and competitive public tender 
-  for all large infrastructure projects, even before transposition of the public 
procurement acquis had been completed.1011 It was on this condition that the 
Commission had closed negotiations on the Transportation Chapter in December 
2003.1012
Following Oostlander and Nicholson’s criticisms, on the 4th February 2004 Guenter 
Verheugen, the Enlargement Commissioner, wrote ‘a firm letter’ to Nastase asking 
him to clarify why the contract had not been let in pursuance of the agreed rules.1013 
Civil servants in the Commission began to doubt that the Romanian government
1008 Oostlander, interview, 11 April 2006.
1009 European Commission, Regular Report on Romania (Brussels, 2001), p. 95.
1010 Freedom House, ‘The Anticorruption Policy o f the Romanian Government Assessment Report’.
(Washington, D.C: Freedom House, 2004).
1011 DG Enlargement, interview, 2006.
10,2 Ibid.
1013 Ibid.
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understood the principles underlying the law they had circumvented.1014 They feared 
that the Romanian government neither appreciated how the EU operates nor 
respected its values.1015 Before the Bechtel contract, they had come to believe that 
Romania was willing to assume EU norms, not merely out of fear of sanction but out 
of a genuine allegiance to them.1016 The ‘mutual trust’ that had been built up between 
the two parties, leading the Commission to believe that Romania would abide by her 
negotiated commitments, had been dashed.1017 So prompt a circumvention of the EU 
law of public procurement suggested that no fundamental change in the values of the 
Nastase government had taken place.
But the Commission did not object only to the lack of public tender. It also objected 
to the fact that this motorway was to be built parallel to TEN Corridor IV and prior to 
it. The Transylvanian Motorway was ‘inconsistent’ with ‘the outline of the road 
network agreed during the negotiations’.1018 And because Romania’s depleted 
treasury had been made liable for Corridor IV and the Transylvanian Motorway at 
once,1019 the Commission apprehended that Romania had forfeited her fiscal capacity 
to prioritise TEN. Financing the Bechtel contract would likely limit her capacity to 
co-finance infrastructure under the Cohesion and Structural Funds;1020 thus, the 
Nastase government’s decision had given de facto priority to the Transylvanian 
Motorway.
Although the Commission had no right to cancel the contract, they felt that the letting
10.4 ibid.
10.5 ibid.
10.6 ibid.
10.7 ibid.
1018 European Commission, 2004 Regular Report on Romania's progress towards accession, (Brussels, 2004), 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report 2004/pdf7rr ro 2004 en.pdf>. p. 83.
1019 Senior official (1), Delegation, interview, 26 June 2006.
1020 European Commission, 2004 Regular Report, p. 83.
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of it must be sanctioned somehow to deter a repeat.1021 At this juncture, they could 
have chosen to reopen the negotiations on Transportation; and, in fact, they came
1099very close to taking this step. This would have precluded the close of all acquis 
negotiations by the end of 2004, sending an ‘extremely negative political signal’ to 
the EU as a whole about Romania’s accession-worthiness.1023 It was an outcome the 
Romanian government would have avoided at all costs;1024 a delay in closing acquis 
negotiations might well have devastated the Nastase government in the upcoming 
elections. As a comparative example of what might have happened, the 
Commission’s deployment of EU conditionality played a major role in ousting 
Slovakian PM Meciar from power in 1998.1025 Nastase would have had very good 
reason to fear for his own re-election.
Verheugen’s letter was followed by a ‘very detailed evaluation’ by DG Enlargement 
of the impact of the Bechtel contract on the political and economic accession criteria 
and on several chapters of the acquis,1026 Nastase was also asked to assess the 
project’s consequences for the Romanian budget.1027 Because the Commission itself 
was constrained by the fact that the contract had already been signed, they had to 
content themselves with ‘clarifying and correcting’ it by making an issue out of it in
1 0 9 8the still ongoing negotiations on Chapter 21 on Regional Policy. The Commission 
took steps to ensure that no Cohesion Funds could ever be spent on the Motorway or 
anything connected with it.1029 Thereafter, the Commission took ‘all the security
1021 Senior official (1), Delegation, interview, 26 June 2006.
1022 Senior official, Negotiatons team, interview, 2006.
1023 Ibid.
1024 Senior official (1), Delegation, interview, 26 June 2006.
1025 Marek Ryb&f and Darina Malov£, ‘Exerting influence on a contentious polity: the European Union’s 
democratic conditionality and political change in Slovakia’ in Antoaneta L. Dimitrova Driven to Change. The 
European Union's Enlargement Viewed from the East ’ (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).
1026 Senior official, Negotiatons team, interview, 2006.
1027 European Commission. 2004. Letter to Terra Milleniul III, 27 May 2004, ENLARG B3(2004)102078.
1028 Senior official, Negotiatons team, interview, 2006.
1029 Ibid.
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measures they could’ to forestall any repeats, and kept the issue of public 
procurement high on their negotiating agenda as a way of deterring the Romanian 
government.1030
The Commission thus settled on sanctioning Romania by taking an uncooperative 
stance toward the project’s realisation. Both the Nastase and the successor Tariceanu 
governments petitioned the EU several times to help them finance at least some of 
the infrastructure peripheral to the Motorway.1031 Each time they were refused: 
‘Since there was no tendering, the European Commission ... will not be able to 
provide any financial support for this project. Furthermore, the European 
Commission will not be in a position to support any financing by the European 
Investment Bank or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for the 
construction of the highway’.1032 In fine, the contract with Bechtel has been said to 
have ‘backfired’ on the Romanian government, which has had to struggle to ‘live up 
to it’ ever since. The promises about Bechtel bringing finance never materialised, 
EXIMBANK only guaranteeing about a third of the contract price and only for the 
first four years.1034 The heaviness of the burden is evidenced by the fact that in 2005 
Tariceanu spent six months renegotiating with Bechtel, just in order to obtain a 5% 
reduction (or €126 million) in the contract price.1035 Ultimately, the necessity for 
such a renegotiation has stemmed from Brussels’ ‘profound irritation’ over this and 
similar contracts.1036
1030 Ibid.
1031 DG Enlargement, interview, 2006.
1032 European Commission, Letter to Terra.
1033 Senior official (2), Delegation, interview, 2006.
1034 Sorin Ovidiu Bota (Secretary o f State, Transportation Ministry), Parliamentary Debates. Sittings o f the 
Chamber o f Deputies, 10 February 2004.
1035 Mihai Nicut, Mihaela Radu, ‘Banii de pe BCR se due la Bechtel’, Cotidianul, 31 January 2006. 
<http://cotidianul.ro/index.php?id=3853&art=8787&cHash=lbc77e55f7> .
1036 Calin Popescu Tariceanu (PM Romania 2004 - )  quoted in Adevarul, ‘Guvemul va cere verificari in cazul 
contractelor Bechtel, Vinci si EADS’, 14 Januaiy 2005.
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As of 2006 it remained unclear whether Romania would be able to afford the 
Transylvanian Motorway.1037 The burden can only become heavier when in the near 
future Romania will have to meet its obligations to co-finance the TEN Corridors. 
Under the Cohesion Fund Romania will receive after accession only about 40-50% 
of what Corridor IV will cost.1038 This will be insufficient to cover all of her 
infrastructure commitments. By interdicting ‘free or cheap money’ from the 
development Banks, the Commission has constrained the Nastase government to 
finance the project alone,1039 forcing it to borrow from more expensive commercial 
lenders.1040
It follows that, despite appearances, the Commission actually constrained the 
Executive more in the Motorway case than in any of the other cases studied herein. 
And yet, this greater constraint was not as heavy as it would have been had 
negotiations been re-opened. Brussels’ discreetness in handling the Motorway affair 
-  publicising it sparingly and conflating it with the issues of adoptions and corruption 
in general -  and the moderate sanction show a degree of lenience toward the 
Romanian Executive. This was driven by the political branch of the Commission, to 
the disappointment of the career civil servants, who seem to have preferred a tougher 
stance.1041 The Commission’s restraint was likely driven by Verheugen, who had the 
final say-so on Romania.1042 Sources inside both the Romanian Executive and the 
Commission have indicated that Nastase was able to rely on the personal friendship 
which he had forged with Verheugen to escape the worst consequences.1043 A senior 
member of the Romanian negotiating team said as much: ‘ [Verheugen’s relation with
1037 DG Enlargement, interview, 2006.
1038 Senior official, negotiations team, interview, 2006.
1039 DG Enlargement, interview, 2006.
1040 Senior official (1), Delegation, interview, 26 June 2006.
1041 DG Enlargement, interview, 2006; Senior official (2), Delegation, interview, 2006.
1042 Dan Alexe, Radio Free Europe, 23 February 2004.
1043 Senior official (2), Delegation, interview, 2006; Senior official, Negotiatons team, interview, 2006.
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Nastase] was a good relationship and personal relationships in international affairs 
and in diplomacy matter in processes o f this kin<f.mA
And yet other motives were surely involved. The Commission’s reluctance to set 
back the accession timetable given to Romania by the President of the Council may 
be explained as well by its desire to avoid fracturing the culture of consensus in 
Brussels upon which so much of the EU’s operation relies. The Commission may 
also have preferred to avoid clashing with EU member-States, some of whom 
(including Romania’s patrons) have been known to circumvent public procurement 
rules from time to time. If the Transportation Minister’s declarations before the 
Romanian Parliament are to be believed, not only France and Germany but also 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia have all granted contracts 
without public tender. Just like Romania, they have enacted nonce legislation that 
circumvented EU public procurement law, thus confronting the Commission with a 
fa it accompli in the form of building works that in practice can hardly be unbuilt.1045 
Should the Commission have taken too aggressive a stance against Romania, this 
might in the fullness of time oblige them to proceed as strongly against EU member- 
States, with ill consequences for all parties concerned.
The Commission’s chosen course of action proved little successful, however, in 
reining-in the Nastase government’s subsequent public procurement conduct. The 
Commission was undermined by the member-States themselves. Powerful Heads of 
State were prepared to tolerate, even condone, discretionary infrastructure contracts, 
provided Nastase was prepared to let such contracts quid pro quo to companies 
headquartered in the same member-States. This was part of Nastase’s shrewd
1044 Mihalcioiu, email, 2006.
1045 Mitrea, 12 Februaiy 2004.
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strategy of cultivating powerful patrons. Observers of Romanian politics have noted 
Nastase’s strategic alliances, concluding that many contracts let under his tenure 
were based not on business reasoning, but on the political logic of bridge-building to 
governments in the EU, as well as to the US.1046 Apparently Nastase tried hard ‘not 
to take sides’, but to please all of his friends and ‘keep them on his side’ by fairly 
distributing ‘presents’ to them: -  ‘one present for the Americans and one present for 
the Europeans’.1047
For example, just a few months later, in August 2004, Nastase let a €650 million 
contract to the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) to 
securitise Romania’s borders, without a public tender.1048 This time he did not even 
pass nonce legislation to legitimise the contract; he simply ‘abused the existing law’ 
by making recourse to ‘national security’.1049 (Such an exception is permissible 
under EU rules, but its interpretation in the European Court has always been 
extremely restrictive. Its use in the EADS case would not have been allowed).1050
The EADS contract was allegedly intended to cement his friendship with German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroder.1051 (According to the Romanian media, the contract 
allegedly benefited Bodo Hombach, a former Councillor in Schroder’s government 
and the manager of the German Social Democrat Party’s electoral campaign.)1052 The 
contract was signed in the presence of the Chancellor just one month before the 
publication of the Commission’s 2004 Regular Report on Romania, and only a few
1046 Senior official (1), Delegation, interview, 26 June 2006; Chiritoiu, interview, 2005.
1047 Senior official (1), Delegation, interview, 26 June 2006.
1048 Jumalul National, ‘450 de zile pierdute’, 8 March 2006, 
http://stiri.rol.ro/stiri/2006/03/45Q de zile pierdute.htm
1049 Senior official (1), Delegation, interview, 26 June 2006.
1050 Senior official (1), Delegation, email communication, 26 November 2006.
1051 Cotidianul, ‘Afacerea frontiera trece granitele. Comisioane: Firma EADS a primit contracte in cadrul Pactului 
de stabilitate’, 16 September 2004; Ovidiu Simonca, ‘Cum poti sa compromiti o vizita a cancelarului Germaniei’, 
Revista 22, December 2004, no. 755.
1052 Cotidianul, Afacerea frontiera.
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months before the close of all accession negotiations.1053 The implication was that 
the German leader condoned Nastase’s behaviour, which surely undermined the 
Commission’s leverage over the Romanian government. Indeed, a Commission 
official admitted that Schroder’s involvement had put the Commission in ‘an even 
more delicate situation’ than in the Bechtel contract, because ‘European companies 
and governments were informed and even involved’.1054 The Romanian Executive 
was thus in a position to ‘turn around and ask “why are you not criticising this one 
too if you criticised the one with Bechtel?”’.1055 Possibly for the same reason -  
cementing friendships -  Nastase circumvented public tender yet again a few months 
after the Bechtel controversy, contracting with French companies such as Airbus for 
airliners and Vinci Construction for a segment of the motorway that will connect the 
Transylvanian Motorway (Brasov) to Bucharest.1056
In conclusion, the supranational organs in Brussels reacted more aggressively to the 
Transylvanian Motorway controversy, with more sanctions than in any of the other 
cases. They could have, in theory, have gone much farther in sanctioning the Nastase 
government, possibly threatening their domestic prospects for re-election. Instead, 
they chose to resolve the conflict in other, less politically damaging, but nevertheless 
constraining ways for the Romanian Executive. If the EU supranational organs did 
refrain, it was because they chose to constrain themselves by anticipation, for reasons 
to do with their own and other EU actors’ agendas, like individual member-States’ 
interests in Romania’s accession and the EU’s geo-political interests in the Balkans, 
all of which Nastase and his Cabinet would have been well aware of.
1053 Cotidianul, Afacerea frontiera; Simonca, Cum poti sa compromiti.
1054 DG Enlargement, interview, 2006.
1055 Senior official (1), Delegation, interview, 26 June 2006.
1056 Senior official (1), Delegation, interview, 26 June 2006; Tudor Mohora (Social Democrat Party MP), 
Chamber o f Deputies, Romanian Parliament, 10 May 2005.
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The Romanian Executive’s deployment of Europe from the bottom-up in this case 
checked and balanced the top-down supranational constraints of the Commission. By 
building bridges to powerful patrons both in the member-States as well as in the 
supranational organs themselves, the Executive under Nastase constrained the power 
of the European Commission to deploy conditionality.
5.4 Civil society sweeps no stakes
It was only in January 2004 that a few Romanian civil society actors had alerted the 
Commission to the circumstances of the contract-letting.1057 Brussels’ subsequent 
criticism in February created an opportunity which Romanian civil society, until then 
dormant, pounced on in order to construct an attack on the Nastase government. The 
Romanian Academic Society (S AR) headed by Professor of Political Science Alina 
Mungiu-Pipidi was the first to react.*SAR is the main non-partisan domestic advocate 
for government accountability and against corruption. SAR had opposed the Nastase 
government from the beginning, and was to become a major contributor to the PSD’s 
defeat in the 2004 elections.1058 By exposing PSD corruption just before the 
elections, SAR together with other advocacy groups had ‘mown down entire lists of 
politicians’.1059 From SAR’s standpoint, the Motorway was just another ‘white 
elephant’ lacking any real economic justification.1060 Given how underfinanced the 
transportation sector is -  Romania spends only €400 million per year on maintaining 
and expanding its roads -  the Motorway’s final cost of €6-7 billion could have 
rehabilitated Romania’s entire road network in all rural districts, with enough left
1057 Ionita, email, 2006.
1058 Interview with Catalin Avramescu (Romanian Political Scientist) by BBC Romanian, 12 August 2006.
1059 Ibid.
1060 Ionita, email, 2006.
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over to build an additional 3,500 kilometres of national roads.1061 These criticisms 
were carried by Evenimentul Zilei and Romania Libera, but they had no discemable 
effect on the Romanian government.1062 SAR’s intervention did little more than 
‘irritate Nastase and the American embassy’.1063 By their own admission, they 
achieved nothing but to contribute to the ongoing domestic debate.1064
By calling for ‘rationality’ and ‘transparency’,1065 SAR tried to complement the EU’s 
pressures with domestic ones. They considered themselves duty-bound to act, even 
though they expected the government to ignore them. The rendering of the contract 
as a fa it accompli and Nastase’s ‘autocratic style’ both discouraged SAR from 
demanding the declassification of the contract,1066 however normal this should have 
been for an organisation whose raison d ’etre is to advocate ‘good governance’ in 
Romania. In fact, they did call for this once the PSD were ousted in favour of a 
coalition more willing to be accountable: ‘It would have been a waste of time to ask 
a government like Nastase’s to publish the contract. There have been other, simpler 
things we have asked for, which they have endlessly procrastinated. We are not so 
naive as to waste time trying to build partnerships with non-credible politicians’.1067
For that matter, they also deemed ‘hypocritical’ the EU criticism, in that ‘nobody [in 
the Commission] would have breathed a word [of protest]’ against an equally 
unaccountable contract let to a European company.1068 It is likely, then, that SAR 
jumped on the bandwagon of EU criticism strategically, utilising the opportunity to
1061 Romanian Academic Society, Criza finantarii sistemului de drumuri, February 2004.
1062 Ionita, email, 2006.
1063 Ibid.
1064 Ibid.
1065 Ibid.
1066 Ibid.
1067 Ibid.
1068 Ibid.
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harden their stance against the PSD government and bolster their reputation as a 
credible opponent to ‘the corrupt PSD’.
Other domestic civil society actors seized the EU-created opportunity: 22 NGOs 
representing journalists and various other civil society interests published a letter to 
Nicholson, Oostlander and Verheugen, pleading with them to keep up the pressure 
on the Nastase government.1069 They utilised Brussels’ criticism as an opportunity to 
scathe the PSD only months away from the elections.
As for environmental NGOs, nearly all of them reacted weakly and belatedly, even 
though a motorway project on such a scale raises some important environmental and 
cultural heritage issues.1070 The environmental values of Romanians have not yet 
been Europeanized enough for even environmental NGOs to deem motorways and 
cars ecologically destructive and thus unsustainable. Western NGOs active in 
sustainable transportation advocate shifting from motorcars and motorways to more 
sustainable practices: railways, cycling, and urban planning that reduces the need to 
travel. Such issues were not raised by any Romanian NGO in relation to the 
Transylvanian Motorway.
Even NGOs who campaign for sustainable transport, like Cyclo-Tourism Club 
Napoca, hesitated to oppose this particular motorway, except on the condition that all 
other motorways being built in Romania are also opposed within an overall policy of 
advocating sustainable transportation.1071 Cyclo-Tourism also argued that a Bechtel- 
built motorway might prove ecologically sounder than Romanian-built ones if ‘it has 
environmentally friendly tunnels and bridges and if it disrupts fewer natural habitats
1069 Radio Free Europe, 9 February 2004.
1070 Serban Orascu (Political Analyst o f Romania), Radio Free Europe, 13 December 2005; Senior official (1), 
Delegation, interview, 26 June 2006.
1071 Mititean, email, 1 November 2006.
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than any national motorway ... which seldom have environmentally friendly tunnels. 
Besides, if use of the motorway is tolled, and if the toll internalises the 
environmental cost of transportation, the overall impact may be positive’. Unlike 
the high density of motorways in the West, Romania has almost none, and so the 
issue for some of the leading NGOs was not so much whether or not motorways are 
desirable, as how the things being built can be used to reach certain goals, including 
environmental ones.1073 If environmental NGOs in Romania had shared the values of 
trans-national environmental civil society, at least those that (for example) campaign 
against the motorway network to be built under TEN, environmental bridges and 
tunnels would not have been the issue, but whether motorways are sustainable at all.
Their social construction of what economic development means, then, conditioned 
the behaviour of Romanian civil society, who chose not to take as aggressive a stance 
in the case of the Transylvanian Motorway as they had in the Rosia Montana and 
Dracula Park cases. Even though some of them knew about the Executive’s decision 
before the contract was signed the NGOs never did mobilise, unlike in Dracula Park 
or Rosia Montana. Most of them gave priority to end-of-year administrative tasks 
over any substantive issues about the Motorway.1074 And, as the Executive had 
classified the contract secret, nobody knew the hard facts of the deal anyway.1075
Environmental civil society took their first concrete steps only after the controversy
thbroke in Brussels. On the 10 March 2004 Terra Mileniul III invited environmental 
NGOs to sign a petition in opposition, which made no environmental arguments
1072 Radu Mititean (Executive Director o f Cyclo-Tourism Club Napoca), Reply to Terra Mileniul III on Letter o f  
Protest, email posted on mediu@neo.ro on 17 March 2004.
1073 Mititean, email, 1 November 2006.
1074 Ibid.
1075 Ibid.
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except that the Executive had ‘marginalised’ the environment in their decision;1076 
otherwise, the letter mostly rehearsed Brussels’ arguments.1077 Only 14 NGOs 
signed, none of them active on sustainable transportation. The response rate was 
low, and many of those who earnestly debated the petition felt they could not sign it, 
lacking the capacity to analyse the technicalities of such a large-scale project, or 
propose in the requisite detail any alternatives.1079 Even some of the signers did it 
half-heartedly, believing Romania needs motorways. For example, Alex Gota, who 
had led the anti-Dracula Park protest so successfully, confided that ‘traveling] by car 
from Sighisoara to Cluj [about 150 Km] is hell’.1080 They nonetheless signed as a 
way of protesting Nastase’s perceived autocracy.1081 As in all other cases, their 
petition was ignored by all Romanian government institutions.1082 The Commission, 
by contrast, responded, offering reassurances that it had taken positive steps to 
constrain the Romanian Executive, including keeping an eye on the Motorway’s 
compliance with the latest EU directives on Environmental Impact Assessment.
When the project reached the phase of El A consultation, very few environmental 
groups tried to influence it.1084 Cyclo-Tourism Club Napoca appears to have been the 
only one who studied the EIA documentation with a view to participating in 
decisions about the Motorway’s implementation. In endeavouring this the Club were 
constrained first by a lack of the most basic information, which the Executive either 
withheld or else had not even worked out. (For example, when the Club asked their
1076 Terra Mileniul III, Letter o f  Protest o f  the Brasov-Bors Motorway, posted on Mediu@ngo.ro, 10 March 2004.
1077 Ibid.
1078 Ibid.
1079 Bako, Mihali, ‘Nu suntem favorabili protestului impotriva autostrazii Bechtel’, email posted on 
mediu@ngo.ro. 16 March 2004; Sustainable Sighisoara Group, email posted on mediu@ngo.ro. 16 March 2004;
1080 Gota, email, 2006.
1081 Ibid.
1082 Terra Mileniul III, Report on the Brasov-Bors Motorway, (Bucharest: Terra Mileniul III, 2004).
1083 European Commission, Letter to Terra.
1084 Mititean, interview, 10 May 2006.
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local authorities for the whereabouts of the Motorway route, they were told that this 
had been decided only ‘in principle’.1085)
The Club were next constrained by the Bechtel Corporation, who snowed them under 
a blizzard of complex technical detail, far more than they could handle in the little 
time the Executive had provided for consultation. Even with their long experience of 
EIA consultation Cyclo-Tourism were overwhelmed: the documentation amounted to 
five tomes totalling 1,500 pages for Cluj County alone.1086 Such a volume of 
information would have put off any interested citizen or NGO; nobody could have 
digested it, particularly in the brief time available before the consultation was to 
begin.1087 To top it all, the Cluj authorities held -  (and if in Cluj then everywhere else 
too) -  only one copy of the EIA report, which they made available for a time period 
that could be measured in hours, inasmuch as the consultation was timetabled during 
the Easter holiday.1088 To get around this constraint, Cyclo-Tourism had to resort to 
photographing the documentation surreptitiously.1089 Such obstacles would have 
discouraged anybody minded to mobilise.1090 When finally the consultation was held, 
few ordinary members of the public turned up. As in many other cases, the 
proceedings were dominated by the authorities, who supported the Motorway.1091
The third constraint on environmental civil society was its own weaknesses. Previous 
controversies had shown that Romanian civil society is quite capable of attracting 
powerful trans-national allies, pooling sufficient resources, and organising effective 
campaigns. Although norm entrepreneurs did arise in this case, forming a hard core
1085 Mititeanu, email posted on Mediu@neo.ro. 11 Feb 2004.
1086 Mititean, interview, 10 May 2006.
1087 Ibid.
1088 Ibid.
1089 Ibid
1090 Mititean, interview, 15 September 2004.
1091 Mititean, interview, 10 May 2006.
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of opposition around which civil society at large could have rallied, they faced a 
much more formidable situation than their counterparts had in Sighisoara or Rosia 
Montana. Except perhaps for reaching out to trans-national civil society allies early 
enough, the norm entrepreneurs in this case took the same steps as their counterparts 
had in the other cases: they circulated petitions, deployed EIA law, and constructed 
EU discourses.
Attempts at mobilising trans-national allies, including reputable groups like the 
WWF, were made later, but only within the framework of ‘Coalition Natura 2000’, a 
trans-national network of NGOs keeping watch over the Natura 2000 nature reserves 
set. up by EU law. However, by 2004, due to a lack of human resources, this 
Coalition had achieved no significant success;1092 they were ‘just moving beyond the 
preparation phase’ to ‘addressing threats’ like the Transylvanian Motorway.1093 If 
only Romanian civil society had sought trans-national allies earlier on (e.g. before 
and during the EIA consultation), they might have become competent enough to 
formulate sound environmental arguments against the Motorway in time. On the 
other hand, because their supranational allies in Brussels preferred not to exercise 
most of the power they had to constrain the Executive, even a trans-national civil 
society alliance would probably have made little difference.
By contrast to the previous cases, civil society in this case was also constrained by 
the nature of the project and of the issue. They faced a project whose costs were 
diffused over all taxpayers and deep into the future, but whose benefits were more 
immediate and both highly localised and distributed along the entire length of a 
lengthy route. Essentially, any Romanian owing a car anywhere near the Motorway
1092 Email communication by the author with Erika Stanciu, World Wide Fund for Nature, 18 April 2006.
1093 Email communication by the author with Andreas Beckmann, World Wide Fund for Nature, 5 March 2006.
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stood to benefit enormously and fairly soon. The counter-resistance of such a vast 
concatenation of self-interests would have been formidable. It is not surprising, then, 
that Terra Mileniul Ill’s direct action on the Motorway route was joined by no one 
from any of the main towns along the route, except Sighisoara.1094 The attraction 
Romanians feel for good motorways was thus one the main factors discouraging civil 
society. By the norm entrepreneurs’ own admission, ‘Romanians cannot conceive of 
development without motorways, and no environmental NGO could have faced the 
general public with environmental arguments against this motorway’, even if 
corruption was involved.1095 In the cases of Dracula Park and Rosia Montana, by 
contrast, both costs and benefits had been highly localised, which meant, 
strategically, that the isolated local resistance to civil society could be overmatched 
by trans-national alliances.
Contrary to expectations, Romanian civil society did not mobilise in this case nearly 
as much as they had in Dracula Park and Rosia Montana. When they did mobilise, 
they did so primarily to exploit the opportunity presented by the critical reaction of 
Brussels for the purpose of sharpening their opposition to Nastase before the 
elections. Their mobilisation was thus opportunistic, rather than driven by moral or 
‘non-material’ values. Once they did mobilise, they deployed the usual panoply of 
Europe; viz. accession conditionality, the environmental acquis, etc. However, since 
their influence over the Executive had always piggybacked on the power of Brussels, 
the waning of this meant that domestic civil society, too, had lost its power to 
piggyback.
1094 Email communication with Ionut Apostol, Terra Milleniul III, 2 May 2006.
1095 Gota, email, 2006; Apostol, email, 2006.
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Conclusions
Romanian civil society was not empowered in the case of the Transylvanian 
Motorway: the Executive’s decisions reflected none of their values and preferences. 
Although the Commission did constrain the Executive through a funding interdict in 
the aftermath of the Bechtel contract, this constraint did not empower domestic civil 
society on the Motorway issue itself. In fact, the Commission’s sanction proved 
rather a double-edged sword. It was intended to deter the Romanian government 
(unsuccessfully as it turned out, at least during Nastase’s tenure) from ever again 
breaching EU public procurement law. On the other hand, interdicting ‘cheap 
money’ harmed every taxpayer in Romania, not excluding civil society; an outcome 
not therefore among civil society’s preferences. It may be arguable that civil society 
was empowered a little, in that the contract was renegotiated in 2006, so that at least 
one of their preferences (a cheaper motorway) came to be reflected in the final 
outcome. (This happened after this dissertation’s endpoint, however, and would have 
to be researched in its own right.)
This case illustrates the limits of accession conditionality once an accession country 
becomes assured of membership. A year before the close of the acquis negotiations, 
the supranational constraints on the Romanian Executive had become considerably 
lighter compared to what they would have been at any previous point during the 
accession process. What had been decisive at the beginning and peak of the acquis 
negotiations was the availability of the ‘carrot and stick’ of accession conditionality 
in the hands of the supranational organs, upon which both Romanian and trans­
national civil society could piggyback. The EU organs themselves depended on this 
incentive to interest the Executive in behaving in ways that would further accession. 
Their expectation that the Romanian Executive would have become socialised
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enough by the end of the acquis negotiations to comply with EU law for its own sake 
was not met. In fact, the Executive breached EU law as soon as they perceived that 
the pressure was off, showing that their values and norms have not been profoundly 
altered by the EU accession process; for if such norms had been internalised, the 
public procurement rules would have been respected for their own sakes.
The assurance of membership meant a loss of external incentive for the Romanian 
Executive to behave in ways acceptable to Brussels, tipping the balance of power 
toward the Executive and their inter-governmental allies and patrons. By the time of 
the Motorway affair, the Executive’s intergovernmental bridge-building was well 
advanced, and with it confidence of accession. This was a major factor allowing the 
Executive to break out of supranational constraints. Whether breaking out of these 
constraints was permanent or temporary can only be established by further research 
inquiring, for example, into whether or not the Commission’s ‘safeguarding clause’ 
in fact constrained the Executive. The clause was imposed at the end of this study’s 
timeframe, and potentially could have delayed Romania’s accession by a year, until 
2008, if she did not respect accession conditionality.
As in the previous case studies, the Motorway case involved the Nastase government 
in several nested games: the domestic game (1), the EU game (2), and an Atlanticist 
or American game (3). The government would benefit in the domestic and Atlanticist 
games from disobeying the EU public procurement rules (bl+b3>0), while incurring 
corresponding costs in the EU game (c2>0). In the game with the EU, on the other 
hand, they would get no benefit from disobeying EU rules (b2=0), while yet their 
disobedience would incur zero costs in the other two games (cl+c3=0). This means 
that the benefits in the non-EU games must simply have outweighed the costs in the
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EU game (bl+b3>c2) for them to have been persuaded to stick with their decision to 
build the Motorway.
This case also illustrates more strongly than the other two, that the Executive, no less 
than civil society, can construct and utilise the EU to empower itself to circumvent 
the constraints imposed on it by their very accession to the EU. This is a significant 
finding, as it suggests the incorrectness of the claim that Europe and/or the EU 
consistently empowers one side or the other in domestic political contests. Indeed, 
this case and the others, taken together, show that differential empowerment varies 
along the temporal dimension, such that once membership becomes assured, it is the 
Executive rather than civil society who is more likely to be empowered by Europe. If 
this is true of the accession endgame, then one may expect the Executive’s self­
empowerment through inter-governmental networking to continue (if not expand) 
after accession. This does not necessarily mean that Romanian civil society has been 
consigned to eternal powerlessness; they, too, will enjoy unprecedented access to 
powerful resources like the European Court of Justice upon accession.
It is noteworthy however, that the Romanian Executive on its own would not have 
been so successful in its bridge-building, had the EU not had enough of its own 
interests invested in Romania’s membership. The strategic self-interests of individual 
EU member-States, and likely other EU-wide geo-political considerations larger than 
Romania, such as stability in the Balkans, must have weighed heavily on the 
effectiveness of Romania’s bottom-up inter-govemmental networking.
From a methodological standpoint this chapter, more clearly than any of the previous
ones, illustrates the interplay between top-down and bottom-up Europeanization.
Viewing matters from the top-down, Romania’s accession to the EU created new
opportunities and constraints, regardless of whether domestic actors liked them or
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not, or were able to influence them or not. Viewing matters from the other end, 
domestic actors found ways, even under tight top-down constraints, of constructing 
and utilising Europe and the EU to empower themselves from the bottom up at their 
own initiative. This was shown by the Executive’s skilful deployment of the EU in 
parallel with their own domestic power resources, which in this Motorway case 
included the power to manipulate the timing and tempo of their acts.1096 These 
findings suggest that Europeanization may be fully understood only by taking fuller 
account of both its top-down and bottom-up dimensions, and the dimension of time.
1096 Goetz, European integration and national executives, p. 223.
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Chapter 6: General conclusions
The key research questions of this dissertation were: ‘How do domestic actors 
construct Europe?’ and ‘How do they utilise it in seeking to empower themselves 
against other actors?’ These are some of the most topical questions in the field of 
Europeanization but have so far been largely unexplored in the context of the post­
communist accession countries. This dissertation has adduced new evidence about 
constructions and utilisations of Europe gathered through in-depth case study drawn 
from domestic controversies in the post-communist Romania, a soon to be EU 
member-State. The focus was on civil society (the new social movements), which 
emerged in Romania for the first time ever after 1989, and the central government 
Executive. The study covered the period during which the EU acquis negotiations 
were negotiated under the Social Democratic government led by Prime Minister 
Adrian Nastase (2000-2004). The method was actor-centred process-tracing, best 
able to disentangle complex causal complex interactions between Europe and the 
domestic arena in ways sensitive to temporality as well as to the domestic and EU 
enlargement contexts.
This concluding chapter compares the three cases studied herein, as follows: The 
main findings are summarised in Section One. How civil society constructed and 
utilised Europe and the EU to empower themselves with basic action capacity as well 
as against the Executive will be analysed in Section Two. Section Three will analyse 
how and by whom the Executive was constrained. Section Four will analyse how the 
Executive too constructed and utilised Europe to escape or minimise these 
constraints as well as to empower itself relative to their domestic political opponents.
Before presenting the main conclusions, a short reminder of the outcome of each
case study is necessary. In Dracula Park and Rosia Montana the civil society were
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empowered relative to their main opponent, the Executive. They were differentially 
empowered because with the help of Europe they forced the Executive to do what 
otherwise it would not have done.1097 Their values and interests prevailed over the 
Executive’s. Contrary to strong Executive preference, Dracula Park was relocated 
away from Sighisoara; contrary to the Executive’s usual practice in similar cases -  
and against all expectations -  gold mining at Rosia Montana was strictly subjected to 
all EU legal requirements.
These outcomes are unprecedented in Romania’s contemporary history. Under the 
Romanian status quo the expectation would have been that the Executive, the locus 
of most important political decisions in Romania, should have unilaterally 
implemented both of these projects, paying no heed to the minority that mobilised. 
The outcomes are even more unusual given that the Social Democratic Party then in 
power also controlled Parliament and all other significant constitutional veto points. 
Furthermore, with many of its elites being former apparatchiks, they were 
unaccustomed to reckoning-in the preferences of minorities. In fact they never seem 
to have imagined that their economic development projects would offend the 
preferences of any Romanians.
The outcomes are even more surprising given that the civil society that prevailed 
consisted of a small elite of civil society entrepreneurs advocating norms and values 
alien to Romania -  Westem-style accountability, democracy and the rule of law, 
human and minority rights and environmental and cultural heritage protection. They 
had low expectations of success and acted in the teeth of the little support and even 
the hostility of the local populace. Indeed, the populace shared with the Executive 
Romanian traditional ‘proletarian values’, namely economic development at all costs.
1097 Steven Lukes, Power.
243
And yet, contrary to all these unfavourable conditions, the norm entrepreneurs 
prevailed. They prevailed not by directly pressurising or persuading the Executive, 
but by finding ways to ‘piggyback’ on European and other trans-national interveners 
more powerful than themselves and than the Romanian Executive.
These unexpected victories raised expectations of mobilisation and empowerment of 
civil society entrepreneurs in future cases where the Executive’s behaviour was out 
of touch with these entrepreneurs’ construction of how a future EU member-State 
ought to behave. The succeeding case of the Transylvanian Motorway -  the third and 
last within the timeframe of this dissertation -  disconfirmed these expectations: civil 
society mobilised feebly and only after Brussels intervened. None of their 
preferences were reflected in the final decision of the Executive, although, when they 
did mobilise, they constructed and utilised Europe in ways similar to the previous 
two cases. Most importantly, in this case, more than in the others, revealed that the 
Executive too constructed and utilised the EU to escape the supranational constraints 
on its discretion imposed by accession, the better to proceed with a domestic decision 
(building the Motorway) that would empower them over their domestic opponents 
before the elections.
6.1 The key findings
This section summarises the main findings of this dissertation. Firstly, the evidence
suggests that at least in the case of a post-Communist accession country without a
civil society tradition or a political culture of compromise and power sharing, the
Diffusion thesis is likely to be supported only at that point when the State is most
susceptible to EU influence; thereafter the leverage that accession conditionality lent
to the EU organs (and to the civil society) expires, leaving the Executive empowered.
The Executive may speed the expiry of conditionality by inter-governmental
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networking with States already members, that can indirectly shield them from 
potentially damaging supranational constraints.
The evidence thus supported two of the differential empowerment theses -  Diffusion 
and Executive Empowerment. No evidence for the Network Governance thesis was 
found pre-accession. Either Diffusion or Executive Empowerment was found to have 
happened, depending on the stage of the accession process at which domestic actors 
tried to empower themselves. The best evidence for Diffusion was found in the cases 
that occurred near the beginning and at the peak of negotiations (Dracula Park and 
Rosia Montana); whereas, the best evidence for Executive Empowerment was found 
in the case which occurred near the close of negotiations (the Transylvania 
Motorway). By then, the Executive had become assured of EU accession. With that, 
the power of EU supranational organs to constrain them -  and empower domestic 
civil society by default -  waned.
In Dracula Park and Rosia Montana, domestic civil society was empowered vis-a-vis 
an uncooperative Executive only because they piggybacked on the power of trans­
national civil society and of other international and European actors (e.g. UNESCO, 
Prince Charles). These in turn piggybacked primarily on the more powerful EU 
supranational organs which were the ones able to make the Executive constraint 
itself.
Civil society’s empowerment in two relatively marginal or ‘low politics’ cases
(Dracula Park and Rosia Montana), and their failure to have any influence in the
‘high politics’ case (Transylvania Motorway) suggests that they may have enjoyed
only a brief window of opportunity in which the Executive was sensitive enough to
EU conditionality to make some concessions on issues of (relatively) low importance
to themselves. Accession appears to have only temporarily and marginally recast the
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power relations between the Executive and the new social movements, without 
changing them fundamentally. Civil society’s victories, although remarkable in the 
Romanian context, seem to have amounted to little against the overall background of 
‘business as usual’, where the age-old ‘gulf between the State and civil society 
persists. Accession appears not to have transformed this pre-existing pattern -  
although post-accession research should be carried out to corroborate this conclusion.
Secondly, contrary to the claim in the East Europeanization literature that the 
accession process empowers the Executive,1098 the evidence gathered in this research 
shows that the process has generally constrained the Romanian Executive’s 
discretion, at least up to the point when EU membership became assured. Indeed, 
participation in the EU before this point had the opposite effect to Executive 
Empowerment. The Executive was so powerful within Romania already that any 
other actors’ participation in policy-making, however slight, constituted a constraint 
on their autonomy. One constraint, accession conditionality, proved time-bound and 
transient. Other constraints, like those provided in the acquis, are likely to impose a 
weaker but more enduring constraint on Executive discretion -  although this is 
merely a hypothesis awaiting further empirical investigation.
Nevertheless, despite their discretion being generally constrained, the Executive was 
able to minimise this top-down (and other) constraints imposed from the bottom up 
by domestic civil society entrepreneurs. They did so by using Europe as well as their 
own domestic power resources. This was self-empowerment, inasmuch as 
minimising constraints is empowerment.
The processes that led to executive empowerment here are different from the
1098 e.g. Grabbe, How does Europeanization affect CEE governance?
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mechanisms propounded by Moravcsik. Indeed, only one of his four mechanisms 
appears to be operative pre-accession -  the construction of discourses aimed to 
legitimise the Executive’s domestic decisions ‘in the name of Europe’. The ‘inter- 
govemmentalism’ that was observed here was different from that featuring in the 
West Europeanization literature. Excluded as an accession country from EU councils 
and from the ‘constitutional’ bargaining between EU member-State executives and 
so lacking opportunity to bargain inter-govemmentally from an equal position, the 
Romanian Executive resorted to cultivating patrons bilaterally. These patron-client 
relationships were driven not only by Romania’s strategic interests but also by those 
of certain senior member-States with a strategic interest in Romania’s accession.
In spite of these differences Moravcsik’s thesis proved a useful heuristic device, 
however, in that the source of Romanian Executive empowerment stood out more 
clearly by contrast to his mechanisms. Moravcsik’s Central Executive Empowerment 
thesis is likelier to be observed after Romania’s accession. Then the Executive will 
be able to bargain inter-govemmentally from a position equal to the other EU 
member-States (unless the Romanian Executive continued to be constrained after 
accession by the patron-client relations they built in pre-accession and, likely in the 
beginning, by their own incognizance of how the EU works).
Thirdly, on the point of winners and losers as between the Executive and the new 
social movements, neither all civil society actors nor all Executive actors were 
empowered or constrained (respectively) by Europe. Power was so centralised under 
the Social Democratic Party, that the constrained faction comprised only a few party 
power-brokers and their inner circle of advisers. Likewise, on the side of civil society 
the empowered comprised only an elite minority of domestic and trans-national norm 
entrepreneurs who mobilised against a background of passivity. They were
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empowered because they cherished values that chimed with those of the European 
interveners, but clashed with those of the more traditionalist Romanian civil society 
and indeed the majority of the public. This much larger faction of civil society thus 
found themselves constrained by Europe. The very numerous ‘losers’ have not been 
researched, and yet the case studies do suggest that accession is creating social 
cleavages in Romania, just as in other newly acceded countries.1099 The exact nature 
and extent of this phenomenon stands in need of further investigation.
Fourthly the kind of the differential empowerment outcomes observed has depended 
on the pre-existing pattern of relations between the State and civil society. The stark 
language of ‘civil society’s victories’ or ‘the Executive loses’ characterising the 
outcomes in the case studies reflects the zero-sum nature of State-civil society 
relations in Romania. Although the following claim may overstretch the empirical 
evidence, the likelihood is that the new social movements are more likely to seek 
empowerment through Europe when the government is dominated by the centre-left 
(the ex-Communist Social Democratic Party), which tends to be friendly to trade 
unions but hostile to these movements. When the government coalition in power is 
less hostile, they might well try solving their problems through Romanian 
institutions. This latter point has in fact been observed in Romania under the centre- 
right, which is friendlier to civil society, as they have depended to some extent on 
them to win the elections. Nevertheless, this conjecture, however experienced, ought 
to be empirically investigated further.
The zero-sum nature of the differential empowerment outcomes observed in Dracula 
Park and Rosia Montana contradicts one of the claims in the literature about 
domestic winners and losers. According to Thatcher (2004), in the senior EU
1099 e.g. Featherstone, Cyprus and the Onset o f  Europeanization, p. 149.
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member-States the EU rarely creates ‘complete’ winners and losers.1100 This claim 
has not held true in Romania, and maybe not in any post-Communist country 
characterised by mutual hostility between State and civil society.
Lastly, no evidence was found supporting Network Governance. Evidence was rather 
found in favour of its critics, in particular in favour of Elite Empowerment, the claim 
that the EU empowers the elites of both civil society and the State. If the Network 
Governance thesis is stretched to cover trans-national as well as domestic 
networking, the evidence found in Romania is one of emerging governance networks 
of a trans-national rather than of a domestic type. The Motorway case revealed that 
trans-national networks were woven not only between Romanian civil society and 
trans-national civil society and supranational organs, but also between the Romanian 
Executive and Executives of EU member-States, and even between Romanian 
political parties in opposition and their counterparts in the European Parliament. As 
the three case studies herein have shown, such trans-national alliances can prove 
formidable resources for domestic actors, and can even tip the domestic balance of 
power. While this phenomenon calls for further research, it seems plausible that 
actors in Brussels and Romania with similar interests or ideologies have a mutual 
interest in weaving governance networks and that the networks that have been 
developed in the pre-membership phase will carry over after Romania’s accession.
6.2 How civil society constructed and utilised Europe
In this section the evidence of the case studies concerning how Romanian civil 
society constructed and utilised Europe to empower themselves domestically is 
synthesised. The main finding is that, before domestic civil society can constrain a
1100 Thatcher, p.287.
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hostile Executive through Europe three conditions must be in place. First, civil 
society must construct a misfit between the domestic status quo and their 
understanding of Europe, which will motivate them to mobilise for redress. Second, 
they must acquire basic action capacity to construct EU discourses from the bottom 
up and utilise top-down opportunities created by accession in ways that actually 
bring constraining pressure to bear on the Executive. Third, they must not be 
confronted with insuperable opposing veto points.
The social construction of Europe by domestic actors underlies and conditions their 
utilisation of it. Merely by wanting to be in the EU, Romanians had already 
constructed it as a desirable alternative to the domestic status quo. For most 
Romanians, the EU is nothing but a superior pathway to material well-being. A small 
cultural elite, however, has arrived pre-accession at constructing Europe as a 
community of more than material values. They have come to identify themselves 
with a Europe of shared values and norms alien to Romania for most of its history: 
democracy; respect for the rule of law; protection of human, minority and civic 
rights; protection of environmental and cultural heritage. It is by contrast with this 
construction of Europe that both domestic and trans-national civil society came to 
perceive a ‘misfit’ between Romanian Executive behaviour and EU norms. This 
construction of the EU as superior to the Romanian State has galvanised them to seek 
ways of bringing the Romanian State in line with it. Without such a priori 
constructions the domestic civil society entrepreneurs would likely have missed out 
on their opportunities to utilise it to achieve their domestic goals.
The finding that domestic civil society must acquire basic action capacity to avail 
themselves of Europe against a hostile Executive verifies the claim in the 
Europeanization literature, that domestic actors need ‘basic competences’ to exploit
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the EU.1101 In the case of Rosia Montana, for example, the local founders of 
Albumus Maior were unable to construct the ‘right’ kind of Europe before Western 
norm entrepreneurs supervened. What was missing were basic cognitive (not just 
material) resources, without which they were incompetent to utilise the EU by 
themselves. Absent Western supervention, the likelihood would have been that 
Albumus’s campaign against the gold mining would have failed, Europe never 
having heard of it.
In all cases, basic action capacity was acquired with the help of trans-national civil 
society1102 or of already initiated domestic actors. These ‘supporting institutions’1103 
can empower even the weakest grassroots opposition to tap Europe to the full. 
Despite its purported agenda of developing civil society in Eastern Europe, Brussels 
actually played no role in empowering domestic civil society at this most basic level 
-  in all of the cases studied. Even the top-down opportunities that Bmssels expressly 
designed for domestic civil society’s use (e.g. El A law) lay unexploited until trans­
national and a few Romanian norm entrepreneurs brought the necessary material and 
cognitive resources that empowered the local protestors to utilise the EU law.
Once made aware of the possibilities of using the EU to empower themselves and 
empowered with basic action capacity, civil society may proceed to exploit them in 
full. One of the most pervasive utilisations proved to be the construction of 
discourses featuring the EU. Civil society discourses had two main functions. When 
addressed to the Executive, they were ‘disciplinary’,1104 and were expressed through 
implicit or explicit threats of non-accession and through references to EU authority
1101 Risse, Green Cowles and Caporaso, Europeanization and Domestic Change.
1102 On the same note see also Sidney Tarrow, Power in movement: social movements and contentious politics 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
1103 BOrzel and Risse, Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact.
1104 Radaelli and Schmidt, Conclusions.
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over the Romanian government. When addressed to other actors, the discourses were 
‘mobilising’, and were expressed through references to EU norms and values. In 
most cases, civil society constructed an ‘ethical’ EU that stood in contrast to the 
Executive’s ‘economic’ EU.
Much less utilised in the pre-accession phase was the top-down opportunity of that 
EU law which had already been transposed into domestic legislation. In the first 
place, civil society heeded EU law only if it supplied needs of their own. In Rosia 
Montana, once provided with material resources to employ legal experts, Albumus 
Maior proved competent enough to utilise the transposed acquis in the Romanian 
lawcourts. They were not observed to construct EU law as a ‘special’ opportunity. 
They incorporated it into their strategies and resorted-to alongside domestic law, 
without paying much attention to whether a legal rule came from Brussels or not. 
They were only preoccupied with whether it advances their goals. The latter point is 
cmcial to the question of whether civil society mobilises around EU law. In the 
Transylvania Motorway civil society resorted to it primarily by featuring it in their 
discourses. Since even the most committed environmentalists in Romania counted 
motorways one of their needs, most civil society actors ignored the possibility of 
mobilising and using it to influence the implementation of the motorway.
When they did mobilise to utilise the EU law, the success ultimately depended less 
on their own competence and more on the strength of their domestic opponents. In 
the Motorway case, for example, those civil society actors who did resort to the EU 
law of Environmental Impact Assessment could not overcome the strength of the 
Bechtel Corporation. Bechtel’s financial power and technical excellence permitted 
them to produce an EIA report of such voluminous technical detail that overwhelmed 
Romanian civil society. (By contrast, the permit application of Rosia Montana Gold
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Corporation was amateurish, and constituted a much easier target for the norm 
entrepreneurs.)
Veto points may be socially constructed where none actually exist. For example, 
would-be opponents of the Transylvanian Motorway constructed in the Romanian 
public an irresistible adversary who would never tolerate it being cancelled, even 
though the public itself showed no signs of mobilising. The opponents reasoned that 
too many Romanians stood to gain from the motorway, unlike the few thousand 
miners of Rosia Montana or the local populace of Sighisoara. Even more subtly, both 
the Romanian public and civil society may well have been influenced in their 
acceptance of the Bechtel contract by the worldwide social construction of Bechtel as 
the ‘Rolls Royce of building companies’. Gabriel Resources, by contrast, was 
constructed as a dodgy penny-stock run by a drug dealer, a negative image that 
probably influenced not only civil society’s opposition but also the Executive’s 
decision to postpone the project. Social constructions thus can contribute to 
incentivising or inhibiting actors’ behaviour.
A domestic government that resists Europeanization is a crucial ‘veto point’ capable 
of constraining any civil society actors who promote EU norms and values. The way 
in which the State implements the transposed EU law can stultify its potential to 
empower civil society to participate in governmental decisions. In theory, EU law, 
once transposed, has the effect of pushing a State toward more inclusion of civil 
society in decision-making. In practice, however, the case studies show that the 
Romanian government under Nastase remained ever-ready to shut out their civil 
society opponents. In this, they utilised their domestic power resources which they 
controlled. Dracula Park was decreed by Emergency Ordinance, bypassing the 
procedures that mandated public consultation. Even after domestic law had been
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fully harmonised with the EIA Directive, the Executive (interlocked with the Bechtel 
Corporation) ‘vetoed’ civil society in the Motorway case by withholding timely 
information about it prior to the EIA consultation over it.
The domestic government, however, cannot control all of the opportunities that the 
EU makes available to domestic civil society. The Romanian Executive had no 
control over Romanian civil society’s utilisation of the EU actors and organs. The 
resort to Brussels proved to be the most important top-down EU opportunity that 
actually brought about civil society empowerment over the Executive. Domestic and 
trans-national civil society availed themselves extensively of DG Environment and 
DG Enlargement in the Commission, and of Green and left-wing MEPs in the 
Parliament, whom they perceived as sharing the same values. They resorted to EU 
supranational organs without any specific invitation from Brussels, and regardless of 
whether these organs liked it or not.
Indeed, resort to them from the bottom up was more frequent than resort to top-down 
opportunities like EU funding or law. This may be due to relatively lower 
‘transaction costs’: petitioning MEPs or the Commission, unlike bringing lawsuits or 
qualifying for funding, requires insignificant material resources. Cognitive resources, 
on the other hand, were requisite for even the most basic utilisation of EU organs. 
Incognizance at first prevented Albumus Maior from communicating at all with 
Bmssels or with anyone beyond Romania. They were incapacitated by having never 
in the first place socially constmcted any kind of State-civil society relationship with 
the EU. On their own, Albumus likely ‘projected’ onto Europe (lacking any 
experience to the contrary) their pre-existing social construct of the Romanian State. 
They would have taken for granted that the EU organs, like the Romanian State, 
would ignore their pleas. Such a construct would have strongly inhibited any idea of
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utilising Europe strategically. No domestic actors are likely to overcome inhibitions 
like this unless ‘initiated’ into alternative social constructions of State behaviour by 
others.
In the end it was the intervention of EU supranational actors that (in tandem with 
other European actors like Prince Charles and the Hungarian government) proved 
crucial to the empowerment of Romanian norm entrepreneurs and their trans-national 
allies. The merit of civil society entrepreneurs was to put the contested issues on 
these more powerful actors’ agenda -  which in itself is a subtle but high-leverage 
form of power.1105 The entrepreneurs used their bottom-up discursive construction of 
a misfit between the Romanian Executive’s behaviour and EU norms and values to 
motivate these supranational interventions. The supranational actors, and not civil 
society, proved to be the only ones powerful enough to oblige the Executive to 
constrain themselves. In sum, Europe in general and the EU in particular have indeed 
created new opportunities and resources for Romanian civil society, which the latter 
have utilised to empower themselves relative to their domestic opposition, the 
Executive in this case.
To conclude, before they resort to Europe to empower themselves, domestic norm 
entrepreneurs had first to perceive the availability and benefit of Europe to their own 
interests. Their motivation to utilise Europe sprang from their construction of a misfit 
between the EU and domestic norms and values. Before domestic actors proceed to 
utilise the EU they must have basic capacity to act or what the literature calls 
‘supporting institutions’.1106 In the East European context, where ‘supporting 
institutions’ are largely absent domestically, civil society must be (or at least are far
1105 Lukes, 1974.
1106 Bflrzel and Risse, Conceptualizing the domestic impact; Risse, Green Cowles and Caporaso, pp. 11-12.
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likelier to be) ‘initiated’ by trans-national entrepreneurs. Once initiated, domestic 
civil society’s success in utilising the EU to change the status quo in line with their 
constructions of the EU depends on the domestic veto points they face.
Domestic veto points like the government may still constrain civil society’s 
utilisation of those elements of Europe which have penetrated the domestic scene, the 
clearest example of which has been EU law. The Romanian government, however, 
has not been able to ‘veto’ civil society’s construction of discourses -  although, as 
the next section will show, they can neutralise it with counter-discourses. More 
importantly, the government is not able to prevent norm entrepreneurs from lobbying 
powerful international and European actors and organs. These are a source of power 
for domestic civil society that is outside of their government’s control. It was this 
source of power which domestic civil society were able to use to obliged the 
Executive to constrain itself in two cases out of three, thus empowering themselves 
by default.
6.3 How the Executive became constrained
The Executive was constrained in all of the cases studied. The nature of the 
constraint, however, varied. The Executive mostly constrained itself in Dracula Park 
and Rosia Montana; in the Motorway case, by contrast, they threw off self-constraint, 
yet were unable to avoid the constraint imposed by the Commission.
In Dracula Park and Rosia Montana civil society empowerment through Executive 
self-constraint is best explained by a combination of Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier’s ‘external incentives model’ with a model of the socialisation and
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internationalisation of new identities1107. The Executive abandoned their pet project 
Dracula Park in Sighisoara with great reluctance. They were constrained -  more 
precisely they constrained themselves -  only after coming to believe that their 
reputation and credibility with Brussels and/or with the British government might be 
damaged. They feared that, as a consequence, they might experience accession which 
might set back Romania’s membership of the EU.
Similarly anxious to avoid upsetting their relations with Brussels and the Hungarian 
government, the Executive constrained themselves in the Rosia Montana case as 
well. The support of the Commission and of the Hungarian government was 
necessary to ensure a smooth and timely accession to the EU. But here they 
constrained themselves with less reluctance than in Dracula Park, as they perceived 
the gold mining project’s material and political benefits to them to be smaller and 
more speculative.
In both cases the uncertainty not merely of accession but of the date of it was a factor 
which the Executive took account of in their cost-benefit calculations. The fact that 
accession itself and its timing were a determinant in explaining the Executive’s 
behaviour resonates with the ‘external incentives’ model. The Executive constrained 
themselves, giving in to the EU norms and values advocated by the opposition, 
because they calculated that the prospective costs of ignoring or breaching these -  
the sanction of delayed accession to the EU -  outweighed the prospective benefits (to 
themselves) of pursuing the projects. Executive self-constraint was achievable, 
however, bnly because of their desire to accede to the EU, and because of the 
conditionality attached to that desire. This appears to be the bedrock foundation of
1107 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, Governance by conditionality.
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civil society empowerment over the Executive, at least in the case where the 
Executive resists the kind of Europeanization that civil society and Brussels promote.
Nevertheless, in both cases, motive forces other than EU conditionality also modified 
Executive behaviour, contributing to the tipping the domestic power balance. These 
did not originate in the EU centre in Brussels; they would be better imputed to 
‘Europe’ at large. In the Dracula Park case the Executive socially constructed Prince 
Charles as a personal friend with whose importance and prestige they wished to be 
identified. Similarly, in Rosia Montana, key Executives including the PM himself 
were influenced by their newly cemented friendship with the Hungarian Social 
Democrat government. These findings suggest that sociological factors like 
internalisation of values and identities may also explain Executive self-constraint. 
Civil society empowerment then would depend not only on accession conditionality 
but also on the Executive’s social relationships with European actors together with 
whom they had constructed an identity of some sort.
It is thus astonishing, prima facie, that the Executive should have flouted their 
commitments to the Commission in order to let the Transylvanian Motorway contract 
without a public tender. The Commission’s reaction could have caused significant 
domestic political damage, if for example the Commission had refused to close 
acquis negotiations on schedule. The Nastase government’s behaviour is hard to 
account for except on the theory that, having been given a firm accession date by the 
European Council, they had interpreted it to mean they had ‘crossed the bridge’ to 
membership; and that this in turn meant ‘immunity’ to accession conditionality. The 
perception that conditionality had expired then altered their calculation of the cost- 
benefit differential across the domestic and EU ‘games’ they were engaged in; it 
constituted a loss o f ‘external incentive’.
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Nevertheless, this latter outcome cannot be fully understood without reckoning-in the 
point that such a calculation depended on the Nastase government’s confidence in 
their interpretation of the implications of the accession date. Such confidence most 
probably stemmed from their social relations with the Executives of certain member- 
States. The date itself was a mere datum but the interpretation that Romania would 
actually accede on this date regardless of breaching EU rules in the meanwhile, was a 
construct of the Nastase government. It rested on a prior construction between 
Romania and its ‘patrons’ in the EU that Romania was as good as ‘in’. The 
Romanian Executive’s behaviour was also influenced by their interpretation of what 
their inter-governmental networking could do for Romania.
Moreover, by the time the Motorway controversy emerged, the Romanian Executive 
had learnt enough about the EU’s workings to know how to avoid inflicting 
irreparable damage on themselves. Their socialisation within EU Executive circles 
had already prompted them to draw bad as well as good lessons from the behaviour 
of other Executives, including the lesson of how to get around EU rules. Such 
constructs and such lessons were then ‘brought home’ to a rational calculation about 
a domestic motorway. This example strengthens the claim that not only ‘external 
incentives’ but also ‘lesson-drawing’ and socialisation with other Executives are 
necessary to fully account for the outcome.
The rational choice dimension of Executive behaviour is perhaps best captured by 
Tsebelis’s ‘nested games’ concept, which posits the simultaneous engagement of the 
actor in several rationalist games on several ‘levels’ or political arenas. In all of the 
case studies the Romanian Executive was engaged in games in arenas other than the 
domestic one (whether they always knew it or not), the configuration of games being 
slightly different in each case. In all cases they were playing the ‘EU game’.
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Additionally, they were playing an ‘international game beyond the EU’, which in the 
Dracula Park case involved the UN and the Prince of Wales; in Rosia Montana a 
bilateral international game with the Hungarian government; and in the Motorway 
case a similar game with the Americans. When the Nastase government was still new 
to office (in Dracula Park), they appeared to be ‘absentee’ players in the games 
external to Romania, at least when it came to relatively minor domestic policy issues. 
They were soon made aware, however, that they were no longer playing a single 
domestic game that they controlled, but several other games which they did not 
control. By the time of the Motorway case, they had already become skilled at 
playing multiple games and even winning.
The reasoning above shows that the empirical evidence gathered in the course of this 
research supports Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s three models of explanation, but 
also that there is more to Europeanization than these explanations. Their ‘social 
learning’ model, for example, focuses rather narrowly on domestic actors’ 
identification with the ethical norms and values espoused by the EU. There is little 
evidence, in the case of the Romanian Executive, that any such norms and values 
were internalised in the pre-accession phase; they constructed the EU as a material 
exploit, not as a community of moral values to be lived up to for their own sakes. 
What mechanistic models leave out is the possibility that domestic actors might 
identify with the EU or Europe in other ways, and in their own ways. In general one 
might identify with any sort of ‘European community’ that one might construct with 
one’s domestic peers -  a construct likely heavily shaped by past conditioning and 
actors’ identities. In the case of the Romanian Executive, they seem to identify more 
with powerful and prestigious EU member-States, from which they sought 
recognition and acceptance, than with any abstractions like ethical norms or values.
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Insights into such phenomena are more clearly revealed by a 
constructivist/sociological perspective, which thus adds much depth to rational 
choice analyses.
The case studies have indeed revealed evidence of ‘lesson drawing’, Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier’s third explanatory model. Although they do not clarify what the 
difference is between ‘social learning’ and ‘lesson drawing’, the latter seems to be an 
act that one does unilaterally; whereas, both social construction (if that is what 
‘social learning’ is) and rational gamesmanship must be at least bilateral. The 
Executive (as well as civil society) was observed to draw lessons from experiences of 
the EU and to deploy them in public discourses aiming at self-empowerment. It is 
noteworthy that the lessons drawn reflected not only the best but also the worst 
practices of EU member-States, as well as of other European and non-European 
trans-national actors. In Dracula Park, for example, the Executive referred to worst 
practice by other EU member-States -  flouting the UN World Heritage Convention -  
to justify their neglect of the Convention, but also to best practice by successful 
international tourism operators to justify Dracula Park. In the Motorway case they 
cited core EU member-States who had also circumvented EU public procurement 
rules. Worst-practice or best-practice lessons were drawn ‘rationally’, depending on 
which ones best served their strategic goals. The finding that the lessons drawn might 
not necessarily be best practice is missing in the East Europeanization literature, 
which has largely assumed uncritically that the accession candidates always learn the 
best lessons from Europe.
Although the above clearly show the benefit of combining rational choice and 
constructivist/sociological insights, some might argue that the results obtained from 
an exclusively rational choice nested games type of analysis would reach the same
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conclusion, whether or not the insights of constructivism and sociological 
institutionalism are factored in. However, such a claim would ignore the fact that the 
Executive’s moves in all games depended on their social constructs and lessons 
drawn from socialising with other Executives. Basic terms of the rational calculation 
in any game are not only set by rational calculation but also by perceptions and social 
constructions of reality, and the evidence herein shows that the Romanian Executive 
is no exception.
Moreover the conclusions of a rational choice analysis depend on the values the 
Nastase government assigned to the various costs and benefits facing them, and these 
could be imputed to them only ex post. For example, the costs of defying Prince 
Charles, as perceived by the Nastase government, proved far higher than any 
(Western) researcher would have been likely to have predicted ex ante. Ex ante there 
was little reason to expect Prince Charles would exert so much influence over the 
Romanian Executive as in fact he did, for in Britain he is generally dismissed as 
powerless and rather unimportant.
Thus, without a constructivist/sociological take on the story, a nested-games analysis 
and Schimmelfenning-Sedelmeier’s model cannot fully account for any of the actors’ 
behaviour, including the Nastase government’s. All actors relied critically on 
perceptions, interpretations or constructions of reality that preceded their rational 
calculations and choices, decisively influencing their strategic moves. For example, 
the evidence shows that the EU supranational organs, in the midst of plying an 
external incentives strategy, overstepped it in ways not accounted for by top-down 
models. These models do not tell the whole story of how Commission personnel sent 
informal and ambiguous ‘signals’ which obliged the Nastase government to ‘read 
between the lines’; how these signals were ‘decoded’ at the receiving end by all
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domestic actors involved; how such informal signals affected these actors’ 
behaviour; how the interpretations may have deviated from the meanings Brussels 
intended to send; and how all of these phenomena affected the Executive’s and all 
other domestic actors’ cost-benefit calculations. The Executive’s perceptions were, 
however, also influenced by the discourses of domestic and trans-national norm 
entrepreneurs, and by the signals and acts of the interveners from Europe and 
beyond. Above all, for Romanian civil society to have been empowered, the 
Executive must have constructed the EU -  their relation to it, and how the EU might 
react to their moves -  in ways pre-susceptible to domestic and European pressures; 
otherwise, these pressures could not have exerted any motive force to alter Executive 
decisions.
Such insights coming from a sociological investigation as revealed through detailed 
process-tracing proved indispensable in explaining the outcomes. The actors’ 
perceptions and interpretations are crucial to any full explanation of Europeanization, 
and all the more so in the context of Eastern Europe, where actors’ perceptions of 
reality may be in many ways starkly different from that of Western Europeans (due 
to their conditioning under socialism as well as under a post-Socialist environment of 
scarcity in all resources). Yet positivist, top-down models gloss over the importance 
and the unpredictability (at least in detail) of these empirical realities.
6.4 How the Executive constructed and utilised Europe
The evidence of the case studies shows that the Executive no less than civil society
may utilise Europe to empower themselves. Whatever the constraints that had been
imposed on them, whether triggered by civil society or generally by accession, the
Executive always found ways of minimising if not breaking free of them. They did
not tolerate a ‘zero’ outcome for themselves in the ‘zero-sum games’ that Dracula
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Park and Rosia Montana devolved into. In both cases they started up new games, 
albeit reactively, in order to get back their own, resorting to European as much as 
domestic power resources. By contrast, in the Motorway case, the Executive pro­
actively incorporated Europe into their strategy of slipping the EU constraints 
standing in the way of commencing the Motorway before the elections. In this way 
they were endeavouring to empower themselves not so much against civil society as 
against their political party opponents.
In the Dracula Park affair they utilised PriceWaterhouseCooper as a face-saver to 
maintain their legitimacy and as a blame-shifter to escape legal liability. Minimising 
constraint is a form of empowerment, even when, as in this case, the outcome was 
not reversed in the Executive’s favour. It is ironic that the idea of PWC was 
suggested by the very Romanian expatriates (trans-national civil society) who were 
fighting to keep Dracula Park out of Sighisoara. This shows, that like the civil 
society, the Executive too might be initiated by trans-national civil society actors into 
new ideas about how they might empower themselves through Europe. In this sense 
even the Executive, not only civil society, may be empowered by trans-national civil 
society entrepreneurs.
Similarly, in the Rosia Montana case the Executive resorted to the proposal of a 
commission of European experts to advise them how to proceed on the 
environmental permit -  an idea that appears to have been suggested by a Green MEP. 
They utilised it in hopes of dumping responsibility on the European Commission and 
‘the experts’, which they thought would enhance their credibility and burnish their 
external image before EU member-States. After this plan failed, senior career civil 
servants and the Environment Minister still succeeded in empowering themselves by 
using the opportunity of EU law transposition so as to diffuse decisional
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responsibility for the Rosia environmental permit (and for future permits of similar 
kind) from them to the entire government. This diffusion of responsibility together 
with the newly transposed EU laws and the newly ratified international convention 
(under the stimulus of accession) had the effect of increasing the number of veto 
points that would have to approve the permit for Rosia, making it more likely that the 
decision would not be approved as easily as if only one ministry decided. This 
increase in veto points might have the unintended effect of empowering domestic 
civil society in opposition.
In the Motorway case, the Executive, although in theory their discretion was 
constrained by EU public procurement rules, deployed their domestic power 
resources (including timing and tempo) to throw off the constraint. Even after the 
Commission intervened to constrain them further, the Executive still managed, by 
prior networking with EU member-State Executive elites and supranational 
politicians (e.g. the Enlargement Commissioner) to limit what the Commission was 
able to do to constrain them.
In minimising constraints, the Executive, like civil society, constructed and utilised 
discourses featuring the EU, and quickly integrated these into their domestic panoply 
of power resources and strategies. Their initial bargaining position having been so 
much stronger than civil society’s, it might have been expected that they would not 
have needed to construct such discourses. That they did do nonetheless reflects the 
gradual erosion of their plenary discretion (the legacy of Communism) by the 
accession process. This gradual erosion left its traces on the cases studied, as may be 
seen by examining them in chronological order. In the first case of Dracula Park, the 
Executive were so supremely confident that they hardly referred to the EU or to 
Europe at all. In Rosia Montana and particularly in the Motorway cases they soon
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reached for EU discourses to help roll back opposition and to forestall it, 
respectively.
The Executive proved adept at utilising EU discourses to legitimise themselves and 
to disempower actual or anticipated challengers, especially by resetting the terms of 
public debate. In the Motorway case they endeavoured to disempower their critics 
with EU discourses meant to shift the debate away from the controversial issue of 
corruption (for lack of public tender) onto economic development and higher 
standards of living -  what almost every Romanian cares about the most. Featuring 
the EU was deemed to enhance the appeal of these discourses, making it easier to 
rally public opinion to their side.
The mere fact that the Executive have been obliged by circumstances to construct 
discourses featuring the EU is evidence that something fundamental has changed for 
them. Had they never felt constrained, but remained as supremely confident as at 
first, they hardly would have taken the trouble to justify themselves in this way. This 
is thus further evidence that the accession process has constrained Executive 
discretion, increasing their need for Europe to legitimise their actions.
The content of these discourses opens a window onto the Executive’s most
fundamental values, of which the dominant ones proved to be materialistic,
economic-developmental values that stood in contrast to those of the new social
movements (at least in Dracula Park and Rosia Montana, if not in the Motorway
case). The discourses also reflected their beliefs about Europe and about their
relation to it: the fact that they had constructed Europe as a ‘strategic’ opportunity or
resource to be exploited for material gain. The Executive hardly conceived of Europe
as a community of ‘softer’ values, norms and principles that are to be respected even
when they conflict with development. The Executive proved willing and ready to
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imitate the EU’s worst -  as well as best -  practices, depending on what worked for 
them. In this vein, Executive discourses often reflected the ‘Delaware effect’ (or 
‘race to the bottom’): they cited the worst practices of the best (in Romanian eyes) 
member-States in order to legitimise dodging the better practices favoured by civil 
society or decreed by Brussels. In the Dracula Park and Motorway cases, for 
example, they held up France and Germany as examples of those who successfully 
breached international law and EU law, respectively, in order to legitimise 
themselves in doing likewise.
A diachronic trend is observable across the case studies in the Executive’s discourses 
featuring the EU toward higher frequency and sophistication. There is little evidence 
of the EU in their discourses in the first case, Dracula Park, except for a few 
documentary references to EU ecological standards. The scantiness of the EU in this 
case might be explained by Executive unawareness or confident indifference, and (as 
they had been out of power for four years) by their want of learning how they could 
utilise such discourses to advantage, even on relatively minor issues like Dracula 
Park. By contrast, their discourses in the last, Motorway case abound with references 
to the EU. By now they had become more adept at deploying ‘Euro-speak’ and more 
aware of its advantages. That the Romanian Executive knew how to utilise the EU to 
legitimise even decisions that Brussels itself publicly disapproved of, is evidence of 
at least strategic social learning.
To sum up, during the process of Romania’s accession to the EU, only a minority of 
Romanian civil society elites and central Executives constructed or utilised Europe to 
empower themselves. Self-empowerment was always aimed at gaining relative 
advantage over domestic opponents. In this they constructed and utilised both 
material and cognitive resources that sprang at least in part from the EU and/or
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Europe, and in part from Romanians’ own hopes, expectations and needs. Their 
reaching out to Europe was always driven by their own interests and perceptions. 
These were implicitly shaped by their pre-existing conditioning under Romanian 
Communist (and likely pre-Communist) as well as post-Communist institutions. The 
fact that both actor-collectives utilised Europe strategically for purposes of self­
empowerment shows that they behave just as ‘rationally’ as their counter-parts in the 
West.
Finally, that evidence was found supporting two mutually contradicting 
empowerment theses (Diffusion and Executive Empowerment) illustrates the 
importance of studying differential empowerment over a longer period of time, and 
of paying attention, not to one actor only but also to other actors involved in a given 
domestic political game. Only by going beyond the first instance of Europe’s 
differential empowerment of civil society, and inquiring into how the Executive 
responded to the ensuing constraints was it possible to evidence how capable the 
Executive is of turning the tables on civil society and their allies, and counter- 
constructing and counter-utilising Europe, deploying it in tandem with its own 
domestic power resources. Not just civil society but the Executive, too, learnt over 
time which ways of resorting to Europe are the best for empowering themselves. 
They may be expected to become all the more adept once contact and socialisation 
within the EU intensifies upon Romania’s accession in January 2007. Thus, by virtue 
of tracing not only how domestic civil society utilised Europe to constrain the 
Executive, but as well how the constrained Executive utilised Europe to minimise the 
constraints, this dissertation has gone beyond previous East Europeanization 
research.
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What will happen after Romania’s accession? Although a civil society minority was 
empowered over the Executive for a brief period in two marginal cases, the 
Romanian Executive also proved capable of breaking free of civil society and of 
trans- and supranational constraints, utilising their domestic power resources as well 
as Europe to undermine the empowerment of their opponents. If this was so pre­
accession, what will happen after Romania’s accession? Will Executives find in the 
EU new resources to empower themselves to escape domestic and supranational 
constraints? Will the new social movements come out ahead? Or will domestic 
power relations be recast more fundamentally? Will the EU, for example, foster co­
operation between Executive and civil society elites, as the Network Governance 
thesis predicts, but for which no evidence was found pre-accession? These are key 
questions awaiting further study.
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ANNEX 1: Interviewees
1. Ionut Apostol, Project Co-ordinator, Terra Mileniul III, Bucharest, 3 
September 2004; 2 May 2006.
2. Lavinia Andrei, Director, Terra Mileniul III, Bucharest, 11 July 2003.
3. Andreas Beckmann, Deputy Director, WWF International, Danube 
Carpathian Programme, 5 March 2006.
4. Anamaria Bogdan, Programme campaigner, Greenpeace in Romania, 23 
August 2005.
5. Raimonda Boian, Spokeswoman for Emil Boc, Leader of the Democratic 
Party, Cluj, 16 March 2006.
6. Sherban Cantacuzino, ICOMOS expert to UNESCO, London, 3 January 
2006.
7. Bogdan Chiritoiu, Councillor to President Traian Basescu, 15 March 2005.
8. Dimitrie Clepan, former Director, Alba Environment Protection Agency, 11 
June 2005.
9. Doina Constantinescu, senior civil servant, Environmental Department, 
Industry Ministry, Bucharest, 12 July 2003.
10. Zeno Cornea, founder member, Albumus Maior, Rosia Montana, 4 February 
2006.
11. Eugen David, President, Albumus Maior, 28 June 2005.
12. Ioana Derscanu, Task Officer Civil Society, Delegation of the European 
Commission Bucharest, Bucharest, 2 September 2004.
13. Jessica Douglas-Home, Chair, Mihai Eminescu Trust, London, 2 January 
2006; 12 April 2006; 26 May 2006
14. Mercedes Echerer, former Green MEP for Austria, 5 October 2005; 15 
December 2005; 16 June 2006.
15. Hermann Fabini, architect and former National Liberal Party Deputy, Sibiu, 
16 December 2005.
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16. Hans Bruno Frohlich, Head Priest of the Evangelical Church, Sighisoara, 14 
December 2005; 13 January 2006.
17. Alex Gota, former Sustainable Sighisoara President, Sighisoara, 10 December 
2005; 5 January 2006; 9 January 2006; 24 January 2006.
18. Maria Hambasan, Romanian judge, Bucharest, 14 February 2006.
19. Petr Hlobil, Campaigns Coordinator, CEE Bankwatch Network, 7 December
2005.
20. Affodita Iorgulescu, Professor, Romanian Academy of Economic Studies, 
Bucharest, 8 November 2005.
21. Sorin Ionita, Research Director, Romanian Academic Society (SAR), 
Bucharest, 18 March 2006.
22. Judit Kacso, Program coordinator, Pro-Europe League, Targu Mures, 7 April
2006.
23. Viorel Lascu, Director European Integration, Oradea County Council, 14 July
2003.
24. Petre Lificiu, former Environment Minister (2000-2004), 17 June 2005.
25. Andra Mihalcioiu, member of Romania’s Negotiations team, Bucharest, 16 
June 2006.
26. Dumitru Mihu, Former Civil Servant, the Ministry of the Environment in 
Romania, Bucharest, 14 July 2003.
27. Radu Mititean, Executive Director, Cyclo-Tourism Club Napoca, 15 
September 2004; 10 May 2006.
28. Sabin Muresan, Programme Coordinator, The Romanian Institute for Peace 
Action, Training and Research (PATRIR), 31 August 2005.
29. Dolores Neagoe, Task Officer Civil Society, Delegation of the European 
Commission, Bucharest, 2 September 2004.
30. Codruta Nedelcu, geologist and environmentalist, ARIN, 13 September 2005; 
10 February 2006.
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31.Arie Oostlander Member of the European Parliament, Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Brussels, 11 April 2006.
32. Oana Penu, Project Coordinator, Regional Environmental Centre for Central 
and Eastern Europe, Bucharest, 3 September 2004.
33. Nicolae Popa, National Liberal MP, 13 December 2005.
34. Crai Pompiliu, MinVest Director, Rosia Montana, 26 August 2005.
35. Adrian Popescu, Romanian journalist, 15 July 2003, Sibiu, Romania.
36. Laszlo Potozky, Director, Environmental Partnership Foundation, 22 
September 2005.
37. Nicolae Ratiu, Pro Patrimonio, London, 13 June 2006.
38. Stephanie Roth, Campaign Manager, Albumus Maior, 7 July 2005.
39. Mechtild Rossler, Chief, Europe & North America UNESCO World Heritage 
Centre, Paris, 11 December 2005.
40. Herwig Schuster, Greenpeace in Central and Eastern Europe, 12 September
2005.
41.Ionut Sibian, Project Co-ordinator, Civil Society Development Foundation, 
12 September 2004.
42. Jonas Sjostedt, Green Member of the European Parliament, Environment 
Committee, 7 July 2005.
43. Erika Stanciu, WWF International, Danube Carpathian Programme, 18 April
2006.
44. Elena Stefanescu, civil servant, Ministry of European Integration, Department 
for the Relation with the Public and NGOs, Bucharest, 12 July 2003.
45. Anca Tofan, Director, Regional Environmental Centre for Central and 
Eastern Europe, Bucharest, 14 July 2003.
46. Gelu Trandafir, former BBC Romanian journalist, Bucharest, 24 February 
2006.
47. Michaela Turk, Public Relations Officer, Dan Danesan, Mayor of Sighisoara, 
6 February 2006.
48. Florin Vasiliu, legal expert, Centre of Support for Non-Governmental 
Organisations (CENTRAS), 12 July 2003.
49. Wolfgang Wittstock, President of the German Democratic Forum, Sibiu, 14 
December 2005.
Anonymised interviewees
1. Former senior civil servant, Romanian Environment Ministry, 11 November 
2005; 3 June 2006.
2. Former senior official, Romanian National Agency for Mineral Resources, 22 
December 2005.
3. Former Secretary of State Environment Ministry, 11 October 2005.
4. Task Officer, European Commission Delegation, Bucharest 13 July 2003.
5. Senior official, European Commission Delegation, Bucharest (1), 10 May 
2006; 26 June 2006.
6. Senior official, European Commission Delegation, Bucharest (2), 12 April
2006.
7. Senior official, Negotiations team, Bucharest.
8. DG Enlargement, European Commission Brussels, 1 July 2005; 13 April
2006.
9. DG Environment, European Commission Brussels, 6 July 2005; 7 June 2006.
10. Former Task Officer for Romania, DG Environment, European Commission, 
Brussels, 5 July 2005
11. Vice President Rosia Montana Gold Mining Corporation, 20 September 
2005; 23 September 2005; 4 February 2006.
12. Former Vice President Rosia Montana Gold Mining Corporation, 11 April 
2005; 30 September 2005; 11 October 2005; 2 February 2006.
13. Former Director, Rosia Montana Gold Mining Corporation, 4 July 2005.
14. County Councillor, Social Democrat Party Sibiu, 20 April 2003.
273
15. Personal Communication with research officer, Regional Environmental 
Centre for Central and Eastern Europe, Bucharest, 14 July 2003.
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